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| United States v. Watson, No. 74-538,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 26, 1976
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Overview: Defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail, 18 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1708, was reversed when the appellate court determined that the warrantless arrest of defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the post-arrest search of defendant's car was coerced. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first ruled that defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) it was based upon probable cause, as the government acted upon information from a reliable informant that defendant possessed stolen cards; and (2) the arrest was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. ¿ 3061(a)(3) and 39 C.F.R. ¿ 232.5(a)(3), which authorized the government to make warrantless felony arrests upon reasonable grounds. Therefore, the Court ruled the post-arrest search of defendant's car to which defendant consented to, and which yielded the credit cards upon which his conviction was based, had not been the product of an illegal arrest. That defendant was not informed of his right to refuse consent to the search did not render the search invalid.
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| Buckley v. Valeo, No. 75-436.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 30, 1976 * *Together with No. 75-437, Buckley et al. v. Valeo, Secretary of the United States Senate, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
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Overview: Plaintiffs, candidates, contributors, political parties, and others, brought suit against defendant government officials, in their official capacity and as members of the Federal Election Commission. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Act, related Tax Code provisions, and the validity of the Commission. The court of appeals upheld the Act. The Court found that the individual and political committee contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing scheme were justified by weighty interests in restricting influences stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions. The Court held, however, that the limitations on campaign expenditures were unconstitutional because they placed substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in political expression that was protected by the First Amendment. The Court found that U.S. Const. art. II, ¿ 2, cl. 2, required that most of the powers conferred by the Act upon the Commission could be exercised only by officers of the United States. The court held that the Commission's present membership was invalid.
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| Mathews v. Eldridge, No. 74-204.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1976
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Overview: The United States Supreme Court found that respondent had not been denied procedural due process when he was not granted an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of his Social Security disability benefit payments. The district court had jurisdiction over the suit, because respondent had presented his claims for review to both the district social security office and the regional office for reconsideration, and petitioner Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare had accepted the termination through the Social Security Administration. Procedural due process had been satisfied because respondent was not in as dire a position as that of a typical welfare recipient, and because of the myriad procedural safeguards of the process, including an evidentiary hearing before the denial of the claim became final. The public interest in limiting the procedures available was significant, given the cost of additional procedures.
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| Imbler v. Pachtman, No. 74-5435.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1976
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Overview: Petitioner was convicted of murder. Respondent was the state prosecuting attorney that conducted the trial. Petitioner thereafter successfully sought a writ of habeas corpus and his conviction was vacated based upon evidence that respondent himself had uncovered, and instances of misconduct at trial. Respondent was then sued under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983, because petitioner claimed respondent had engaged in a conspiracy to unlawfully charge and convict him. Respondent moved to dismiss, which was granted by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals and Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that public policy required that prosecutors, in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state's case, enjoyed the same absolute immunity from civil liability under ¿ 1983 that they had at common law in malicious prosecution suits. The court stated that qualified immunity only could have an adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system, but also noted that respondent's activities here were intimately associated with the judicial process, and declined to hold whether immunity also applied to a prosecutor's role as an administrator or investigative officer.
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| Time, Inc. v. Firestone, No. 74-944.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1976
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Overview: Based on a published order of a court hearing respondent's divorce, petitioner news publisher wrote an article in its national magazine reporting the divorce, inaccurately reporting that the divorce resulted from respondent's extramarital affairs that would "make Dr. Freud's hair curl." Petitioner appealed an adverse judgment that the report was actionable and that damages were appropriate because respondent was a public figure and that petitioner had not maliciously published the report. The court found that respondent was not a public figure because she had merely resorted to judicial process to obtain a divorce and had not interjected herself into a matter of public controversy. The fact that her divorce was a "cause celebre" did not make her a public figure in the constitutional sense. The court noted that constitutional limitations required a showing of fault on the part of a defendant charged with publishing defamatory material, but that the lower courts had not made any finding as to petitioner's fault in the record. Without this finding, the court could not support the award of damages even though there was evidence that petitioner's publication was inaccurate.
