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| Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, No. 86-836,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 13, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The students brought an action against petitioners for allegedly violating their rights under. The principal did not believe the students' articles were appropriate for publication because the identity of the students in the articles would be easily ascertained. The principal made the decision to eliminate two pages from the newspaper, which removed the articles from publication. The district court found in favor of petitioners but the appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court because the Court found that the principal's actions were not unreasonable. The Court found that public schools did not possess all of the attributes of streets and other traditional public forums. The school had an interest in protecting the identity of the students in a pregnancy article as well as maintaining the integrity of student speech allowed in the school newspaper. Therefore, no violations ofrights occurred.
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| Honig v. Doe, No. 86-728,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 20, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The students maintained that their indefinite suspension in aid of expulsion constituted a prohibited "change in placement" under 20 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1415(e)(3), the "stay-put" provision of the EHA, under which a child whose placement was under review was to remain in his current placement pending completion of review unless the parents and school agreed otherwise. The appellate court agreed and required the state to provide services directly if the local school could not; it also ruled that a 30-day suspension would not violate ¿ 1415(e)(3). On appeal, the court modified the order to provide that a 10 day suspension did not violate ¿ 1415(e)(3) and otherwise affirmed the judgment. The court held that under ¿ 1415(e)(3), state or local school authorities could not exclude disabled students from the classroom during the pendency of proceedings to review decisions concerning their education, for dangerous or disruptive conduct that grew out of the students' disabilities. Moreover, a court had power to order the state to provide services if the local school could or would not. Finally, a suspension greater than 10 days constituted a "change in placement" prohibited by ¿ 1415(e)(3).
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| Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, No. 86-1278,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1988, Decided
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Overview: Respondent brought suit against petitioner for libel, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication of his caricature in an ad parody. The jury awarded damages on the intentional infliction of emotional distress charge, and the court of appeals affirmed the award. Petitioner sought certiorari claiming the damages were inconsistent with the First Amendment. On review, the Court found that respondent, as a public figure, was required to show that the statements published in the advertisement parody were made with actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth. The Court found that the award of damages was inconsistent with the Court's longstanding refusal to allow damages just because a particular form of speech may have had an adverse emotional impact on the audience. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was accordingly reversed.
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| Basic Inc. v. Levinson, No. 86-279,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 7, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals as to the standard of materiality applicable to premerger discussions and to determine whether the courts properly imposed a presumption of reliance in certifying class members in an action alleging violations of ¿ 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 78A et seq., and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. ¿ 240.10b-5 (1987). The Court held that an omitted fact was material if a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in making his or her vote and this standard should be applied to all ¿ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions. The Court also held that materiality required a case by case review of the facts and that a rebuttable presumption existed that stockholders relied on available information when buying or selling securities. The judgment of the court of appeals was accordingly reversed and remanded.
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| Huddleston v. United States, No. 87-6,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 2, 1988, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner challenged his conviction of possessing stolen property in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. ¿ 659, on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of "similar acts" involving petitioner's previous sale of stolen televisions, on the issue of petitioner's knowledge, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The intermediate court affirmed, and on certiorari, the court affirmed the intermediate court's decision, holding that the trial court properly allowed the evidence to go to the jury. The court held that the trial court was not required to make a preliminary finding that respondent had proved commission of the similar acts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the trial court had only to determine that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), that its probative value outweighed its potential for prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403, and that it was relevant. The trial court properly concluded that the evidence was relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402, as enforced through Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) and (b), because the jury could reasonably have found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the televisions were stolen.
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| California v. Greenwood, No. 86-684,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 16, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The arrestees claimed that they had exhibited an expectation of privacy in the trash that was searched by the police because it was in opaque bags on the street for collection at a fixed time and there was little likelihood that it would be inspected by anyone. The court held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home because there was no subjective expectation of privacy in the garbage that society accepted as objectively reasonable. The garbage was sufficiently exposed and did not have Fourth Amendment protection because it was deposited in an area particularly suited for public inspection for the express purpose of having strangers take it. The court concluded that the police could not reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.
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| Pinter v. Dahl, No. 86-805,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The controversy arose out of the sale prior to 1982 of unregistered securities by petitioner to respondent investors. When the subject venture failed, respondents brought suit against petitioner, seeking recission under ¿ 12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 771(1), for the unlawful sale of unregistered securities. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging that respondents' suit was barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto. The lower court granted judgment for respondents and held that the doctrine of in pari delicto was inapplicable in an action under ¿ 12(1) and that respondent was not considered a seller within the meaning of ¿ 12(1). The Court reversed and held that the common-law in pari delicto defense was available in a private action brought under ¿ 12(1). Moreover, the Court held that one did not have to confer a benefit on himself or on a third party in order to qualify as a seller within the meaning of ¿ 12(1). Thus, the Court remanded for a determination of whether respondent bore substantially equal responsibility for the failure to register and distribute the securities and whether respondent was primarily a promoter of the offering.
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| Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., No. 87-499,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 17, 1988, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners, a former employee of respondent and his company, brought action under federal antitrust law and state law, alleging that respondent falsely accused petitioners of misappropriating trade secrets when they were not protected because respondent's patents were invalid. The district court awarded summary judgment to petitioners, respondent appealed to the federal circuit court of appeals, which held that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the case to the appeals court for the seventh circuit, which transferred the case back. The federal circuit adhered to its jurisdictional ruling, but nevertheless reversed the district court on the merits. The Court granted certiorari, vacated the federal circuit's judgment, and remanded for transfer to the seventh circuit, holding that the federal circuit lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. ¿¿ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a), because the case did not arise under federal patent law. The Court applied the well-pleaded complaint rule and held that the patent law issue was not necessary to the success of petitioners' claims because there were reasons unrelated to patent law why petitioners may or may not be entitled to relief.
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| Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., No. 86-1908,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1988, Decided
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Overview: Relying on the parties' contractual forum-selection clause, the nationwide manufacturer filed a motion to transfer the company's action under 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1404(a). The district court denied the motion, reasoning that state law controlled the motion and that state law disfavored contractual forum-selection clauses. The intermediate appellate court reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions that the case be transferred. The intermediate appellate court held that the choice of forum clause in the contract was enforceable as a matter of federal law. The company filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted. The Court disagreed with the intermediate appellate court that the relevant inquiry was whether the choice of forum clause was enforceable. Instead, the Court stated that the relevant inquiry was whether ¿ 1404(a) controlled the nationwide manufacturer's request to give effect to the forum-selection clause and transfer the case. In answering that inquiry, the Court held that ¿ 1404(a) governed the parties' venue dispute.
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| West v. Atkins, No. 87-5096,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1988, Decided
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Overview: The inmate tore his left Achilles tendon while playing volleyball at a state prison in which he was incarcerated. The physician treated the inmate's injury by placing his leg in a series of casts. Thereafter, the inmate filed an action against the physician under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The inmate claimed that the physician failed to provide adequate treatment. The district court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment. The circuit court affirmed. After granting certiorari, the Court determined that the physician's professional and ethical obligation to make independent medical judgments did not set him in conflict with the state and other prison authorities. The Court held that the physician, as an employee of the state, acted under color of state law for purposes of ¿ 1983 when he treated the inmate's injuries. The Court further held that the State bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to the inmate and delegated that function to the physician. The judgment was reversed and remanded.
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