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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - February - May, 1990
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Washington v. Harper, No. 88-599,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 27, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners challenged a decision that held a Washington policy that did not provide a judicial hearing before the involuntary administration of medication violated inmates' constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reviewed the policy and held it allowed authorities to drug inmates against their will if a physician determined the inmate needed the medication, suffered from a mental disorder, and was gravely disabled or presented a risk of serious harm to himself or others. Inmates who refused to take the medication voluntarily could request a hearing before a special committee to review the decision. Inmates had a right to attend the hearing, present evidence, and cross-examine the staff. Continuous treatment could only occur with periodic review by a physician, and inmates could have a new hearing every 180 days. The court recognized that inmates had a Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse treatment. The court reasoned that the right to be free of medication had to be balanced against the state's duty to treat mentally ill inmates and run a safe prison. The court concluded the State's procedures did not deprive inmates of the right to refuse treatment without adequate due process.
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Maryland v. Buie, No. 88-1369,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 28, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Following armed robbery by two men, police arrested defendant in his home after defendant came up from his basement. Police conducted a protective sweep of the basement and found, in plain view, a sweat suit like the one worn in the robbery for which defendant was arrested. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress and convicted defendant, but the court of appeals reversed. The Court granted certiorari and vacated the court of appeal's decision, finding that arresting officers were permitted to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and during, the arrest, and that interest was sufficient to outweigh the possible intrusion. The Court found that no search warrant was required and that officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, the Court held that there had to be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger.
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United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, No. 88-1353,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 28, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The United States Supreme Court reversed the order granting respondent alien's motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of respondent's residence in Mexico. Respondent argued that a search of his residence in Mexico violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure under U.S. Const. amend. IV. The district court held that drug enforcement agents failed to justify the search of respondent's Mexico residence without a warrant. On review the court found that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extended its reach only to the "people," which referred to a class of persons who were part of a national community or who had otherwise developed sufficient connection with the United States to be considered a part of its community. The court distinguished the matter from cases where residents stationed abroad were afforded rights under the Constitution. Because respondent was a citizen of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and because the residence searched was in Mexico, the protections against unreasonable search and seizure had no application.
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Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, No. 88-1719,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 20, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The issue was whether the employees who sought back pay for the union's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation had a right to trial by jury. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitled the employees to a jury trial. The remedy of back pay sought in the action was legal in nature. Therefore, the employees were entitled to a jury trial on all issues presented in their suit. The employees' action encompassed both equitable and legal issues. To recover from the union, the employees had to prove that their employer breached a collective-bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The relief the employees' sought was not restitutionary, and therefore it was not equitable. The back pay was not money wrongfully held by the union, but wages the employees would have received from their employer had the union processed their grievances properly.
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Employment Div. v. Smith, No. 88-1213,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 17, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Respondent employees were fired by a drug rehabilitation organization after ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. The Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because peyote use was criminal under Oregon law, making their discharge work-related "misconduct." The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed on U.S. Const. amend. I, Free Exercise grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but determined that the criminality of peyote use was irrelevant to the employees' constitutional claim. The United States Supreme Court held that the criminality of peyote use was relevant, but remanded for a determination of the applicability of the law to sacramental peyote use. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute prohibited religious use and violated the Free Exercise Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Free Exercise Clause was inapplicable because the state law was not aimed at promoting or restricting religious beliefs. Because the employees' peyote use was prohibited and the prohibition was constitutional, Oregon could deny unemployment compensation.
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Minnesota v. Olson, No. 88-1916,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 18, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The state supreme court reversed defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and second-degree assault finding that the arrest was illegal because there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. The state then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the order. On review, the Court held that defendant, as an overnight guest, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host's home. The Court held that the expectation was rooted in understandings that were recognized and permitted by society, it was legitimate, and that defendant could have claimed the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Court held that the state supreme court correctly applied the standard in determining whether exigent circumstances existed in the officers' warrantless entry of the home. The Court affirmed the order from the state supreme court.
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Stewart v. Abend, No. 88-2102,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 24, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The author of a pre-existing work agreed to assign the rights in his renewal copyright term to petitioners, owners of a derivative work, but the author died before the commencement of the renewal period. The author's executor renewed the copyright and assigned the renewal right to respondent, who brought an action for copyright infringement as a result of petitioners' continued release of the derivative work. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, which found that petitioners' continued use constituted infringement. The Supreme Court held that the rights of the owner of a copyright in the derivative use of the pre-existing work were not extinguished once it was incorporated into the derivative work. Since the author died prior to the renewal period, the grant of rights to petitioners in the pre-existing work lapsed and petitioners' right to use those portions of the pre-existing work incorporated into the derivative work expired.
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Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., No. 89-44,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 29, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner nonresident challenged an appeals court decision that held that the forum state had a valid jurisdictional predicate for in personam jurisdiction over petitioner in a pending divorce action in the forum state because petitioner had been present in the forum state and personally served with process. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court. The forum state had jurisdiction over petitioner after he was served with process while temporarily in the state for activities unrelated to the pending divorce action. Due process under U.S. Const. amend. XIV was satisfied because nothing in the line of cases supporting the minimum contacts doctrine supported the proposition that physical presence was itself insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
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Taylor v. United States, No. 88-7194,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 29, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Defendant's sentence was enhanced pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. ? 924(e), based on defendant's prior convictions, two of which were burglary. Defendant argued that his burglary convictions were not to be counted for enhancement purposes, because they did not involve conduct that presented a serious risk of personal injury to another under 18 U.S.C.S. ? 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court found that a person was convicted of burglary for purposes of sentence enhancement under ? 924(e) if he was convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition, having the basic elements of unlawful entry. The Court found that ? 924(e) required a trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, rather than the particular facts underlying the conviction. The Court noted that, in the state in which defendant received his burglary convictions, most but not all of the burglary statutes included all the elements of generic burglary. But, because the Court could not ascertain which of those statutes were the bases for defendant's prior convictions, the Court remanded.
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