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| Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., No. 72-5847,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 19, 1974, Decided
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Overview: After petitioner employee was terminated by respondent employer, he initiated grievance proceedings pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement. Petitioner testified at an arbitration hearing that he was discharged due to racial discrimination, but the arbitrator ruled petitioner was discharged for just cause. Petitioner then sued respondent under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding petitioner was precluded from litigating the Title VII claim due to the arbitrator's ruling against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that petitioner, in submitting his grievance to arbitration, was seeking to vindicate his contractual rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, and therefore was not precluded from asserting his independent statutory rights under Title VII. Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected respondent's suggestion that the courts had to defer to the arbitrator's decision and held that a federal court should consider a claim under Title VII de novo, while according such weight to an arbitral decision as the court deemed proper.
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| United States v. Matlock, No. 72-1355,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 20, 1974, Decided
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Overview: The question before the Court was whether the evidence presented by the government with respect to the voluntary consent of a third party to search defendant's living quarters was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at defendant's criminal trial for bank robbery. The Court reversed the judgment, finding that the government had proven the third party's actual authority to consent to the search. The Court noted that defendant's own out-of-court admissions would have surmounted all objections based on the hearsay rule both at the suppression hearings and at the trial itself, and would have been admissible for whatever inferences the trial judge could have reasonably drawn regarding joint occupancy of the east bedroom. The Court also noted that, under the circumstances, there was no apparent reason for the trial judge to distrust the evidence and to exclude the third party's declarations from his own consideration. Finally, the Court noted that because the third party was a witness for defendant at the suppression hearing, she was available for cross-examination. Thus, the risk of prejudice, if any, from the use of hearsay was reduced.
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| Davis v. Alaska, No. 72-5794,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 27, 1974, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner, convicted of burglary and grand larceny, contended that his counsel should have been permitted to cross-examine a key juvenile witness to determine bias and prejudice. The State maintained, on the other hand, that it had an important interest in maintaining the anonymity of juvenile offenders and that the curtailment of cross-examination as to the witness' probationary status was proper. The Supreme Court held that, in the circumstances presented, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments conferred the right to cross-examine the prosecution witness about his delinquency adjudication for burglary and his status as a probationer. Such cross-examination was necessary in order to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice. The Court disagreed with the state supreme court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and the adequacy and meaningfulness of the scope of cross-examination required under it.
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| EDELMAN v. JORDAN, No. 72-1410,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 25, 1974, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners were the director of the state's department of public aid. Respondent filed suit against petitioner and past directors alleging aid was being administered to the federal-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) in a manner inconsistent with federal regulations and with U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The district court held in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner and past directors to release the AABD benefits wrongfully withheld. On appeal petitioner asserted that U.S. Const. amend. XI barred the award of retroactive benefits. The appeals court affirmed the district court and petitioner sought the Court's review. The Court held while U.S. Const. amend. XI did not bar a suit against a state by the state's citizens, the Court had consistently held that an unconsenting state was immune from suits brought the states' citizens as well as by citizens of another state. Further, because an in an action for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real party in interest, the rule that a suit by private parties seeking to impose liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury was barred by U.S. Const. amend. XI applied.
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| KEWANEE v. BICRON, No. 73-187,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 13, 1974, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was a leading manufacturer of a type of synthetic crystal, which was useful in the detection of ionizing radiation. The individual respondents were former employees of petitioner, who formed or later joined respondent corporation. Before termination with petitioner, respondents executed, as a condition of employment, at least one agreement each requiring them not to disclose confidential information or trade secrets obtained as employees of petitioner. Reversing the appeals court determination of preemption by federal patent law, the United States Supreme Court held that federal patent law did not preempt Ohio state trade secret law. The two systems, the court explained, were not in conflict. They offered different degrees of protection to inventors and others. The Court noted that matter, once in the public domain, was not incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection. Trade secret law encouraged invention in areas where patent law did not reach. To preempt or do away with Ohio trade secret law would have deprived society of discoveries not protected by trade secret law.
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| Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, No. 73-203,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 28, 1974, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was an odd lot trader of securities. Respondents were brokerage firms used by petitioner and others. Alleging that respondents had monopolized odd lot trading and set the differential at an excessive level in violation of ¿¿ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. ¿¿1 and 2, petitioner filed a class action lawsuit. After disagreement between the lower court as to whether a class action could be maintained, the court granted certiorari. The court allowed review of the issue of class action because the matter was collateral to the merits of the case. The court held that there was a failure to comply with the notice requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), and the lower court had improperly imposed part of the cost of notice on respondents. Publication notice was insufficient because the names and addresses of the potential beneficiaries were known. In addition, Rule 23(c)(2) required that petitioner bear the cost of notice to the members of his class. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the appeals court and remanded the matter.
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| Gertz v. Robert Welch, No. 72-617,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1974, Decided
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Overview: After a policeman killed a youth, the youth's family retained petitioner to represent them in a civil action. During the trial, respondent published an article about petitioner that labeled him as a "Communist" and a member of a Marxist organization. Because the statements contained serious inaccuracies, petitioner filed a libel action against respondent. The district court held that the New York Times standard applied, which meant that respondent escaped liability unless petitioner proved that a defamatory falsehood was published with actual malice. The district court entered judgment for respondent and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that petitioner was not a public figure. The state's interest in compensating injury to the reputation of a private individual required a different rule. The Court held that the states could define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injuries to a private individual. The states could not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
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| Wolff v. McDonnell, No. 73-679,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1974, Decided
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Overview: The inmate alleged that the prison's policies as to the taking of good time, the inmate legal assistance program, and the inspection of attorney mail were unconstitutional. The Court held that the inmates' interest in disciplinary procedures was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to good time and its deprivation as a sanction was provided by state statute. Due process required provision of advance written notice of the claimed violation, a written statement of the evidence relied upon, and the reasons for the disciplinary action. The inmate had to be allowed to call witnesses and present evidence when to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or goals. Cross-examination and counsel were not constitutionally required. The prison's acceptance of a rule whereby the inmate was present when mail from attorneys was inspected was all that the constitution required. Finally, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the capacity of the inmate legal adviser had to be assessed in light of the demand for assistance in civil rights actions as well as in habeas corpus proceedings because both actions served to protect basic constitutional rights.
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| United States v. Nixon, No. 73-1766,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 24, 1974, Decided **Together with No. 73-1834, Nixon, President of the United States v. United States, also on certiorari before judgment to the same court.
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Overview: The President of the United States invoked executive privilege to avoid compliance with a third-party subpoena duces tecum that required the production of tape recordings and documents. A special prosecutor sought to obtain information concerning meetings between the President and certain individuals charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and other offenses. The President's motion to quash the subpoena was denied, and cross-petitions for immediate review were granted. Holding that the President's general privilege of confidentiality did not extend to an absolute privilege of immunity from all judicial process, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to quash. Issues relating to the production of documents in a pending criminal case were justiciable and were properly heard on interlocutory appeal in a case involving the President. Because the special prosecutor had demonstrated a specific need for the evidence sought by way of subpoena and had complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c), it was proper to compel production and to examine the material in camera. The legitimate needs of the judicial process outweighed executive privilege.
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