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| Chaplinsky v. N.H., No. 255,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 9, 1942, Decided
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Overview: Appellant was convicted under a New Hampshire statute, N.H. Pub. Laws ch. 378, ¿ 2, for using offensive language towards another person in public. Appellant contended that the statute was invalid under U.S. Const. amend. XIV because it placed an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech and because it was vague and indefinite. In affirming the lower court's decision, the court noted that there were certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which had never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem, such as "fighting" words. The lower court declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve public peace, and in appellant's case, the forbidden words were those that had a direct tendency to cause acts of violence. Furthermore, the word "offensive" was not defined in terms of what a particular addressee thought, it was defined as what reasonable men of common intelligence understood as words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. The court held that the statute was narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of the state power.
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| Skinner v. Oklahoma, No. 782,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1942, Decided
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Overview: Defendant claimed that the act violated the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court held that the act failed to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that defendant was convicted of larceny and that the act treated larceny and embezzlement, intrinsically the same crime and punishable in the same manner, the same except for the sterilization provision. The equal protection clause did not prevent a legislature from recognizing degrees of evil, and the constitution did not require things different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. However, where legislation laid an unequal hand on those who had committed the same quality of offense, the equal protection clause would be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn. The crimes of larceny and embezzlement rated the same terms of fines and imprisonment, but when it came to sterilization the pains and penalties of the law were different, which made for invidious discrimination against groups of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.
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| Ex parte Quirin, Nos. 1-7,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 31, 1942, Decided. Per Curiam decision filed, July 31, 1942. Full Opinion filed, October 29, 1942.
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Overview: Petitioners, eight German-born U.S. residents, were captured by the United States, as they tried to enter the country during war time, for the purpose of sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations under the law of war. The President of the United States held that petitioners were to be tried before a military tribunal under the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.S. ¿¿ 1471-1593. Petitioners challenged the President's authority, arguing that under the U.S. Const. art. III, ¿ 2, amends. V and VI, petitioners had a right to demand a jury trial at common law in the civil courts. The court found that petitioners were alleged to be unlawful belligerents, and that under the Articles of War, they were not entitled to be tried in a civil proceeding, nor by a jury. The court also determined that trying petitioners before a military court was not illegal and did not violate the U.S. Const. amends. V and VI relating to "crimes" and "criminal prosecutions." Thus, the court affirmed the President's authority to try petitioners before a military tribunal without a jury.
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| Wickard v. Filburn, No. 59,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, November 9, 1942, Decided
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Overview: Appellee farmer filed a complaint against appellants to enjoin enforcement against himself of the marketing penalty imposed by amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (Act), 7 U.S.C.S. ¿¿ 1281 and 1340, and seeking a declaratory judgment the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act applicable to him were unconstitutional. The district court held that the agriculture secretary's speech advocating quotas had invalidated the required referendum of farmers affected by the quota. The district court enjoined collecting a marketing penalty from appellee and from subjecting appellee's entire crop to a lien for the payment of the penalty and from collecting a penalty. The Court determined that the secretary's speech did not have the effect of invalidating a referendum. Appellee's complaint was found frivolous and injunction unwarranted. The Court also found that the Act amendment was not violative of U.S. Const. amend. V. Appellee was not denied due process by a penalty being imposed because government regulation was by an authorized act of Congress and was within its commerce powers. The judgment of the district court was reversed.
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