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| Goss v. Lopez, No. 73-898,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 22, 1975, Decided
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Overview: Ohio law provided for a free education and compulsory school attendance of youngsters. Although ¿ 3313.66 gave certain procedural rights to those students facing expulsion, no such procedures were provided for students facing suspensions of up to 10 days in cases of misconduct. After each of them were suspended without a prior hearing, plaintiff students brought a class action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court determined that the statutory scheme violated the students' procedural due process rights and defendant school officials appealed directly to the Supreme Court. In affirming, the Court ruled that the students had protected liberty interests in a public education that could not be taken away by suspension without the minimal procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard, flexibly applied to the given situation. Students did not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door and the Fourteenth Amendment forbid such arbitrary deprivations of liberty as unilateral suspensions of up to 10 days without notice and hearing. Rudimentary due process was required to ensure fairness in disciplinary truth-seeking determinations.
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| Gerstein v. Pugh, No. 73-477,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 18, 1975, Decided
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Overview: Respondents were arrested in Florida and charged with offenses under a prosecutor's information. One respondent was denied bail and the other respondent was unable to post bond. At the time of respondents' arrest, a person charged by information could be detained for substantial period without opportunity for judicial determination of probable cause. Respondents filed a class action, in which petitioner was one of several defendants, claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on probable cause. The district court's ruling that the practice of arresting and detaining a person for trial on an information, without a judicial determination of probable cause, was unconstitutional, was affirmed by the circuit court. The district court ordered an adversary determination of probable cause. The court held that U.S. Const. amend. IV required a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following an arrest; however, the Constitution did not require an adversary determination of probable cause. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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| Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, No. 73-938,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1975, Decided
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Overview: Appellant broadcasting company's reporter broadcasted the name of a rape victim over the air. He obtained the name of the victim through court papers. O.C.G.A. ¿ 26-9901 (1972) made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity of a rape victim. Appellee parent brought an action for money damages against appellants pursuant to this statute claiming that his right to privacy had been invaded by the television broadcasts giving the name of his deceased daughter. The issue was whether consistent with U.S. Const. amend. I and U.S. Const. amend. XIV, a state might extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim that was publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in construing ¿ 26-9901 to extend a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court. The court held that the cause of action for invasion of privacy through public disclosure of the name of a rape victim imposed sanctions on pure expression, the content of a publication.
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| United States v. Nobles, No. 74-634,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1975
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Overview: At trial, defense counsel called an investigator to testify about interviews with eyewitnesses in order to discredit their identification testimony. The trial court excluded the testimony when defense counsel refused to submit the investigator's report to government counsel. The circuit court of appeals held that U.S. Const. amend. V prohibited the disclosure condition imposed by the district court, and that Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 precluded prosecutorial discovery at trial. The court granted certiorari and reversed. The court held that disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report did not violate U.S. Const. amend. V because the content of the report was statements of third parties and not defendant's personal communications. Thus, requiring their production would not compel defendant to be a witness against himself. The court also held that Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 did not constrain a district court's power to condition impeachment testimony of the witness on the production of relevant portions of his report, and that the work-product doctrine did not exempt the report from disclosure because its protection was waived by calling the investigator as a witness.
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| Warth v. Seldin, No. 73-2024,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1975
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Overview: Petitioners, various organizations and individuals, brought an action against respondent town, and against members of respondent town's planning and zoning boards. Petitioners claimed that respondents' zoning ordinances effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of petitioners' constitutional rights and in violation of 42 U.S.C.S. ¿¿ 1981, 1982, and 1983. The lower court held that none of the petitioners had standing to prosecute the action. The court affirmed, holding that the facts alleged failed to support an actionable causal relationship between respondents' zoning practices and petitioners' asserted injury. In contrast to cases where plaintiffs challenged zoning restrictions applied to particular projects that would supply housing within their means, and of which they were intended residents, in this case petitioners were unable to demonstrate that unless relief from the allegedly illegal actions was forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests would be harmed. Thus, the court held that petitioners failed to meet threshold standing requirements and affirmed the judgment below.
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| Brown v. Ill., No. 73-6650,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1975
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Overview: Following an illegal arrest, petitioner gave inculpatory statements after he was read his constitutional rights. The statements were admitted at trial on the basis that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, were sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest, making admissible that which would normally be excluded. On certiorari, the Court held that the Miranda warnings could neither automatically nor by themselves protect an accused's Fourth Amendment rights. Whether a confession was freely given or improperly coerced, the Court held, had to be determined on a case by case basis. The Court held the trial court had to examine factors such as the temporal proximity of the arrest to the confession, the intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. The Court also held that the exclusionary rule did not automatically proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons, and that Miranda warnings, along with other factors, might permit the admission of such evidence. However, the Court examined the record in light of those factors and concluded that petitioner's statements were inadmissible.
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| Faretta v. Cal., No. 73-5772,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 30, 1975
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Overview: Petitioner initially represented himself against state charges of grand theft, but after the trial court determined that petitioner had not intelligently and knowingly waived his right to counsel, he appointed a public defender, ruling that petitioner had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Petitioner was convicted, the state appellate court affirmed the ruling and the conviction, and the state supreme court denied review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded, holding that the state could not constitutionally force a lawyer upon petitioner because he was literate, competent, and understanding, and voluntarily exercised his informed free will. The Court said that while the right to effective assistance of counsel of U.S. Const. amend. VI was part of the due process of law guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIV to defendants in state criminal courts, counsel thrust upon petitioner would not be an assistant, but a master, "representing" petitioner only through a legal fiction. The Court cited the long history of the right of self-representation, and the consensus of federal court authority and state constitutions in support.
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| United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, No. 74-114,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 30, 1975
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Overview: Border officers on roving patrol stopped defendant's car, saying later their only reason for doing so was the occupants' apparent Mexican descent. Upon questioning defendant and his passengers, the officers learned that the passengers had entered the country illegally. Defendant was charged with knowingly transporting illegal immigrants in violation of ¿ 274(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1324(a)(2). At trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress testimony regarding the passengers, claiming this evidence was fruit of an illegal seizure in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant was convicted. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted. On certiorari, the court affirmed, holding that except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol could stop vehicles only if they were aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warranted suspicion that the vehicles contained illegal aliens. Mexican ancestry, standing alone, did not justify the officers' stop, according to the court.
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