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| Old Chief v. United States, No. 95-6556.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 7, 1997, Decided
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Overview: The charges against defendant resulted from a fracas involving at least one gunshot. Before trial, defendant moved for an order prohibiting the government from mentioning or offering into evidence any testimony regarding his prior criminal conviction for assault causing serious bodily injury, except to state that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year. Defendant also offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of such a crime. The government refused the offered stipulation, and the district court ruled that the government was not required to so stipulate. The government introduced at trial, over defendant's objection, the order of judgment and commitment for defendant's prior conviction. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, and the appellate court affirmed. On certiorari review, defendant argued that his offer to stipulate rendered the prior conviction inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403. The Court agreed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting defendant's record of conviction because its discounted probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
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| Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 18, 1997, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner former employee filed an action against respondent employer for retaliatory discrimination under ¿ 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e-3(a). The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action on the ground that the term "employees" in ¿ 704(a) was limited to current employees and invalidated petitioner's action. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court reversed. Considering the statutory language, its specific context, and the statute's broader context, the Court held that the term "employees" as used in ¿ 704(a) was ambiguous. The Court resolved the ambiguity by reference to other sections in the statute. It concluded that several sections plainly contemplated that former employees would make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII. Section 704(a) expressly protected employees from retaliation for filing a "charge" under Title VII, and a charge alleging unlawful discharge, 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e-2(a), would necessarily be brought by a former employee. Thus, it was more consistent to include former employees within the scope of "employees" protected by ¿ 704(a).
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| Auer v. Robbins, No. 95-897.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 19, 1997, Decided
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Overview: Police officers sought payment from the police commissioners' board for overtime. The court of appeals held that the police officers met both the salary-basis test and the duties test for exemption under 29 U.S.C.S. ¿ 213(a)(1) and were exempt from overtime under the FLSA. The Court held (1) the salary-basis test applied to public-sector employees under 29 C.F.R. ¿¿ 553.2(b) and 553.32(c), (2) the Secretary of Labor's salary basis test, including the no disciplinary deductions element, was not an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory exemption to the FLSA as it applied to public-sector employees, (3) the mere possibility of an improper deduction in pay did not defeat an employee's salaried status if no practice of making deductions existed, (4) the Secretary of Labor permissibly interpreted the salary-basis test to deny exempt status when employees were covered by an employment policy that effectively communicated that deductions would be made in specified circumstances, such as disciplinary matters, and (5) the police commissioner's board was entitled to preserve one police officer's exempt status by complying with the corrective provision in 29 C.F.R. ¿ 541.118(a)(6).
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| Md. v. Wilson, No. 95-1268.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 19, 1997, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was a front-seat passenger in a car that was stopped by a state trooper after pursuit. The state trooper ordered defendant out of the car. When defendant exited the car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. Before defendant's trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, he moved to suppress the evidence because the state trooper's ordering him to exit the car constituted an unreasonable seizure under the U.S. Const. amend. IV. On appeal, defendant argued that that general rule that police officers may order a driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures did not extend to passengers. After applying a test that balanced the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers, the Court held that the rule extended to passengers.
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| Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., No. 95-728,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 3, 1997, Decided
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Overview: The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded for further proceedings, as the court below, in deciding that petitioner infringed upon respondent's patent, failed to consider all of the requirements under the doctrine of equivalents. Petitioner's primary argument was that the doctrine of equivalents did not survive the 1952 revision of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.S. ¿ 100 et seq. The Court declined to depart from the established doctrine of equivalents, noting that the 1952 Patent Act was not materially different from the 1870 Patent Act with regard to claiming, reissue, and the role of the Patent and Trademark Office. Further, 35 U.S.C.S. ¿ 112, P6, an added provision, was silent on the doctrine of equivalents as applied where there was no literal infringement. The Court stated that the lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly supported adherence to its refusal, in prior case law, to find that the Patent Act conflicted with the doctrine.
