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| Zablocki v. Redhail, No. 76-879,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 18, 1978
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Overview: Wisconsin residents were prevented under Wis. Stat. ¿ 245.10 (1973) from marrying if they were behind in their child support obligations or if the children to whom they were obligated were likely to become public charges. In a class action brought by the residents under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983, the county clerks contended that the statute assisted the state to counsel residents on their financial obligations and protected the children to whom support was owed. The Court, however, found that the statute violated equal protection in that it directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry without being closely tailored to effectuate the state's interests. The Court noted that other future financial obligations were not curtailed, only those that might be associated with marriage, and further found that the effect of the statute was that more illegitimate children would be born.
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| Carey v. Piphus, No. 76-1149,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 21, 1978; As Amended
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Overview: The court considered whether, in an action under ¿ 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial "nonpunitive" damages. Petitioners argued that unless the students proved that they actually were injured by the deprivation of procedural due process, the students were entitled at most to nominal damages. The students contended that substantial damages should be awarded under ¿ 1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right whether or not any injury was caused by the deprivation. The court noted that the basic purpose of a ¿ 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. The court held that in the absence of proof of actual injury, the students were entitled to recover only nominal damages. Although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself was compensable under ¿ 1983, neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it was so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused.
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| Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., No. 76-419,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 3, 1978, Decided **Together with No. 76-528, Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: The corporation contended that the rulemaking proceedings instituted by the Commission to deal with the question of environmental effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle provided an adequate database for the regulation adopted. Therefore, the adoption of the resultant administrative rule and the decision to grant petitioner's license were statutorily valid. The Court held that the lower court improperly intruded into the Commission's decision making process by denying the Commission the right to exercise its administrative discretion in deciding how, in the light of internal organization considerations, it may best proceed to develop the needed evidence and how its prior decision should be modified in light of such evidence.
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| Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., No. 77-293,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 15, 1978, Decided
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Overview: The Supreme Court reversed a decision that denied appellant father's motion to quash service of the summons in a judicial action filed by appellee mother in California to modify a child support award entered in New York. The Court determined that California state courts were constitutionally unable to exercise personal jurisdiction over appellant as a nonresident, nondomiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within California, because appellant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with California. By merely consenting to his children's living with appellee in contradiction of the parties' separation agreement, appellant did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of California law. Particularly, because the action was domestic in nature, appellant did not derive any commercial or financial benefit from his children's presence in California. Therefore, appellant's actions were not such that it was fair, just, or reasonable to require him to conduct his defense to the child support modification in California.
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| Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 75-1914,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 6, 1978, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners were a class of female employees of respondent agencies. Petitioners sued respondents, claiming respondents as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. After consideration of the legislative history concerning the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the precursor of 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983, the court determined that municipal corporations were persons who could be sued under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983. The court, unrestrained by stare decisis, overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, which had held that municipal corporations could not be sued under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983. The court, however, upheld the rule that respondeat superior was not a basis for rendering municipalities liable under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 for constitutional torts of employees. Only when execution of a government policy inflicted the injury could a governmental entity be responsible under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983. Since the present case involved official policy as the violation, the appellate court's decision was reversed.
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| Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, No. 76-1701,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1978, Decided
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Overview: The Supreme Court affirmed a court of appeals' judgment, which agreed with the Secretary of Interior that operation of a particular federal dam, the Tellico Dam, would eradicate an endangered species, held that a prima facie violation of ¿ 7 of the Endangered Species Act (Act), 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1536, occurred, and ruled that an injunction requested by respondents should have been issued. The Court held that pursuant to the Act's explicit provisions, the survival of a relatively small number of fish required the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress had expended and continued to appropriate large sums of public money. The Court noted that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities and to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost because the value of endangered species was "incalculable." The Court held that the continuing appropriations for the dam did not constitute an implied repeal of the Act at least insofar as it applied to the project. The Court held that an injunction was the appropriate remedy because of "institutionalized caution" and the separation of powers.
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| Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, No. 77-335,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 19, 1978, Decided
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Overview: Respondents were the representative plaintiffs in a class action brought against petitioners. Respondents sought to require petitioners to assist in compiling list of class members to satisfy individual notice required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The court of appeals concluded the federal discovery rules authorized the district court to order petitioners to assist in compiling the list and bear the compilation expenses. The court reversed and remanded the action because Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) was the appropriate authority of such an order and the court abused its discretion requiring petitioners to bear compilation expenses. Since identification was a necessary component in order to send notice, Rule 23(d) authorized the district court to require petitioners' cooperation in providing notice. The expense of hiring a third party to compile the list would be no greater for respondents, who sought the information, so respondents were required to pay the third party.
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| Mincey v. Arizona, No. 77-5353,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1978, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was arrested during a drug raid in his apartment when one of the officers was shot and killed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed his conviction for murder and assault on state grounds, but affirmed his conviction for three narcotics offenses under a "murder scene exception." On petition for certiorari, the court reversed. Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was a homicide, there were no exigent circumstances. Petitioner was wounded and taken to the hospital. There was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant, and a police guard at the apartment minimized that possibility. The seriousness of the offense under investigation itself did not create exigent circumstances of the kind that, under the Fourth Amendment, justified a warrantless search. The "murder scene exception" was inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the warrantless search of petitioner's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there.
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| Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, No. 77-677,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1978, Decided
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Overview: On appeal, the Court held that it was undisputed that there was no independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the widow's state-law tort action against the equipment company because both were citizens of Iowa. Thus, it was clear that the widow could not originally have brought suit in federal court naming the equipment company and the power company as codefendants, because citizens of Iowa would have been on both sides of the litigation. The widow's claim against the equipment company, however, was entirely separate from her original claim against the power company, where the equipment company's liability to the widow depended not at all upon whether or not the power company was also liable. The nonfederal claim was asserted by the widow, who voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law claim in a federal court. The Court held that the district court lacked power to entertain the widow's lawsuit against the equipment company. Thus, the asserted inequity in the equipment company's alleged concealment of its citizenship was irrelevant.
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