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| Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., No. 75-616,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 11, 1977
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Overview: Respondents challenged petitioner village's denial of requests for rezoning, alleging that the denials were racially discriminatory and violated U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Respondents sought to build low-to-middle income, multiple-family housing subsidized by ¿ 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1715z-1. Section 236 required that the subsidized development be racially integrated. Some comments from opponents and supporters addressed the social issue of racial integration; however, many opponents focused on the zoning aspects of respondent's petition since rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value and since the rezoning was incompatible with the single-family development of the village. Official action was not unconstitutional solely because it resulted in a racially disproportionate impact. Evidence showed that petitioner focused almost exclusively on the zoning aspects of respondents' petition and the zoning factors on which petitioner relied were not novel criteria in petitioner's rezoning decisions. As such, respondents failed to prove that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in petitioner's decision.
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| Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, No. 75-1278,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 11, 1977
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Overview: Respondent teacher was terminated by petitioner school board for sending a copy of petitioner's memorandum regarding a dress code for teachers to a radio station and for making obscene gestures to students. Holding that the courts below failed to balance petitioner's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performed against respondent's U.S. Const. amend. I free speech interest, the court vacated the judgment. The court held that with respect to respondent's claim that he was terminated for exercising his right of free speech, no test for causation was appropriate that would place him in a better position as a result of his conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing. Instead, the court held, the proper procedure was one that required respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that it was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in petitioner's decision not to rehire him. That proved, the court held that petitioner was still not liable if it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's re-employment, even in the absence of the protected conduct.
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| Brewer v. Williams, No. 74-1263,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 23, 1977;
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Overview: Respondent was arrested for the abduction of a missing girl. His attorney advised him that police officers would be transporting him to another city, that the officers would not interrogate him, and that he should not talk to the officers until consulting with the attorney. After respondent's arraignment, another attorney similarly advised respondent. The officers gave respondent Miranda warnings. During the trip, respondent expressed no willingness to be interrogated. In the car, one officer discussed how expected snow might make recovery of the body and a Christian burial impossible, and that respondent was the only one who knew where the body was. Respondent eventually led the officers to the body. The Court held that respondent was entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, as judicial proceedings had been initiated against him before the start of the car ride, and the officer deliberately set out to elicit information from him when he was entitled to the assistance of counsel. Respondent did not waive his right to counsel because he consistently relied upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities.
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| Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, No. 75-1753,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 23, 1977;
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Overview: Petitioner acquired 95 percent of corporate stock and carried out a short-form merger under Delaware corporation law. Respondent minority stockholders sued, alleging petitioner's actions violated federal law because they employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud and engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase of a security in violation of S.E.C. Rule 10b-5. The appellate court found respondents stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted because S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 reached breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure. The Court reversed, holding that the merger, if carried out as respondents' alleged in their complaint, was neither deceptive nor manipulative and, therefore, did not violate federal law. The Court found the short-form merger was carried out in full compliance with Delaware law and did not involve manipulation or deception as those terms were used in ¿ 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 78j.
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| Ingraham v. Wright, No. 75-6527,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 19, 1977;
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Overview: Petitioner students filed an action against respondent school administrators for violations of petitioners' constitutional rights. Petitioners argued that the use of corporal punishment was cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment. However, the United States Supreme Court held that U.S. Const. amend. VIII was intended to apply to criminal procedures and was not applicable to corporal punishment in public schools. In so holding, the court noted that public school teachers and administrators were privileged at common law to inflict only such corporal punishment as was reasonably necessary for the proper education and discipline of the child; any punishment going beyond the privilege could have resulted in both civil and criminal liability. As long as the schools were open to public scrutiny, the court saw no reason to believe that the common-law constraints would not effectively remedy and deter excess punishment. Furthermore, petitioners were not entitled to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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| Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, No. 75-636,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 31, 1977; as amended * *Together with No. 75-672, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: On appeal, the union contended that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining agreements did not violate Title VII. The Court held that, because the seniority system was protected by ¿ 703(h) (42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e-2(h)) of Title VII, the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining the system did not violate Title VII. The unmistakable purpose of ¿ 703(h) was to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legislative history showed, the result was intended even where the employer's pre-Title VII discrimination resulted in whites having greater existing seniority rights than minorities. Although a seniority system inevitably tended to perpetuate the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination in such cases, the congressional judgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of Title VII. The single fact that the system extended no retroactive seniority to pre-Title VII discriminatees did not make it unlawful.
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| Moore v. East Cleveland, No. 75-6289,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 31, 1977
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Overview: Appellant argued that appellee municipality's housing ordinance, which categorized a second grandchild living in appellant's home as an illegal occupant, violated the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court agreed, saying that the ordinance bore no rational relationship to permissible state objectives. This ordinance did not distinguish between related and unrelated individuals, the court explained, but sliced into the family and regulated what categories of relatives might live together. Such intrusion into family life was not constitutionally protected. Rejecting arguments that the ordinance served to prevent overcrowding, minimize traffic, and avoid burdening the public school system, the court held that the provision had but a tenuous relation to the alleviation of these objectives. Nor was the constitutional right to live together as a family limited to the nuclear family, the court ruled, as the extended family traditionally played a role in providing sustenance and security. Cutting off protection of family rights at the first convenient boundary, the nuclear family, was arbitrary and could not be justified.
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| Manson v. Brathwaite, No. 75-871,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 16, 1977; as amended
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Overview: Respondent, on a claim for habeas relief, proposed a per se rule of exclusion that he claimed was dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test and concluded that the criteria applicable in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning an identification were satisfactorily met and complied with in respondent's case. The Court reasoned that the factors that had to be considered included the opportunity of the witness to view respondent at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors was weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. The Court determined that it could not say that, under all the circumstances of respondent's case, there was very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
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| Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, No. 76-63,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1977; as amended
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Overview: Appellant state enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. ¿ 106-189.1, prohibiting closed containers of apples shipped into the state from displaying state grades or classifications. Appellee sued, asserting that the statute violated the Commerce Clause and seeking injunctive relief from its enforcement. The district court granted the requested relief. On review, the Court affirmed. It held that appellee had standing to sue because it performed the functions of a traditional trade association representing the state apple industry. The Court also held that the jurisdictional amount in controversy of 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1331 was met, because appellee's substantial volume of sales and the continuing nature of the statute's impact on sales precluded a finding to a legal certainty that its losses and expenses would not total the requisite $ 10,000. The Court finally held that the statute both burdened and discriminated against the interstate sale of apples and that appellant did not meet the burden of demonstrating substantial local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve local interests.
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| United States v. Chadwick, No. 75-1721,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1977; as amended
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Overview: After arresting defendants, agents opened and searched defendants' locked foot locker without a warrant and seized marijuana from the locker. After several appeals, the appellate court affirmed the suppression of the seized marijuana holding that probable cause was not sufficient to sustain a warrantless search. On review, the Court held that by placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would have remained free from public examination. The Court held that the expectation of privacy was no less than one who locked the doors of his home to intruders and that defendants were due the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV's Warrant Clause. The Court held that there being no exigency it was unreasonable for the government to have conducted a search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provided. The Court held that the search was too remote to have been considered incident to arrest. The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court.
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