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| Bennett v. Spear, No. 95-813,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 19, 1997, Decided
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Overview: On review, the Court held that the court of appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of irrigation districts' claims because their complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish the elements of standing as required by U.S. Const. art. III. Irrigation districts further met the zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the citizen-suit provision, 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1540(g) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1531 et seq. The Court held that irrigation districts' 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1533 claim was the only violation reviewable under the citizen-suit provision of 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1540(g)(1)(C), because the Secretary's omission of the required procedures of decisionmaking was the basis of that claim, and that the claims under 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1536 were not reviewable under either 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1540(g)(1)(C) or 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1540(g)(1)(A), because the Secretary's conduct in implementing or enforcing the ESA was not a violation of the ESA within the meaning of those provisions. The 16 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1536 claims, based on the Biological Opinion, which was a final action, plainly were within the zone-of-interests that protected by ¿ 1356 and thus were reviewable under the APA, 5 U.S.C.S. ¿ 701 et seq.
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| Bd. of the County Comm'Rs v. Brown, No. 95-1100,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 28, 1997, Decided
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Overview: The Court granted certiorari to decide whether the county was properly held liable for respondent's injuries based on the sheriff's single decision to hire the officer who caused the injuries. Although the municipality could be held liable as a "person" under ¿ 1983, it could not be held liable solely because it employed a tortfeasor. Vicarious liability could not be imposed on the governing body solely on the basis of the employer-employee relationship. Respondent was required to identify a municipal policy or custom that caused her injuries. It was not sufficient for respondent merely to identify conduct attributable to the county, such as the one-time decision to hire, she also had to demonstrate that through its deliberate conduct, the county was the moving force behind the injury and that municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability. The Court found that the lower courts failed to test the link between the officer's background and the risk that, if hired, he would use excessive force. The mere probability that the sheriff used inadequate screening was insufficient to impose municipal liability.
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| Clinton v. Jones, No. 95-1853,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 27, 1997, Decided
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Overview: Respondent, a private citizen, sought to recover damages from petitioner, the President of the U.S., based on actions that allegedly took place before his term began. Petitioner argued that in all but the most exceptional cases, the U.S. Constitution requires federal courts to delay such litigation until the President's term ends. The court held that the doctrine of separation of powers did not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. However, the court held that it was appropriate for the district court to consider potential burdens on the President in evaluating the management of the case. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to delay the trial until after petitioner leaves office.
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| Agostini v. Felton, Nos. 96-552, 96-553,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1997, * Decided*Together with No. 96-553, Chancellor, Board of Education of the City of New York, et al. v. Felton et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: This action arose from a case in which U.S. Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I, barred a city from sending public school teachers into parochial schools to provide education to disadvantaged children pursuant to a congressionally mandated program. On remand, the district court entered a permanent injunction reflecting the ruling. Twelve years later, petitioners sought relief from its operation as a result of intervening Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court overruled its prior decision holding that a federally funded program providing instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis was valid under the Establishment Clause when such instruction was given on the premises of sectarian schools by government employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those present in this case.
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| Kan. v. Hendricks, Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1997, * Decided*Together with No. 95-9075, Hendricks v. Kansas, also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: Inmate was committed as a sexually violent predator after the trial court found that pedophilia was a mental abnormality as defined by Kan. Stat. Ann. ¿ 59-29a02(b) (1994). The court held that the Act satisfied due process requirements because it unambiguously required a finding of dangerousness either to one's self or to others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement. Commitment proceedings were initiated only when a person had been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that made the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence. Kan. Stat. Ann. ¿ 59-29a02(a) (1994). As the Act did not establish criminal proceedings and because the involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act was not punitive, inmate's involuntary detention did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, even though the confinement followed a prison term. Because the Act did not impose punishment, did not criminalize conduct legal before its enactment, or deprive inmate of any defense that was available to him at the time of his crimes, the Act was not impermissible under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
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