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| Paul v. Davis, No. 74-891,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 23, 1976
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Overview: Petitioner police chief sought review, on writ of certiorari, of the decision that respondent accused stated a valid claim under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 and the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The case arose after petitioner circulated a flier on which respondent's mug shot was displayed. The photograph was taken upon respondent's prior arrest, and the flier was intended to help local retailers identify shoplifters. The Court held that petitioner's alleged defamation, a typical state tort claim, was not actionable under the Due Process Clause and ¿ 1983. The procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause could not be the source for a body of general federal tort law. The Court also found that respondent's injury to reputation was not specially protected by ¿1983 and the Due Process Clause. Damage to reputation, alone, apart from some more tangible interests, was not sufficient to invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause. Further, petitioner did not deprive respondent of any state-provided right, and respondent's case was not within the constitutional zone of privacy. The Court reversed the judgment.
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| Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, No. 74-940,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 24, 1976 * *Together with No. 74-949, Akin et al. v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: The water users claimed that, under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C.S. ¿ 666, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the government's suit, which named some 1,000 water users as defendants and sought a declaration of its rights to waters in certain rivers and tributaries in one of the state's water districts. The water users further argued that, even if jurisdiction existed, dismissal was proper under the abstention doctrine. The Court held the Amendment did not diminish the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1345, but that dismissal was proper in view of the concurrent state court proceedings. In so holding, the Court found that, under the Amendment, the state court had jurisdiction over Indian water rights and that, although the abstention doctrine did not apply, a number of factors counseled against concurrent federal proceedings. Those factors included the Amendment's clear federal policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system, the adjudication system established by the state's Water Rights Determination and Administration Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. ¿ 37-92-101 et seq., and the extensive involvement of state water rights.
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| Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, No. 74-1042,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 30, 1976
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Overview: Petitioner, an accounting firm, had been retained by a small brokerage firm for 21 years to perform periodic audits of the brokerage firm's books and records. Respondents were customers of the brokerage firm who had invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by the president of the brokerage firm. Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner under ¿ 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5. Respondents' complaint was based on a theory of negligent nonfeasance. The district court's grant of summary judgment to petitioner, on the basis that a cause of action could not be maintained under ¿ 10(b) of Act and Rule 10b-5 merely on allegations of negligence, was reversed by the circuit court. The Supreme Court reviewed the Act and concluded that the language of ¿ 10(b) clearly connoted intentional misconduct. The Court stated that the language of a statute controls when it is sufficiently clear in context. The Court held there could be no private cause of action for damages under ¿ 10(b) of Act and Rule 10b-5 without an allegation of scienter, i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
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| Fisher v. United States, No. 74-18,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 21, 1976 * *Together with No. 74-611, United States et al. v. Kasmir et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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Overview: In two separate cases, following notice of investigation of possible civil or criminal liability under federal tax laws, the clients obtained documents relating to the preparation of their tax returns by their accountants. The clients transferred the documents to their lawyers. The Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the attorneys for production of the documents. The attorneys contended that enforcement of the summonses would involve compulsory self-incrimination of the clients in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The summonses were enforced by the district court. The Third Circuit upheld the order, but the Fifth Circuit reversed the order. The court stated that the Fifth Amendment was limited to prohibiting the use of physical or moral compulsion exerted on the person asserting the privilege. The clients' privilege under Fifth Amendment was not violated by the enforcement of the summonses because enforcement against a client's lawyer could not compel the client to do anything, particularly not to be a witness against himself. The documents were not the clients' private papers. The judgment of the Third Circuit was affirmed. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed.
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| Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, No. 74-895,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 24, 1976
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Overview: Plaintiffs alleged that Va. Code Ann. ¿ 54-524.35 (1974) violated U.S. Const. amend. I and XIV insofar as it provided that a pharmacist licensed in Virginia was guilty of unprofessional conduct if he published, advertised, or promoted any price for prescription drugs. Plaintiffs were an individual Virginia resident, who used prescription drugs on a daily basis, and two nonprofit organizations. Plaintiffs claimed U.S. Const. amend. I entitled the user of prescription drugs to receive advertising and promotional information from pharmacists concerning the prices of prescription drugs. Defendants, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy (Board) and the individual Board members, were against commercial advertising of prescription drug information as defendants were concerned with maintaining the integrity of the profession. The district court declared this portion of the statute void, and enjoined defendants from enforcing it. The court held that a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information was protected by the First Amendment, as it was indispensable to well-informed private economic decisions. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
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