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| Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., No. 81-1203,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 23, 1983, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner hospital sought review of a judgment in favor of respondent construction company in an action to compel arbitration under ¿ 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. ¿ 4, to resolve contract dispute. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1291, reversed a stay of proceedings, and remanded the case for entry of an order to arbitrate. Petitioner asserted that the stay order from which respondent appealed was not a final decision and was not appealable under ¿ 1291. The United States Supreme Court held that a stay order was final and appealable when its sole purpose and effect was to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court. The Court also held that the a stay of federal proceedings was improper because of the probable inadequacy of the state court proceeding to protect respondent's rights where there was a doubt as to whether respondent could obtain an order compelling arbitration from the state court, and because there were no exceptional circumstances or the clearest of justifications to support surrender of federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of respondent was affirmed.
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| Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, No. 81-896,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 23, 1983, Decided
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Overview: Both the union and the association previously represented teachers in the school district and had equal access to the inter-school mail system. The union was later elected exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers in the school district, however, and its collective-bargaining agreement provided that no other union would have access to the inter-school mail system. Although the association was not prevented from using other school facilities to communicate with teachers, it and two of its members filed suit under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983. After first dismissing the union's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the Court granted certiorari. The association argued that the inter-school mail system was a limited public forum from which it could not be excluded because of the periodic use of the system by private non-school-connected groups and its own prior unrestricted access to the system. The Court rejected this argument and reversed, holding, inter alia, that the system was not a forum for public communication and the differential access provided the union and the association enabled the union to fulfill its obligations as exclusive representative of the teachers.
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| Fla. v. Royer, No. 80-2146,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 23, 1983, Decided
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Overview: Narcotic detectives determined that defendant fit the profile of a person transporting illegal drugs because he was carrying heavy American Tourister luggage, was between the ages of 25-35, was casually dressed, appeared pale and nervous, paid for his ticket with cash, and wrote only a name and destination on his luggage tag. When officers stopped defendant and asked to see his identification, the name on the airline ticket did not match defendant's driver's license. Without returning defendant's documents, the officers asked defendant to accompany them to a small room. The officers retrieved defendant's luggage and asked defendant's permission to open the luggage. Defendant handed them a key without giving an affirmative answer. The Court held that defendant's consent was involuntary because defendant was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage. When the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told defendant he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room while retaining his ticket and driver's license, defendant was effectively seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
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| Connick v. Myers, No. 81-1251,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 20, 1983, Decided
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Overview: After an employee was notified that she was being transferred, she distributed a questionnaire to staff members. Her supervisor told her she was being terminated because she refused to accept the transfer. The court held that the employee's discharge did not offend the First Amendment. The questionnaire was an employee grievance concerning internal office policy. The questions posed in the survey were not matters of public concern. The purpose of the questionnaire was to precipitate a vote of no confidence in the supervisor. The functioning of the supervisor's office was endangered, because the employee exercised her rights to speech at the office. The limited First Amendment interest involved in the case did not require the supervisor to tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.
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| L.A. v. Lyons, No. 81-1064,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 20, 1983, Decided
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Overview: Respondent, a motorist injured by the city police when subjected to a choke hold after being stopped for a traffic violation, argued that an injunction directed at the municipality was warranted to prevent respondent and others similarly situated from being threatened with injury in the future. The Court disagreed, explaining that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain respondent's claim for injunctive relief. The Court held that to invoke jurisdiction, respondent was required to show that he was in immediate danger of irreparable injury; neither the existence of past injury nor conjecture over the prospect of some future injury created the case or controversy required for jurisdiction. The Court held that while respondent may have had a claim for damages based on the injury he already sustained, injunctive relief was not available absent a real and immediate likelihood that respondent would again be targeted by the municipality. There was no showing, the Court concluded, that the municipality's revised policy on the use of choke holds would be applied indiscriminately and thereby result in injury to respondent or other citizens.
