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| Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, No. 93-1001,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 18, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Respondent bought a house containing termites from respondent homeowner and sued for damages. Respondent homeowner had contracted with petitioner termite company earlier for service and signed a contract that contained an arbitration clause for all disputes. After respondent brought suit in state court, petitioner brought a motion to stay the proceedings under the arbitration clause and the Federal Arbitration Act (Act), 9 U.S.C.S. § 2. The state court ruled that the clause was unenforceable, as the parties did not contemplate activities involving interstate commerce under the Act. Petitioner appealed the ruling, and the court held that the Act applied to all disputes involving commerce. The court gave the Act a broad reading and enforced the arbitration clause between the parties. The court reversed and remanded for the parties to arbitrate their disagreements.
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| McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., No. 93-1543,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 23, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Fearing that the employer would fire her because of her age of 62 years, the worker gained access to and copied several of the employer's confidential documents. When she was discharged as part of a claimed reduction in force, the worker sued under the ADEA. During discovery, the employer learned that the worker had copied its confidential records, so it sent her another termination letter, stating that she was discharged for misconduct. Summary judgment was then entered for the employer on a ruling that the after-discovered misconduct precluded recovery under ADEA because misconduct was a legitimate, non-age related reason for discharge. The court of appeals agreed, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing which would have resulted in discharge if discovered earlier did not bar, in law or equity, the worker from any relief under the ADEA, which was intended to eradicate invidious bias in the workplace. If age was the basis for her discharge, the worker was entitled to damages that included backpay up to the time the employer learned of her misconduct.
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| Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-7901,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 23, 1995, Decided
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Overview: In evaluating the inmate's petition for habeas corpus, the intermediate appellate court applied the Sawyer standard and held that the inmate had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have found him guilty. In his petition for a writ of certiorari, the inmate argued that the Sawyer standard did not apply to his claim of actual innocence and that, in any event, the intermediate appellate court misapplied the Sawyer standard. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the inmate's petition and held that the Carrier standard, not the more stringent Sawyer standard, governed the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who had been sentenced to death raised a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his constitutional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, in applying the Carrier standard in the context of the inmate's request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court should have focused on the likely behavior of the trier of fact and should have assessed the probative force of the inmate's new evidence in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.
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| Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., No. 93-404,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 28, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners, the sole shareholders of a corporation, privately sold all of the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation to respondent, a corporation created to effect the sale of the stock. After the financial recitations provided for in the purchase agreement were discovered to have been inaccurate, respondent sought recission of the purchase under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.S. § 77l(2), even though petitioners agreed to pay an adjustment. The court below reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of petitioners after finding § 12(2)'s right of action for recission applied to any communication that offered any security for sale, including the stock purchase agreement at issue. On appeal, the Court found that the word "prospectus," as used in the Securities Act of 1933 (Act), was a term of art referring to a document that described a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder. Therefore, the judgment of the court below was reversed because the contract of sale, and its recitations, were not held out to the public and were not a prospectus as the term was used in the Act.
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| Ariz. v. Evans, No. 93-1660,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 1, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner's initial detention of respondent, which led to arrest for possession of marijuana, was based on incorrect computer data. Respondent argued the arrest should be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful arrest. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, the appellate court reversed, the state supreme court reversed, and petitioner appealed. The issue was whether evidence seized in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV by an officer who acted in reliance on an erroneous police record due to a clerical error made by court personnel, must be suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary rule regardless of the source of the error. The Court applied Leon and reversed the suppression order notwithstanding erroneous information due to court clerical error because there was no evidence the arresting officer was not acting objectively reasonably and application of Leon supported a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors committed by court employees.
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| Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, No. 94-18,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 6, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners opened a stock account with respondent brokerage company and claimed that respondent mishandled their account. Petitioners sued respondent in federal court, and respondent successfully stayed the proceeding, claiming that their agreement with petitioners required all disputes to go before an arbitration panel, applying New York law as its choice of law. An arbitration panel convened and found in favor of petitioners, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Respondent challenged the award of punitive damages, arguing that under New York law, arbitrators were not permitted to award punitive damages. On appeal, the court held that the agreement requiring that New York law applied meant that only New York's substantive law was applicable to the parties' dispute, and not its provisions limiting an arbitrator's award. The court determined that the parties' agreement permitted punitive damages from arbitrators and so enforced the panel's award.
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| Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., No. 93-1577,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 28, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner sought review of a judgment that set aside a judgment that respondent infringed on petitioner's trademark, in violation of 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114(1), premised on a holding that a trademark could not be obtained for a color alone. The court held that a color, to the extent it met the ordinary requirements to register a trademark, was registerable. The court also held a color could satisfy the part of the statutory definition of a trademark, which required a person to "use" or "intend to use" the mark to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source was unknown, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127. The court held, however, that to the extent that a color was functional, the mark would have to be examined to determine if its use as a mark would permit one competitor to interfere with legitimate competition. Accordingly, the judgment that held petitioner could not register a color as a trademark was reversed.
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| Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, No. 93-1121,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 18, 1995, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner investors previously brought an action against respondent securities investment company for fraud and deceit in the sale and exchange of stock in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. 240. Petitioners' action was dismissed with prejudice and became final after petitioner did not file an appeal. Subsequently, § 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78aa-1, was codified. Petitioners then sought to have their action reinstated pursuant to § 27A. The district court found that the section required the reinstatement of petitioners' action, yet found the section to be unconstitutional and denied petitioners' motion, which was affirmed by the appellate court. After granting certiorari, the Court found § 27A to be unconstitutional and affirmed the decision of the lower court. Section 27A, by retroactively commanding federal courts to reopen final judgments, violated the fundamental principle that a judgment conclusively resolves the case. Thus, the separation of powers principle was violated by § 27A, when Congress codified the section.
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