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| Goldberg v. Kelly, No. 62,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 23, 1970, Decided
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Overview: The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the district court that only a fair hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits satisfied due process. The procedures used by the commissioner in terminating welfare benefits required notice of termination and a review by a local welfare official, allowed a recipient to make a written statement to demonstrate why benefits should not be terminated, and further allowed a fair hearing after termination. On review the Court held that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing to produce an initial determination of the validity of the termination was necessary to satisfy procedural due process. The Court found that especially with welfare recipients who lacked independent resources, termination of benefits while the issue was being decided deprived recipients of the very means necessary to live. The Court noted that the need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence adversely affected the ability to seek redress from the termination, and the protection of due process outweighed the expense of a pre-termination hearing and continued benefits pending decisions.
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| In re Winship, No. 778,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 31, 1970, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner appeared on a juvenile's behalf at his adjudicatory proceeding to determine his delinquency. The juvenile had been charged with committing acts that, had they been done by an adult, would have been larceny. The juvenile court made its determination based on a preponderance of the evidence presented, relying on N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act ¿ 744(b), and ordered him to a training school for 1 1/2 years, with possible extensions to his 18th birthday. The Supreme Court found that the same concerns that led to the establishment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal matters were no less evident in a juvenile proceeding, and particularly in this case where the juvenile was charged with an act that rendered him liable to confinement for up to six years. The Court rejected respondent city's argument that delinquency adjudications were not convictions and would have no effect on his citizenship rights or privileges. The Court acknowledged that the underlying policy of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation, but that none of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process would be compromised by adopting the higher standard of proof.
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| Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., No. 79,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1970, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner, a white person accompanied by six young Negroes, brought an action against respondent restaurant under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 for an alleged violation of her Equal Protection rights under U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The suit arose out of respondent's refusal to serve lunch to petitioner and petitioner's arrest upon departure from the restaurant on a vagrancy charge. The lower court affirmed the directed verdict for respondent and held that petitioner could not prove she was refused service pursuant to a custom of the community, enforced by the state, to refuse service to whites in the company of Negroes nor could she prove a conspiracy between respondent and police. The court reversed and held that petitioner could make out a claim under ¿ 1983 if she proved that respondent refused her service because of a state-enforced custom of segregating the races in public restaurants. The court held that respondent failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact, especially in its failure to foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the restaurant who reached an understanding with respondent's employee that petitioner not be served.
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| N.C. v. Alford, No. 14,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, November 23, 1970, Decided
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Overview: A judgment reversing the denial of appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that a guilty plea in a murder case was made involuntarily because its principal motivation was fear of the death penalty was vacated and the case was remanded. Appellee testified in state court that he did not commit the murder but chose to plead guilty to avoid the threat of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that appellee would not have pleaded guilty except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty did not show that the plea did not result from a free and rational choice, especially where appellee was represented by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would be to appellee's advantage due to the great weight of the evidence against him. According to the Court, the standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea was whether it represented a voluntary and intelligent choice among the available alternatives. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea shown by the State and appellee's clear desire to enter it despite his professed innocence, the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting the plea.
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