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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - February - April, 1987
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Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., No. 85-693,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner, a Japanese corporation, manufactured a valve that was sold to respondent, a Taiwanese corporation, who used it in the manufacture of a motorcycle tire. When the tire exploded while the motorcycle owner was driving it in California, the driver filed a products liability action against respondent, who filed a cross-complaint for indemnity against petitioner. The trial court denied petitioner's motion to quash the service of summons, the appellate court reversed, and the state supreme court reversed the appellate court. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that petitioner knew that some of its component parts would be used in products that would be sold in the state did not provide the necessary minimum contacts for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner did nothing to purposely avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state. Therefore, since there were no minimum contacts, the state was estopped by Fourteenth Amendment due process from exercising personal jurisdiction over petitioner. The Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and remanded the case.
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Pa. v. Ritchie, No. 85-1347,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor, as a result of assaults on his minor daughter. During pretrial, defendant attempted to obtain the contents of the file that the Children and Youth Services (CYS) made in its investigation of the victim's complaint, but was denied access, since those files were confidential under Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, ? 2215(a) (1986). The state supreme court vacated the conviction, remanded the case, and ordered the court to allow defendant's attorney full access to the files. On appeal, the court held that U.S. Const. amend. VI granted defendant the right to confront his witnesses at trial. Defendant was entitled to pretrial disclosure of confidential information only if that information were material as determined by the trial court, but his attorney did not have the right to examine the CYS file. Thus, the court affirmed that part of the judgment of the state supreme court and remanded the case for the court to determine if the CYS file contained material, exculpatory evidence, which would warrant a new trial, but reversed the remaining part of the judgment.
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Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1987, Decided
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Overview: When law enforcement officers entered defendant's apartment under exigent circumstances after a bullet was fired into the apartment below, two sets of expensive stereo equipment were noticed by one of the officers. He thought these anomalous in the context of the squalor of the apartment, and moved some of the components in order to read and record their serial numbers. When, after phoning the numbers into headquarters, it was confirmed that a turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, the officer seized the equipment, and defendant was subsequently indicted for robbery. The Court affirmed the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized, holding that the officer's moving of the equipment constituted a "search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry. Such a search was not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because it was not sustainable under the "plain view" doctrine absent probable cause, which was not present by the State's admission.
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School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, No. 85-1277,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Respondent's job as an elementary school teacher was terminated solely because she had three relapses of tuberculosis within two years. She filed an action against petitioners, alleging that she was a handicapped person under ? 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.S. ? 794. The district court held that a contagious disease was not a handicap under the Act, but the decision was reversed by the court of appeals. On certiorari, the Court held that since respondent's tuberculosis was an impairment that limited her activities, she was a handicapped person within the meaning of the Act. The fact that tuberculosis was contagious did not change her handicapped status. However, if her pupils had a significant risk of contracting the disease from her, and no reasonable accommodation could be found to eliminate that risk, then she would not be otherwise qualified for her job, and her discharge was proper. The U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the court of appeals and remanded the case to determine if respondent was otherwise qualified for her job as an elementary school teacher.
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United States v. Dunn, No. 85-998,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Drug enforcement agents began investigating defendant after he purchased large quantities of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs. The agents watched defendant place the chemicals in a barn on his ranch and observed a laboratory. Agents then made a warrantless entry on the property to confirm their suspicions. After obtaining a warrant, the agents arrested defendant. Defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the unlawful warrantless entry. The appellate court also found that the barn was within the protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment because it was within the curtilage of the residence. On appeal, the court held that the barn lay outside the curtilage of the ranch house. The barn was 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from the house itself. The barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. Agents also knew that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home.
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Ins v. Cardoza-Fonseca, No. 85-782,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 9, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Respondent alien brought an action against petitioner government, requesting the withholding of deportation pursuant to ? 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C.S. ? 1252(h), and asylum as a refugee pursuant to ? 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C.S. ? 1158(a). Petitioner argued that ? 243(h), which required an alien to show that he was more likely than not to be subject to persecution, was the same standard that governed applications for asylum under ? 208(a). The lower court rejected petitioner's contention, and the Court affirmed holding that Congress used different, broader language to define the term "refugee," as used in ? 208(a), than it used to describe the class of aliens who had a right to withholding of deportation under ? 243(h). Thus, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Affairs erred in applying the "more likely than not" objective standard of proof from ? 243(h) to respondent's ? 208(a) asylum claim and should have instead applied the more generous, subjective "well founded fear" standard.
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Johnson v. Transportation Agency, No. 85-1129,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 25, 1987, Decided
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Overview: The agency noted in its plan that women were represented in numbers far less than their proportion of the county labor force in both the agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories. The male employee argued that he was more qualified than the female employee, and, thus, the promotion violated Title VII. The Court affirmed the judgment of reversal. In so doing, the Court held that (1) the agency appropriately took into account as one factor the sex of the female employee in determining that she should have been promoted to the road dispatcher position; (2) the decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan that represented a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the agency's work force; and (4) such a plan was fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodied the contribution that voluntary employer action could make in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace.
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O'Connor v. Ortega, No. 85-530,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 31, 1987, Decided
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Overview: While respondent was on paid administrative leave during an investigation of various charges of wrongdoing, petitioners caused his office to be entered and repeatedly searched. Several items were seized and later used in disciplinary proceedings. Respondent sued, claiming the warrantless search of his office violated his Fourth Amendment rights. On cross-motions, summary judgment was entered for petitioners, but the court of appeals reversed and ordered that partial summary judgment be entered for respondent on the issue of liability. On further review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that neither party was entitled to summary judgment. A majority of the Court agreed that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, subject to Fourth Amendment protection, but a plurality was of the opinion that there was a genuine issue as to the reasonableness of the inception and scope of the search, precluding summary judgment. Another justice concurring in the judgment wrote that the incomplete evidence in the record could not support a summary judgment.
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Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, No. 85-1043,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 6, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Respondent employee was injured at work and sought permanent disability benefits under a policy purchased from petitioner insurance company. After termination of his benefits, respondent sued petitioner on various state law counts related to insurer good faith. The circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's holding that respondent's common law claims were preempted by ERISA. The Court granted certiorari and reversed. It held that respondent's common law causes of action were preempted because they did not fall under the exemption for law that "regulates insurance" set forth in 29 U.S.C.S. ? 1144(b)(2)(B). The court reasoned that the state law of good faith was not a law that "regulated insurance" for purposes of the exemption under its common sense meaning, and because it did not define the terms of the relationship between insurer and insured. The Court held further that the language, structure, and legislative history of ERISA required the conclusion that its civil enforcement provisions were meant to establish an exclusive remedy for violations related to employee benefit plans.
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McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 22, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder. At the penalty hearing, the jury imposed the death penalty because petitioner did not provide any mitigating circumstances. The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision and denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court in which he alleged the state's capital sentencing process was administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner based his claims on a study that indicated a risk that racial consideration entered into capital sentencing determinations. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court held that the statistical study did not present substantial evidence that would require a reversal of petitioner's conviction. The Court concluded that the lower court had properly applied Georgia law.
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