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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - January - December, 1981
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Upjohn Co. v. United States, No. 79-886,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 13, 1981, Decided
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Overview: Responding to a claim that its foreign subsidiary made illegal payments to secure a government business, petitioner corporation initiated an investigation and sent out a questionnaire to all of its foreign general and area managers to determine the nature and magnitude of such payments. After petitioner disclosed such payments to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service demanded a production of all the files relating to the investigation. Petitioner refused to produce the documents. The court rejected the "control group" test applied by the lower appellate court, concluding that even low-level and mid-level employees could have the information necessary to defend against the potential litigation, and that Fed. R. Evid. 501 protected any client information that aided the orderly administration of justice. The court rejected the lower appellate court's conclusion that the work-product doctrine did not apply to tax summonses, but remanded the issue because the work-product at issue was based on potentially privileged oral statements. The doctrine could only be overcome upon a strong showing of necessity for disclosure, and unavailability by other means.
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Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, No. 79-1764,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 4, 1981, Decided
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Overview: The employer hired the employee for the position of accounting clerk. The employee alleged that the employer's failure to promote and subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. ? 2000e et seq. The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that the employer had rebutted the prima facie case of gender discrimination. The court held that the appellate court erred by requiring the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the employee and that the person retained instead had superior objective qualifications for the position. The employer bore only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions when the employee proved a prima facie case of discrimination.
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Steagald v. United States, No. 79-6777,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 21, 1981, Decided
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Overview: Based on information received from a confidential informant, Drug Enforcement Administration agents entered petitioner's home with an arrest warrant in an attempt to locate a federal fugitive. The agents did not have a search warrant. The fugitive was not found in the house, but the agents did observe cocaine while in the house. After obtaining a search warrant, the agents uncovered additional incriminating evidence. Petitioner was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges. The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the denial of petitioner's suppression motion. The court concluded the arrest warrant was not adequate to protect the U.S. Const. amend. IV interests of petitioner, who was not named in the warrant and whose home was searched without his consent, and in the absence of exigent circumstances. While the arrest warrant protected the fugitive from an unreasonable seizure, it did nothing to protect petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home.
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Edwards v. Ariz., No. 79-5269,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 18, 1981, Decided
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Overview: After he was arrested and read his Miranda rights, petitioner requested an attorney. The police officers ceased questioning, but detectives from the same police department returned the next day and again interrogated petitioner. Petitioner confessed to the crimes during the second interrogation. The lower courts held that although petitioner had invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, he had waived both rights during the second interrogation after again being informed of his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court held that (1) the use of petitioner's confession against him violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, where petitioner had asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, and the police, without furnishing him with counsel, returned and secured a confession; (2) petitioner did not validly waive his right to counsel, where there was no finding that he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it; and (3) having requested counsel, petitioner was not subject to further interrogation until counsel had been made available to him, unless petitioner himself initiated further communication with the police.
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Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, No. 79-6423,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1981, Decided
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Overview: The mother's infant son was adjudicated a neglected child and placed in the custody of the department of social services. Subsequently, the mother was incarcerated for a murder conviction. Although the mother had an attorney to represent her in the criminal appeal, she did not inform her lawyer about the termination of parental rights proceeding. At that proceeding, the mother represented herself. On appeal, the mother contended that due process required the State to appoint counsel for her because she was indigent. The Court observed that there was a presumption against the right to appointed counsel when no potential deprivation of physical liberty existed. In analyzing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the Court found that the parents' interests could overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel in appropriate cases. The Court concluded that the decision of whether due process required the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination of parental proceedings was left to the trial court in the first instance. In the instant case, the Court held that the state trial court committed no error by failing to appoint counsel for the mother.
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New York v. Belton, No. 80-328,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 1, 1981, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped by a police officer at a fast rate. Upon stopping the car, the officer smelled marihuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car's floor that was marked with a name for marihuana. He therefore required the occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. He opened the envelope and found that it contained marihuana. He also searched defendant's jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. In defendant's subsequent drug prosecution, the trial court denied his motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle. However, the final state appellate court reversed, holding that the search of the jacket was not incident to defendant's arrest. The state was granted certiorari, and the Court reversed the decision of the state court, holding that the items seized in the warrantless search of the vehicle's passenger compartment, incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest, were justifiably seized because of the exigencies of the situation. Thus, the search did not violate the safeguards of U.S. Const. amend. IV and U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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Dames & Moore v. Regan, No. 80-2078,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 2, 1981, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner company filed an action against defendants, the Government of Iran and Iranian banks, seeking money owed for services performed. The district court issued orders of attachment directed against the property of defendants. Petitioner was granted summary judgment. However, pursuant to an unrelated hostage agreement, American hostages in Iran were released. The U.S. President issued executive orders to implement the agreement. The orders nullified all non-Iranian interests in Iranian assets and suspended all settlement claims. Petitioner filed an action for declaratory relief against the government to prevent enforcement of the executive orders. The district court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed, holding that the executive orders were sustained by the broad authority granted under the Trade With the Enemy Act. Thus, attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically made subordinate to further actions that the President might take under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.S. ?? 1701-1706. Also, the President was authorized to suspend pending claims because Congress consented.
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Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, No. 80-848,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 8, 1981, Decided **Together with No. 80-883, Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v. Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: Respondent's decedents died in an aircraft in the Scottish highlands. All the decedents were Scottish residents, as were their heirs. As the decedents' personal representative, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States because petitioner manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania and because the law was more favorable there. Petitioner wanted to litigate the tort action in Scotland, and filed to dismiss the action in Pennsylvania. A district court dismissed the action, but the lower appellate court reversed the district court's decision. On appeal, the court reversed, finding the district court had not abused its discretion in dismissing the matter. It noted that the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law in Scotland should not, by itself, bar dismissal. There usually was a strong presumption, the court explained, in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum. However, that presumption applied with less force when a plaintiff or real party in interest was foreign. It was more convenient for a plaintiff to choose its home forum. Therefore, when a foreign plaintiff chose a United States forum, the presumption was less reasonable.
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Widmar v. Vincent, No. 80-689,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 8, 1981, Decided
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Overview: University students that belonged to a religious group were informed that they could no longer meet in university buildings. The students alleged that the university violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court held that the university's exclusionary policy violated the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech had to be content-neutral. The state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based discrimination against the students' religious speech. The university discriminated against student groups based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion, which were forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. Any religious benefits of an open forum at the university would be incidental. The advancement of religion was not be the forum's primary effect.
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