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| Smith v. Wade, No. 81-1196,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 20, 1983, Decided
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Overview: The inmate sued the guard for violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. The inmate contended the guard knew or should have known that an assault against him was likely when he placed another inmate in his cell who was known for fighting. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The Court held that punitive damages were available in a proper ¿ 1983 case. The guard argued it was not a proper case for punitive damages and that the jury instructions failed to require a finding of actual malicious intent. The court held that malicious intent was not required. In addition, the inmate did not have a more restricted remedy than a person asserting an ordinary tort cause of action and could be awarded punitive damages for recklessness or serious indifference to or disregard of the inmate's rights. The guard contended the trial court erred in not requiring a higher standard for punitive damages than for compensatory damages. The Court found no error. Punitive damages were discretionary with the jury, whereas compensatory damages were not. The same threshold applied, even when the underlying standard was one of recklessness.
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| Hensley v. Eckerhart, No. 81-1244,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 16, 1983, Decided
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Overview: Respondents, on behalf of involuntarily confined persons at a state hospital, filed suit against petitioner hospital officials and members of the Mental Health Commission for civil rights violations. Respondents' complaint related to the constitutionality of the treatment and conditions at the hospital and sought damages for the value of past patient labor. Respondents were successful on one claim and were awarded attorney fees underbased on the entire litigation. Because the district court had not indicated that it considered the relationship between the amount of fee awarded and the fact that respondents were not successful on all of their claims, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded. While finding that the determination of a reasonable fee was based on the hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable rate, the Court held that the outcome of the litigation was a crucial factor in the fee determination. Holding that fees should not be awarded for services on unsuccessful claims that were distinct from the successful claims, the Court remanded for a determination of what fees were reasonable in light of respondents' partial success.
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| Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 8, 1983, Decided
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Overview: A state supreme court ruled to suppress evidence against respondents, a husband and wife, reasoning that the search warrant was based on a confidential informant's tip that did not satisfy the purported "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" prongs for probable cause. Holding instead that probable cause was determined by a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Court reversed. The Court held that probable cause determinations were not susceptible to the rigid, technical methodology that had been read intojurisprudence. The Court held that the elements of an informant's veracity and knowledge should be understood simply as issues that could illuminate the commonsense inquiry of whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. The Court held that this approach comported with the standard of proof for a warrant, which required only the "probability," and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. The Court held that the informant's recitation of detailed facts, though relating to innocent activities, when corroborated by observation by police officers, afforded probable cause to believe that respondents had drugs in their possession.
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| United States v. Place, No. 81-1617,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1983, Decided
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Overview: When defendant arrived at the airport on a Friday afternoon, he was met by drug enforcement agents. When defendant refused to consent to a search of his bags, an agent told him that they were going to take the bags to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. The agents transported the bags to another airport to subject them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog that reacted positively to one of the bags. Ninety minutes had elapsed since the seizure of the bags. The agents retained the bags until Monday morning when they secured a search warrant for the bag wherein they discovered cocaine. The Court affirmed the reversal of defendant's conviction on the basis that the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible. The 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage went beyond the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics. The violation was exacerbated by the agents' failure to accurately inform the defendant where they were transporting his bags, how long he might be dispossessed, and what arrangements would be made for return of the bags if the investigation dispelled the suspicion.
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| Ins v. Chadha, No. 80-1832,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1983, Decided **Together with No. 80-2170, United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., and No. 80-2171, United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: Respondent deportable alien initially brought an action to challenge the constitutionality of the provision in ¿ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1254(c)(2), authorizing the House of Representatives, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow respondent to remain in the United States. The lower court held that the House was without constitutional authority to order respondent alien's deportation because ¿ 244(c)(2) violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and held that the House's action pursuant to ¿ 244(c)(2) was legislative in function and did not fit within any exceptions authorizing one House to act alone. As a result, the House's action was subject to certain checks contained in U.S. Const. art. I, such as the bicameral requirement, presentment to the President, and the Presidential veto. Because the House failed to act in conformity with the express procedures for enacting legislation, the Court held that the congressional veto provision in ¿ 244(c)(2) was severable from the Act and unconstitutional.
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