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FREEHOLD BOROUGH, Plaintiff, v. WNY PROPERTIES L.P./POST & COACH, Defendant. FREEHOLD BOROUGH, Plaintiff, v. POST & COACH FREEHOLD ASSOC., Defendant.
DOCKET NO. 003027-2000, DOCKET NO. 001877-2002
TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
May 8, 2003, Decided
DISPOSITION:
[*1] Defendants' motion to dismiss municipality's complaint denied.
CASE SUMMARY
| PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff municipality sought increases in the assessments of certain real property for two tax years. Defendants, the property's owners, moved for summary judgment dismissing the municipality's complaints. |
| OVERVIEW:
Prior tax appeals as to the property were settled by assessing the property at a certain amount. The property was then sold for a greater amount, so the municipality appealed the assessment. Under N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1(a), the Uniformity Clause, all property had to be assessed according to the same standard of value. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, the Equal Protection Clause, protected an individual from state action subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class. The owners claimed the municipality's decision to appeal the property's assessment violated these provisions. Selecting the property for appeal was not the equivalent of assessment and taxation, for purposes of the Uniformity Clause. An appeal would result in an assessment by the court bringing the ratio of assessed to true value of the property to the common level of the taxing district, effectuating the Uniformity Clause. The municipality's selection of this property for appeal did not violate the Uniformity Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, as it was not shown that the appeal would result in an assessment which would bear unequally on persons or property of the same class. |
| OUTCOME:
The owners' motion to dismiss was denied. |
LEXISNEXIS HEADNOTES:
assessor, municipality, ratio, revaluation, subject property, reassessment, municipal, taxing district, spot, taxation, uniformity, sales price, true value, tax year, underassessed, valuation, lower limit, discriminatory, revised, county board, summary judgment, fair value, sale price, apartment, assessed value, disparity, favorable, township, assessed valuation, governing body
LEGAL TOPICS: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Governments, Real & Personal Property Law, Tax Law
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DESERT PALACE, INC., DBA CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO, PETITIONER v. CATHARINA F. COSTA
No. 02-679
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
April 21, 2003, Argued
June 9, 2003, Decided
NOTICE:
[*1]
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version.
PRIOR HISTORY:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9th Cir. Nev., 2002)
DISPOSITION:
Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
| PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Respondent former employee sued petitioner employer, alleging sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. A jury rendered a verdict for the employee and awarded her damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, en banc, reinstated the district court's judgment, finding that the district court did not err in giving a mixed-motive instruction. Certiorari was granted. |
| OVERVIEW:
The employee presented evidence that (1) she was stalked by a supervisor, (2) she received harsher discipline than men, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors stacked her disciplinary record and used or tolerated sex-based slurs against her. The district court gave the jury a mixed-motive instruction and rejected the Secretary's objection, which claimed that the employee had failed to adduce "direct evidence" that sex was a motivating factor in her dismissal. The Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury. Under 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(m), the employee only had to "demonstrate" that the employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to any employment practice; therefore, the employee did not need to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction. The employee only needed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice. |
| OUTCOME:
The Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. |
LEXISNEXIS HEADNOTES:
direct evidence, mixed-motive, motivating, sex, circumstantial evidence, employment decision, preponderance, gender, affirmative defense, heightened, played, employment practice, illegitimate, unlawful employment practice, matter of law, impermissible, Civil Rights Act, substantial factor, lawful, disparate treatment, sex discrimination, national origin, order to obtain, circumstantial, conventional, evidentiary, persuasion, warehouse, religion, color
LEGAL TOPICS: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law & Procedure, Governments, Labor & Employment Law
