|
|
| |
Access State and Federal Case Law, plus U.S. Supreme Court cases —
for free!
Click on any of the case links below to view the full text of that case —
for free — through lexisONE®, a legal research and news service from LexisNexis®. Login is required — registration is free!
|
| |
Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - February 24 - June 22, 1972
|
| |
Giglio v. United States, No. 70-29,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Defense counsel asked a witness on cross-examination if any promises of leniency had been made, and the witness falsely answered no. The prosecution represented that no such promises had been made. Upon learning that a promise not to prosecute the witness had in fact been made, defendant moved for a new trial based upon the newly discovered evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. On certiorari, the Court reversed and remanded because the prosecution's failure to disclose the promise of leniency to the witness was an issue affecting credibility, which was therefore material. The suppression of material evidence violated due process and warranted a new trial whether it resulted from the prosecution's negligence or deliberate deception.
|
|
| |
Eisenstadt v. Baird, No. 70-17,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 22, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Appellant was convicted of, among other things, giving vaginal foam to an unmarried woman at the close of a lecture, a violation of Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 272, ? 21. The district court dismissed appellant's petition for habeas corpus relief, but the circuit court vacated the district court's order, and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. The Court affirmed the circuit court's order. Appellant had standing to assert the rights of unmarried people to access the contraception because he served as an advocate for this third-party right. In so ruling, the Court emphasized that the reason for giving away the foam was to test the statute. Then, the Court held that the state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. There was no rational reason for the different treatment of married and unmarried people. The right of privacy to be free of unwanted intrusions into the fundamental decision of whether to have children was the same for married and unmarried alike. The Court rejected appellee's argument that the distinction was health related, noting that unmarried persons had as great an interest in avoiding the spread of harmful diseases.
|
|
| |
Stanley v. Ill., No. 70-5014,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 3, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: In a dependency proceeding by the State, the children of plaintiff unwed father were declared wards of the State. Plaintiff appealed from the order, claiming that he had never been shown to have been an unfit parent and that he had been deprived of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The state supreme court held that plaintiff could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the children's mother, who was deceased, had not been married. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding that the State's interest in caring for plaintiff's children was de minimis if plaintiff was shown to be a fit father. The Court held that plaintiff was denied equal protection of the law because all parents were constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children were removed from their custody. Thus, plaintiff, as an unwed father, was also entitled to a hearing.
|
|
| |
SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON, No. 70-34,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 19, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Defendant federal forest service and a private corporation sought to develop part of a national forest into a ski resort and recreational area. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the development contravened federal laws for the preservation of national forests and seeking a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff claimed standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. ? 701 et seq. The trial court granted the injunction and found plaintiff had standing where plaintiff alleged statutory authority was exceeded. The appellate court reversed, denied the injunction, and held plaintiff lacked standing where it failed to allege development would affect plaintiff's members. Plaintiff appealed. The Court affirmed, holding an injury in fact required more than an injury to a cognizable interest and required the party seeking review be injured himself. Where plaintiff failed to allege development would injure it or its members, plaintiff lacked standing.
|
|
| |
Wis. v. Yoder, No. 70-110,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 15, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The parents were convicted of violating the state's compulsory public school attendance law. The parents practiced the Amish and Mennonite religions and argued that sending their children to public school after the eighth grade violated their religious beliefs and threatened their religious way of life. The state supreme court reversed the convictions. On certiorari review, the Court found that the parents' fundamental religious belief that they should remain "aloof from the world" was endangered by the enforcement of the public education laws. Although neutral on its face, the compulsory school attendance law unduly burdened the Free Exercise Clause. The parents educated their children at home in practical pursuits and prepared them to become functioning adults in their communities. The court held that accommodating the parents' religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education would not impair the physical or mental health of the child, result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from societal welfare.
|
|
| |
Kastigar v. United States, No. 70-117,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 22, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury. Petitioners refused to answer questions, asserting their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, despite a grant of immunity proffered by respondent, the United States. Petitioners contended that the scope of immunity was less broad than the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. On review, the court held that the immunity provided by respondent left the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The immunity therefore was coextensive with the privilege and sufficed to supplant it. The court held that petitioners had been offered both use immunity and immunity from transactions arising from the testimony (transactional immunity), therefore, petitioners could be compelled to testify. The judgment of the appellate court compelling petitioners to testify was therefore affirmed.
|
|
| |
Adams v. Williams, No. 70-283,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner sought review of a judgment that granted respondent's petition for habeas corpus relief and reversed his convictions for illegal possession of a handgun and heroin. On certiorari, the Court reversed. The Court first ruled that the initial forced stop of respondent's car was justified because the officer had received a tip from a known informant, who had provided the officer with information in the past, that respondent was in a car nearby, had a handgun concealed at his waist, and was carrying narcotics. Thus, the Court ruled that the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the stop of respondent. From that, the Court ruled that the officer, having a reasonable belief that respondent was armed and dangerous, made a permissible limited protective search for the weapon at respondent's waist, despite the fact that the weapon was not visible from the exterior of the car. Having seized the weapon, the officer was provided with probable cause to arrest respondent for its possession; the subsequent search incident to arrest, which produced the narcotics that formed the basis for respondent's heroin conviction, was therefore lawful.
|
|
| |
Fuentes v. Shevin, No. 70-5039,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1972, Decided **Together with No. 70-5138, Parham et al. v. Cortese et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
View this case - free
|
Overview: The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorized the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person's possession under a writ of replevin, and neither provided for notice or hearing prior to seizure. Petitioners argued that the statutes deprived them of property in their possession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On review, the Supreme Court found that the statutes' prejudgment replevin provisions deprived petitioners of their property without due process insofar as they denied the right to prior notice and hearing before property was taken. The Court noted that states had the power to seize goods prior to a final judgment in order to protect creditor's security interests, but only after the creditor tested their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing. The Court rejected any argument that petitioners waived their basic procedural rights due to general terms of default printed in small type on the back of the conditional sales contracts and unaccompanied by explanation or clarification.
|
|
| |
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., No. 71-322,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 12, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The German corporation contracted with the United States corporation to transport an oil rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic Sea. During transportation, the rig was damaged and was towed to Tampa, Florida, where the United States corporation filed suit. The German corporation, however, asked the district court to enforce the forum-selection clause contained in the contract placing jurisdiction in England. The district court refused to enforce the clause and the lower appellate court affirmed. Reversing the lower appellate court's judgment, the court held that the forum-selection clause should be enforced unless the party resisting the clause could show that enforcement would be unreasonable. Furthermore, the court held that the argument that such clauses ousted a court of jurisdiction was not valid, and the German corporation did not waive operation of the clause by appearing in the federal court. As a result, the court held that the forum-selection clause was valid and the case was remanded for a determination of whether enforcement was unreasonable.
|
|
| |
Barker v. Wingo, No. 71-5255,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 22, 1972, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court judgment that petitioner, who challenged his criminal conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding, had not been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The rule that the Court adopted and used as a factor in determining whether the speedy trial right had been denied was whether or not he had asserted his right. However, a waiver of that right could not be presumed, except as to delay caused by petitioner. The conduct of both the prosecution and petitioner were to be balanced, taking into account petitioner's assertion of the right, prejudice to petitioner, the length of delay, and the reasons for the delay. Given the minimal prejudice and the fact that petitioner had not wanted a speedy trial, petitioner's rights had not been violated.
|
|
| |
Back to Top |
| |
|
Worldwide
Feedback
Feedback