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| Spinelli v. United States, No. 8,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 27, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. The warrant was granted by a magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had observed defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a confidential reliable informant had informed the authorities that defendant was operating a gambling operation. On certiorari, the court found that the application for the warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's information. Also the affiant-officers failed to support their claim that their informant was "credible" or his information "reliable." The bald assertion that defendant was "known" as a gambler was entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision and the Court rejected as imprecise the "totality of circumstances" approach embraced by the court of appeals. Thus, the affidavit fell short of providing probable cause as necessary to support the issuance of the search warrant.
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| Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 21,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Respondent school officials suspended petitioner students from public high school because they wore black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. Petitioners sued respondents under. The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding the constitutionality of respondents' action on the ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent the disturbance of school discipline. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed because the wearing of armbands was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those that participated in it. Petitioners' conduct was closely akin to pure speech which was entitled to comprehensive protection under the, absent facts that might reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.
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| Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, No. 42,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 10, 1969, Decided
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Overview: On the afternoon of Good Friday, 52 African-Americans were led out of a Birmingham church by three ministers, one of whom was the petitioning minister. They walked in orderly fashion, two abreast, for four blocks, in order to protest the alleged denial of civil rights to African-Americans in the city. The marchers stayed on the sidewalks except at street intersections, did not interfere with other pedestrians or automobiles, and did not disobey traffic signals. The city police stopped the marchers and arrested them for violating Birmingham, Ala., General Code § 1159. The minister was convicted for violating § 1159 and was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment at hard labor and an additional 48 days at hard labor in default of payment of a $ 75 fine and $ 24 costs. The Court reversed the minister's conviction, holding that the city authorities clearly indicated to the minister that under no circumstances would he and his group be permitted to demonstrate, not that a demonstration would be approved if a time and place were selected that would minimize traffic problems. It was evident that the ordinance was administered so as to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly.
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| Boykin v. Ala., No. 642,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 2, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was charged with common-law robbery. He pleaded guilty to the five indictments against him, and the trial court entered his plea of guilty. A jury was convened for sentencing, pursuant to Ala. Code, tit. 15, § 277 (1958), and the jury sentenced defendant to death. On automatic appeal, the state supreme court affirmed the judgment, holding that a death sentence for robbery was not cruel and unusual punishment. On further appeal, although the issue of voluntariness of the plea had not been raised below, the court chose to consider the issue under the plain error doctrine as stated in Ala. Code, tit. 15, § 382(10) (1958). The court reversed defendant's conviction because the record contained no showing that his guilty plea was voluntary. An affirmative showing of voluntariness on the record was necessary in order to conclude that defendant had waived his constitutional rights.
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| Brandenburg v. Ohio, No. 492,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 9, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan and was convicted by the Ohio courts after a television news report was aired broadcasting speeches made by petitioner. He was charged with violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13, which made it unlawful, inter alia, to advocate crime or methods of terrorism or to voluntarily assembly with any group to teach or advocate doctrines of syndicalism. His conviction was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The United States Supreme Court granted review and concluded that, because Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute did not draw a distinction between teaching the need for force or violence and preparing a group for violent action, the statute unconstitutionally intruded on the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Const. amends. I and XIV. As a result, the Court reversed petitioner's conviction because the statute upon which his conviction was based was unconstitutional.
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| Powell v. McCormack, No. 138,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 16, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner challenged the U.S. House of Representatives' refusal to allow him to take his seat in the 90th Congress by voting to expel him by a two-thirds vote after the 89th Congress found him guilty of filing deceptive travel expense reports and making illegal salary payments to his wife. The parties agreed that petitioner met the standing qualifications for election to Congress set forth in U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. The Supreme Court held that (1) the case was not mooted by petitioner's being seated in the 91st Congress; (2) congressmen named as defendants were immune from suit under the Speech or Debate Clause of U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, but congressional employees named as defendants were not immune; (3) the 90th Congress's denial of membership to petitioner was an exclusion, not an expulsion; (4) the judiciary had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit; and (5) the case was justiciable rather than barred by the political question doctrine. The court remanded with instructions to issue a declaratory judgment in favor of petitioner.
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| Chimel v. Cal., No. 770,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Police came to petitioner's home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. When petitioner returned from work, police arrested him. Police then asked for permission to "look around." Even though petitioner objected, the officers conducted a search. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. Police seized a number of coins and medals, among other things, that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of burglary. Reversing the appeals court's affirmance of conviction, the court held that the search was "unreasonable." It found that there was no justification for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurred. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not appropriate. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper, and the court overturned the conviction.
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| Miranda v. Arizona,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
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