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| Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, No. 80-327,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 12, 1982, Decided
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Overview: Respondents, a nonprofit organization and its employees, brought an action to compel petitioner religious institution to transfer property back to the United States on the ground that the conveyance of the property to petitioner under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C.S. ¿ 471 et seq., was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed respondents' action for lack of standing, and on appeal the circuit court reversed, finding that respondents had standing as citizens alleging a violation of their personal rights under the Establishment Clause, U.S. Const. art. I. On further appeal, the Court reversed again, holding that enforcement of the Establishment Clause did not create an exception to the requirement under U.S. Const. art. III that a plaintiff had to allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself in order to invoke judicial power. Also, respondents did not have standing as taxpayers because they were challenging an administrative ruling rather than congressional action, and the ruling was authorized under the Property Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, ¿ 3, cl. 2, rather than the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I.
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| Santosky v. Kramer, No. 80-5889,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 24, 1982, Decided
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Overview: After incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent removed petitioners' biological children from petitioners' home. Petitioners' parental rights were later terminated. The court of appeals rejected petitioners' argument that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard in N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. ¿ 622 was unconstitutional. The court held that before a state could sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process required that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard was inconsistent with due process because the private interest in parental rights affected was substantial and the countervailing governmental interest favoring the preponderance standard was comparatively slight. The court held that a clear and convincing evidence standard adequately conveyed to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process, and that determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard was a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts.
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| Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, No. 81-440,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1982, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners provided excess business interruption insurance to cover respondent's operations in a foreign country. Respondent allegedly experienced mechanical problems, resulting in a business interruption loss. Respondent brought suit when all of the insurers refused to indemnify respondent. When petitioners failed to produce documents requested by respondent during discovery, the district court assumed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) that petitioners were subject to in personam jurisdiction due to their business contacts with the state. The court found that application of a legal presumption to the issue of personal jurisdiction did not in itself violate the Due Process Clause. The court held that application of the sanction was just under the circumstances because petitioners failed to comply with several court orders despite warnings of sanctions, and that the sanction was specifically related to the particular claim at issue in the order to provide discovery because respondent was seeking through discovery to respond to petitioners' contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
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| United States v. Ross, No. 80-2209,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1982, Decided
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Overview: A reliable informant contacted police department, describing respondent's vehicle, the location of the vehicle and respondent and stating that he had just seen respondent complete a drug sale. At the scene, a license and computer check revealed that the matching car was registered to a person fitting respondent's description. Five minutes later, police officers observed the vehicle being driven by respondent and stopped the vehicle. The police officers discovered a bullet in the front seat and a pistol in the glove compartment. Upon respondent's arrest, police officers opened the trunk and found a closed paper bag containing a white powder. At issue was whether the warrantless search of the vehicle stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband was unreasonable under U.S. Const. amend. IV. The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile was defined by the object of the search and the places in which there was probable cause to believe it would be found. Probable cause justifying the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle justified the search its contents that could have concealed the object of the search.
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| Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, No. 81-574,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 14, 1982, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner initiated a recruitment and training program for minorities. Respondent, a Mexican-American, was hired through the program and was promoted two times. His application for another position was subsequently denied even though promotions were awarded to several white employees with less seniority. Respondent brought an action alleging that petitioner discriminated against Mexican-Americans because of national origin and subjected Mexican-Americans to continuous employment discrimination. While the merits of both respondent's promotion claim and class hiring claim remained open for consideration, the court granted certiorari to decide whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants who were denied employment. The court held that respondent's complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion would require the decision of any common question concerning the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans because it did not present questions of law or fact that were common to the claims of respondent and other proposed class members.
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| Plyler v. Doe, No. 80-1538,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1982, Decided **Together with No. 80-1934, Texas et al. v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children et al., also on appeal from the same court.
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Overview: The Texas Legislature revised its education laws, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. ¿ 21.031, to authorize local school districts to deny enrollment in public schools to children not legally admitted to the country. Plaintiffs, undocumented school-aged children, challenged the revision on equal protection grounds. In affirming the lower court's decision that the revision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that illegal aliens were a suspect class. Unlike most of the classifications that had been recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, was the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class was itself a crime. However, plaintiffs were not comparably situated. The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to anyone, citizen or stranger, who was subject to the laws of a state. Furthermore, denial of an education to plaintiffs posed an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause, which was the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.
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| Harlow v. Fitzgerald, No. 80-945,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1982, Decided
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Overview: Respondent brought an action against petitioners for civil damages for petitioners' alleged conspiracy to violate respondent's constitutional and statutory rights. Respondent averred that petitioners entered into the conspiracy in their capacities as senior presidential aides. Petitioners unsuccessfully asserted an immunity defense. At issue was the scope of the immunity available to senior aides and advisors of the President of the United States in a suit for damages based on their official acts. The court found that petitioners were entitled to some form of immunity from suits for damages. The court held that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity that would be defeated if they knew or reasonably should have known that the action violated respondent's constitutional rights or if the action was taken with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of respondent's constitutional rights. As such, the judgment denying petitioners' immunity defense was vacated and remanded.
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| Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, No. 80-2043,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1982, Decided
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Overview: After the school board members attended a conference in which a list of objectionable books was circulated, the school board directed that certain books be removed from school libraries, characterizing them as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." The students sued, claiming the removal of books violated their First Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the school board and members, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial. On further review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but issued no opinion of the Court, basing its judgment on there being a genuine issue as to the reasons for the removal of the books. In a plurality opinion, three justices were of the opinion that students had a First Amendment right to receive ideas and information as a necessary predicate to their meaningful exercise of the rights of speech, press, and political freedom. Another justice concurring in the judgment wrote that the state had no authority to deny access to ideas for political reasons, while a fifth justice concurring in the judgment did not want to reach the First Amendment question on an incomplete record.
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| Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., No. 80-1730,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1982, Decided
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Overview: Respondent creditor filed an action in state court and sought prejudgment attachment of petitioner debtor's property. The county sheriff executed a writ of attachment that effectively sequestered petitioner's property. The attachment was later dismissed on the basis that respondent did not establish the statutory grounds for attachment. Petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 action against respondent, alleging that it acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law. The district court held that no claim for relief under ¿ 1983 was stated because respondent was not a state actor. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that there was no allegation of conduct under color of state law. The court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded, holding that petitioner presented a valid claim under ¿ 1983 that challenged the constitutionality of the state attachment statute because respondent acted jointly with the state in securing petitioner's property. The court held that because petitioner was deprived of his property through state action, respondent therefore acted under color of state law in participation of that deprivation.
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| Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, No. 80-1002,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1982, Decided
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Overview: The lower courts had interpreted the Act to mean that the school district had to provide an interpreter for the student, who was deaf, because having an interpreter would maximize the student's educational potential. The school district argued that the Act did not require this level of services. The Court reversed and remanded the case. In doing so, the Court held that (1) the lower courts erred when they held that the act required states to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children; (2) the evidence firmly established that the student was receiving an adequate education because she performed better than the average child in her class and easily advanced from grade to grade; and (3) insofar as the school district was required to provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public education," it had satisfied that requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the student to benefit educationally from that instruction.
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