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| Chapman v. Cal., No. 95,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 20, 1967, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners were convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a bartender. During the jury trial, the prosecutor repeatedly made reference to the fact that petitioners' did not testify, inferring it was a sign of guilt. Reversing the appeal court affirmance of the convictions, the Supreme Court held that the "machine-gun repetition of a denial of the constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version of the evidence worthless," was not harmless error. In determining what constituted harmless error, the Court asked whether there was a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. The Court found that the prosecutors' tactics had affected substantial rights of petitioners. Therefore, the Court overturned the convictions and remanded the case for a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences.
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| In re Gault, No. 116,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 15, 1967, Decided
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Overview: The lower court affirmed the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by appellant parents of a 15-year-old boy, who was committed as a juvenile delinquent until he was 21 by a juvenile court. The child was taken into custody after a female neighbor complained of lewd phone calls, while he was still subject to a six months' probation order as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had stolen a wallet from a lady's purse. On appeal, the Court disagreed with the lower court's conclusion that the child and his parents received due process. The delinquency petition was in general terms, and it was not served on the child or his parents. In addition, the child and his parents were not notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel. The child had been denied the rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the juvenile court hearings because the complaining neighbor was not called as a witness, and the privilege against self-incrimination was not observed because the child's confession was obtained out of the presence of his parents, without counsel, and without advising him of his right to remain silent.
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| Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, No. 39,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 22, 1967, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners appealed a judgment, which dismissed their complaint that challenged regulations issued by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. Petitioners argued that the Commissioner had exceeded his authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act), 21 U.S.C.S. § 301 et seq., by requiring labels, advertisements, and other printed matter to designate the established name of a drug every time its trade name was used. The dismissal was based on a holding that pre-enforcement review of rules was precluded by the Act, and because no case or controversy existed and no relief was available under the Administrative Procedure Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Supreme Court held there was no explicit statutory preclusion of pre-enforcement review and no persuasive reason to conclude Congress intended to preclude such review. The Court held that the controversy was ripe for adjudication where the legal issues presented were fit for judicial resolution and the challenged provisions of the Act imposed an immediate change in petitioners' conduct, with serious penalties for noncompliance. Accordingly, judgment dismissing petitioners' complaint was reversed.
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| Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, No. 480,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 29, 1967, Decided
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Overview: The inmate was convicted of armed robbery. Items of his clothing, including a cap, jacket, and trousers, were seized during a search of his home and were admitted into evidence without objection. After unsuccessful state court proceedings, the lower court granted habeas corpus relief to the inmate, finding that the clothing was improperly admitted into evidence because the items had evidential value only and were not subject to seizure. On appeal by the warden, the Supreme Court found that neither the entry of the inmate's home nor the search for him without a warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of the case, the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. The Court further found that the seizure of clothing occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with the inmate's arrest, as part of an effort to find a suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. Finally, the Court found that the seized clothing matched the description of those worn by the robber and the police could have reasonably believed that the items would aid in the identification of the culprit.
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| Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, No. 37,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1967, Decided **Together with No. 150, Associated Press v. Walker, on certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2d Supreme Judicial District.
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Overview: The Court reviewed two cases to consider the impact of its decision that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press required a federal rule that prohibited a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proved that the statement was made with "actual malice" on libel actions instituted by persons who were not public officials, but were "public figures" involved in issues in which the public had an important interest. The Court concluded that these libel actions could not be left entirely to state libel laws, unlimited by any overriding constitutional safeguard, but that the rigorous requirements of the Court's decision regarding public officials was not the only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake. The Court held that a "public figure" who was not a public official could also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, whose substance made substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct that constituted an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.
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| Loving v. Va., No. 395,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1967, Decided
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Overview: Appellants were indicted on charges of violating the state's ban on interracial marriages. After their conviction, appellants took up residence out-of-state and instituted a class action requesting that Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-58 and 20-59, the state antimiscegenation statutes, be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which had affirmed appellants' convictions and had upheld the constitutionality of the statutes. The Court rejected the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications was enough to remove the classification from the U.S. Const. amend. XIV's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations and held there was no legitimate overriding purpose which justified the classification. The Court found that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violated the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and deprived appellants of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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| Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., No. 343,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1967, Decided
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Overview: The parties had entered into the agreement after the corporation purchased the assets of the company's paint business. After the corporation failed to make the first payment due under the agreement the company served notice to arbitrate. The corporation filed suit seeking rescission of the entire agreement on the basis of fraud allegedly consisting of the company's misrepresentation that it was solvent and able to perform the agreement while it was completely insolvent. The company moved to stay the court action pending arbitration. The company contended that whether there was fraud in the inducement of the consulting agreement was a question for the arbitrators. The district court granted the company's motion with the court of appeals affirming. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the agreement was tied to the interstate transfer of the assets it affected interstate commerce and was within the coverage of the Act; (2) the arbitration clause in the agreement was separable from the rest of the agreement; and (3) allegations as to the validity of the agreement in general, as opposed to the arbitration clause in particular, were to be decided by the arbitrator.
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| United States v. Wade, No. 334,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1967, Decided
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Overview: The employees of a robbed bank identified respondent in a lineup that had been conducted without counsel being present. At trial, the employees pointed to respondent when asked to identify the robber. Respondent was convicted, but the court of appeals reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial, excluding the courtroom identifications. The court of appeals concluded that the lineup violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. The Court remanded the action to the court of appeals to enter a new judgment vacating respondent's conviction, until a hearing could determine whether the in-court identifications had independent origins. The post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the proceedings, so respondent was entitled to have his attorney present. Based on the record, the Court could not determine whether the courtroom identifications should be excluded. Evidence had to be presented as to whether the in-court identifications were based on observations or the lineup.
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| Katz v. United States, No. 35,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 18, 1967, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At the trial, the government was permitted, over defendant's objection, to introduce evidence of defendant's end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls. A court of appeals, in affirming his conviction, rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV because there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a person in a telephone booth could rely upon the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV. One who occupied a telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll that permitted him to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world. The Court determined that the government agents ignored the procedure of antecedent justification, which was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in the case.
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