|
|
| |
Access State and Federal Case Law, plus U.S. Supreme Court cases —
for free!
Click on any of the case links below to view the full text of that case —
for free — through lexisONE®, a legal research and news service from LexisNexis®. Login is required — registration is free!
|
| |
Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - January - May, 1994
|
| |
Albright v. Oliver, No. 92-833,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 24, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner surrendered to the officer after a warrant was issued for his arrest for selling a substance that looked like an illegal drug. The prosecution was later dismissed for failing to state an offense under Illinois law. Petitioner then alleged a ? 1983 claim against the officer, claiming that he was denied a substantive due process "liberty" right to be free of criminal prosecution not based upon probable cause. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the claim was to be considered under the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, which did not afford petitioner relief. The Court reasoned that petitioner's surrender to the authorities constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court explained that where a particular amendment provided an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular government behavior, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, was the guide for analyzing such claims. The Court expressed no view as to whether petitioner's claim could have succeeded under the Fourth Amendment because that question was not presented in the petition for certiorari.
|
|
| |
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, No. 92-1292,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 7, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioners, a rap music group, were sued by respondent, the corporate owner of an original rock ballad, for copyright infringement. Petitioners claimed the song was a parody entitled to fair use protection under the Copyright Act of 1976,. The court below found the commercial purpose of petitioner's parody had prevented it from being a fair use. That judgment was reversed on appeal because the Court found it was error for the court below to have concluded that the commercial nature of petitioners' parody had rendered it presumptively unfair. The Court held that no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either, the character and purpose of the use, or, market harm, in determining whether tranformative use, such as parody, was a fair one. The Court held that a parody's commercial character, which tended to weigh against a finding of fair use, was only one element that should be weighed in a fair use enquiry. Therefore, the court below was found to have given insufficient consideration to the nature of the parody under the fair use factors as set forth inin weighing the degree of copying.
|
|
| |
Liteky v. United States, No. 92-6921,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 7, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioners sought review of the judgment denying their motion to disqualify the district court judge from presiding over their trial for willful destruction of property of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. ? 1361. Petitioners' motion relied on events occurring during an earlier trial of petitioner priest. The court held that under ? 455(a) recusal was required whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The court further held that under ? 455(a), the presence of an extrajudicial source did not establish bias, and the absence of an extrajudicial source did not preclude bias. In addition, the opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, did not amount to bias or partiality unless they displayed a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Finally, the court held that when intrajudicial behavior was at issue, manifestations of animosity had to be much more than subtle to establish bias. Accordingly, the judgment denying petitioners' motion for recusal was affirmed.
|
|
| |
Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., No. 92-854,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 19, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner served as an indenture trustee for bonds issued to finance public improvements for the local public building authority. Petitioner had become aware that the appraisals on the land securing the bonds may have been optimistic. Petitioner ordered an independent review but postponed it. Thereafter, the authority defaulted on the bonds. Respondents sued petitioner for being secondarily liable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. ? 78j, for its conduct in aiding and abetting the authority's fraud. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the appellate court reinstated it. Petitioner appealed. The court held that a private action for aiding and abetting could not be maintained under 17 C.F.R. ? 240.10b-5 (1993) for acts prohibited by 15 U.S.C.S. ? 78j. Only primary violators were liable under ? 78j. Respondents' complaint did not allege that petitioner was a primary violator. Therefore, the court reversed the appellate court's decision.
|
|
| |
J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., No. 92-1239,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 19, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Respondent had filed a complaint for paternity against petitioner. Respondent used most of its peremptory challenges to remove male jurors. As a result, the jury was comprised of all women. Petitioner claimed that respondent's use of peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors on the basis of their gender violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to gender-based peremptory challenges. In reversing the appellate court's decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender regardless of whether the challenge involved a male or female. Respondent cited studies that concluded that women and men had varying attitudes as support for its gender-based peremptory challenges. The Court held that respondent's reasoning did not provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender-based discrimination. As a result, respondent's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause.
