 |
|
 |
|
|
Access State and Federal Case Law, plus U.S. Supreme Court cases — for free!
Click on any of the case links below to view the full text of that case — for free — through lexisONE®, a legal research and news service from LexisNexis®. Login is required — registration is free!
While viewing the full text of the case, select from upgrade options to Shepardize® or view the fully-featured case on lexis.com including Core Terms, Shepard's® Signals, Case Summaries, Print Options, and more. lexisONE offers access to comprehensive content and flexible services for faster, more efficient legal research. Review our flexible LexisNexis® subscriptions offered through daily, weekly or monthly research packages.
| Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, No. 11,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 21, 1966, Decided **Together with No. 37, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., and No. 43, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co., also on certiorari to the same court.
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Two appeals were consolidated to review the validity of patents in light of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C.S. § 103, which provided that in determining the patentability of a device it was necessary to consider not only its novelty and utility, but also its obviousness to one of ordinary skill in the art. The court affirmed a circuit court judgment in favor of respondents in petitioners' plow clamp patent infringement suit, and reversed a decision affirming judgment for respondent, who brought cross actions for infringement of its sprayer patent in petitioners' consolidated declaratory judgment suits. On appeal, the court held that § 103 placed an emphasis on the factor of obviousness but did not lower the level of patentable invention. The court then examined the patents in question in light of the prior art and determined that the plow clamp patent in the first case was invalid because there were no operative mechanical distinctions, much less nonobvious differences in petitioners' device, and the sprayer patent in the second two cases was also invalid because its invention rested on small, nontechnical differences in a device that was otherwise old in the art.
|
|||||
| United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, No. 243,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 28, 1966, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The employee was awarded compensatory and punitive damages in an action against petitioner union for alleged violations of federal law governing unfair labor practices. The employee brought his action in federal court in connection with a state court action for unlawful conspiracy and unlawful boycott. The suit stemmed from the conduct of union members, who, through violent means, forcibly prevented the opening of a mine operation supervised by the employee. The Court held that even assuming pendent jurisdiction was proper in the case, reversal was required due to the employee's failure to meet special proof requirements imposed by federal law, which required proof that the union ratified the acts of its members. The Court held that while the union members acted in a way that was reprehensible, there was no proof that the union approved of the violent methods. The mere fact of continued picketing at the mine site was not properly relied upon to show ratification. Actual proof existed that the union put a stop to it as soon as it became aware. Therefore, the ruling of the appellate court was reversed.
|
|||||
| Miranda v. Ariz., No. 759,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 13, 1966, Decided **Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No. 584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February 28-March 2, 1966.
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of three cases, and affirmed the fourth. When an individual was taken into custody and subjected to questioning, theprivilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized. To protect the privilege, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Effective waiver required that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Presuming waiver from a silent record was impermissible.
|
|||||
| Schmerber v. Cal., No. 658,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1966, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Petitioner contended that the drawing of his blood for an alcohol analysis test without his consent denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and his right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state court affirmed the conviction and petitioner sought review. The Court upheld petitioner's conviction. It held that the privilege against self-incrimination protected an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or to otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis did not involve compulsion to these ends. The Court also held that the record showed no violation of petitioner's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, because the arresting officer could have reasonably concluded that the delay in obtaining a warrant could result in the destruction or disappearance of evidence and because the test was conducted in a reasonable manner.
|
|||||
Back to Top
| www.lexisnexis.com | About LexisNexis | Terms & Conditions | Customer Support | Contact Us |
| Copyright® 2009 LexisNexis , a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. |
