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| Morissette v. United States, No. 12,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 7, 1952, Decided
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Overview: The government had property, used as a bombing range, on which private citizens extensively hunted deer despite signs posted stating "keep out." After an unsuccessful hunting trip, petitioner removed spent bomb casings from the property under the belief that the property was abandoned and considered of no value by the government, and salvaged the casings for $ 84. Petitioner was charged with unlawfully and knowingly stealing and converting government property, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. ¿ 641. At trial, petitioner testified that the casings were taken with no wrongful or criminal intent, but the trial court ruled felonious intent was presumed by petitioner's act of taking property. The trial court refused to submit to the jury the question of whether petitioner acted with innocent intention. The Supreme Court extensively reviewed the requirement of culpable state of mind and held that the mere omission from ¿ 641 of any reference to intent would not be interpreted or construed as elimination of intent from crimes enumerated in ¿ 641. The Court stated that when intent was an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence was a question of fact that was to be submitted to the jury.
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| Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., No. 85,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1952, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner, a nonresident of Ohio, filed suit against respondents, including respondent incorporated foreign mining company. The mining company had been carrying on a limited but continuous and systematic part of its general business in the state . Petitioner's cause of action did not arise in Ohio and did not relate to the company's activities there. At issue was whether the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Const. amend. XIV precluded Ohio from subjecting a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts in an action in personam. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the company's continuous and systematic in-state activities, including directors' meetings, business correspondence, banking stock transfers, and payment of salaries, were enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject the company to proceedings in personam, at least insofar as the proceedings sought to enforce causes of action related to those very activities or to other activities within the state. As such, it did not violate federal due process for Ohio to either take or decline jurisdiction of the company.
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| Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, No. 744,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 2, 1952, Decided
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Overview: On the eve of a strike against certain steel companies, an executive order was issued directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the nation's steel mills. The steel companies obeyed the orders but brought proceedings against the government, charging that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision. The district court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the government's continued seizure and possession of the mills, and the court of appeals stayed the injunction. Certiorari was granted. The Court found that a final determination of the constitutionality of the order was proper. The Court held that the presidential power exerted here could not be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power nor under the several constitutional provisions that granted executive power. The seizure could not stand because Congress had the exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed.
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