|
|
| |
Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., No. 92-757,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 26, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial in a Title VII case against respondent for sexual harassment even though respondent had committed the discrimination and petitioner was left without an equitable remedy. During appeal, the Act became effective and granted the right to a jury trial for cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. ? 2000e et seq. The Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply the law in effect at the time the discriminatory conduct occurred, or the law that became effective during the appeal. The Court affirmed the circuit court's determination and did not give the Act a retrospective application. The Court reviewed congressional intent on whether the Act was retrospective. The Court determined that no express or implied intent had been given. The Court examined the presumption against statutory retroactivity. Further, because a retroactive interpretation would have caused a contrary reading in the Act, the Court affirmed the circuit court's refusal to grant retroactive operation.
|
|
| |
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 93-263,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 16, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The court reversed a judgment ruling that after dismissal of an action pursuant to a settlement agreement, a district court had jurisdiction to decide an enforcement motion under its inherent supervisory power. After petitioner sued respondent in a state court, respondent removed the case to a federal district court on the basis of diversity. Thereafter, the parties agreed to settle all claims and moved to dismiss the complaint and cross-complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii). In the dismissal order, the district judge did not reference the settlement agreement or reserve jurisdiction to enforce it. The court held that respondent could not subsequently seek to enforce the settlement agreement in the federal district court, and that enforcement of the settlement agreement was for the state courts. Specifically, the alleged breach of an agreement that produced the dismissal of an earlier federal suit was no basis for federal court jurisdiction over the agreement in dispute. Further, the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction was not warranted where the dismissal order was in no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement agreement.
|
|
| |
Bfp v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 92-1370,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 23, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner was a partnership formed for the purpose of buying a home. Petitioner took title to property subject to a first deed of trust in favor of respondent savings association. Respondent savings association entered a notice of default under the first deed of trust and scheduled a properly noticed foreclosure sale. The foreclosure proceeding was completed, and the home was purchased by respondent buyer. Petitioner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and filed a complaint seeking to set aside the conveyance on the grounds that the sale constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C.S. ? 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court denied the petition, and the trial court and the appellate court affirmed the decision. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. The Court held that the consideration received from the non-collusive real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted in conformance with applicable state law satisfied the requirement of ? 548(a)(2) that transfers of property by insolvent debtors within one year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition be in exchange for a reasonably equivalent value.
|
|
| |
Staples v. United States, No. 92-1441,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 23, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Petitioner was indicted for unlawful possession of an unregistered machinegun in violation of the National Firearms Act (Act), 26 U.S.C.S. ? 5861(d) following the recovery of a weapon from petitioner's home. At trial, petitioner testified that the weapon had never fired automatically when it was in his possession, and that he was ignorant of the weapon's automatic firing capability. The district court rejected petitioner's contention that ? 5861(d) contained a mens rea requirement. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced for the offense, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded, holding that to obtain a conviction under the Act, the government was required to prove that petitioner knew of the features of his weapon that brought it within the scope of the Act. The court noted that the silence as to the mens rea requirement in ? 5861(d) did not suggest a congressional intent that such requirement be eliminated. The court noted that the potentially harsh penalty attached to a violation of ? 5861(d) provided further support for the proposition that a mens rea requirement existed.
|
|
| |
Waters v. Churchill, No. 92-1450,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 31, 1994, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The employee was a nurse in the employer's obstetrics department. A nurse in another department was considering transferring to obstetrics and asked the employee's opinion about the department. The employee allegedly informed the trainee that things were bad in obstetrics and complained about her supervisor. The conversation was reported to the employee's supervisor. After an investigation, the employee was discharged without asking the employee her side of the story. The employee filed an internal grievance that the hospital president reviewed. The employee alleged that the conversation concerned how the hospital's cross-training program adversely affected patient care and that she was terminated because she had previously criticized the cross-training program. After investigation, the president rejected the employee's grievance. The employee brought an action under 42 U.S.C.S. ? 1983 and alleged that her termination violated her U. S. Const. amend. I right of free speech. The court remanded for further proceedings because the employee produced enough evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact about the employer's actual motivation for the employee's job termination.
|
|
| |
Back to Top |
| |
|
Worldwide
Feedback
Feedback