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| Grayned v. City of Rockford, No. 70-5106,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1972, Decided
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Overview: Appellant demonstrator was convicted of violating an antipicketing and an antinoise ordinance while demonstrating in front of a school. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of each ordinance by appealing directly to the state supreme court, which held that both ordinances were constitutional on their face. On appeal on a writ of certiorari, the Court reversed the court below with respect to the antipicketing ordinance because it was unconstitutional, but affirmed the court below with respect to the antinoise ordinance. The Court held that the antinoise ordinance was not impermissibly vague because it was written specifically for the school context, where the prohibited disturbances were easily measured by their impact on the school. The antinoise ordinance was narrowly tailored to further the city's compelling interest in having an undisrupted school session, and did not unnecessarily interfere with U.S. Const. amend. I rights. The ordinance did not give license to punish appellant because of what he was saying, but represented a considered legislative judgment that demonstrating should be restricted at a particular time and place, in order to protect the schools.
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| Bd. of Regents v. Roth, No. 71-162,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1972, Decided
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Overview: The professor was hired for his first teaching job as an assistant professor at a state-run university. He was hired for a fixed term of one year and was not re-hired the following year. The professor brought suit against the university alleging that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the university never gave him a reason for their decision not to re-hire him and further he had no opportunity to challenge their decision at a hearing. The lower court granted summary judgment on the procedural issue and ordered the university to provide the professor with reasons and a hearing. The appellate court affirmed and the board of regents sought review. On review, the Court held that the professor had no protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted for term, therefore, there could be no Fourteenth Amendment protection. The decision of the lower court and the appellate court was reversed and the case was remanded.
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| Branzburg v. Hayes, No. 70-85,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1972, Decided **Together with No. 70-94, In re Pappas, on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, also argued February 23, 1972, and No. 70-57, United States v. Caldwell, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, argued February 22, 1972.
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Overview: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, and held that petitioner, a newspaper staff reporter, had to appear before a grand jury to answer questions put to him, as the Constitution of the United States did not exempt petitioner from performing the normal citizen's duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury's task. Petitioner, who was subpoenaed by the grand jury, contended that the Kentucky reporters' privilege statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. ¿ 421.100 (1962), U.S. Const. amend. I, or ¿¿ 1, 2, and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution authorized his refusal to answer. The Court perceived no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings was insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that petitioner argued would result from insisting that he answer to the grand jury. Moreover, the evidence failed to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if the Court reaffirmed the prior common law and constitutional rule regarding testimonial obligations of newspaper reporters.
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| Furman v. Ga., No. 69-5003,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1972, Decided **Together with No. 69-5030, Jackson v. Georgia, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 69-5031, Branch v. Texas, on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
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Overview: The prisoners challenged the imposition of the death sentence in petitions for a writ of certiorari. The Court found that the key question was whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty under the laws applicable to the prisoners constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In reversing the judgments, the Court held that the death penalty did violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the application of the penalty was discretionary, haphazard, and discriminatory in that it was inflicted in a small number of the total possible cases and primarily against certain minority groups.
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| Morrissey v. Brewer, No. 71-5103,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1972, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners filed habeas corpus petitions, alleging that they had been denied due process because their paroles had been revoked without a hearing. On review, the court held that the requirements of due process in general applied to parole revocations. The court determined that whether procedural protections were due depended on the extent to which an individual would be condemned to suffer grievous loss. The court held that one's freedom was valuable and, therefore, its termination called for some orderly process. The court ordered that all parole revocations in the future required a simple factual hearing to ensure due process of law. The court reversed the judgments against petitioners and remanded for further consideration.
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| Perry v. Sindermann, No. 70-36,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1972, Decided
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Overview: Respondent was a teacher at a state college. Petitioners, the Board of Regents and the college president, hired him for four successive years under a series of one-year contracts. When respondent's last contract expired, the Board of Regents voted not to offer the teacher a new contract. The regents issued a press release setting forth allegations of the teacher's insubordination; however, they offered no official statement for the nonrenewal of his contract and they allowed him no hearing. The teacher brought suit, claiming that the nonrenewal of his contract was inappropriately based on his criticism of the regents and the college president and was therefore a violation of his right to free speech. The regents argued that a nontenured teacher had no right to continued employment. The Supreme Court held that the right to free speech was totally separate from the issue of tenure and that a factual determination was required. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court that a mere subjective "expectancy" was protected by procedural due process but agreed that the teacher had to be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim and a right to a hearing.
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| Neil v. Biggers, No. 71-586,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 6, 1972, Decided
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Overview: Respondent brought a federal habeas corpus action in the wake of his conviction for rape. Petitioner, the State of Tennessee, argued that respondent's claims were barred by 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2244(c) because respondent's claims had already been adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari. The district court held that respondent's claims were not barred and that the station-house identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process. The court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court held that 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2244(c) did not bar claims on which the judgment of a state court stood because of the absence of a majority position in the Court and that the lower courts thus properly reached the merits. The Court held, however, that the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. The Court found that the victim of the rape spent a considerable period of time with her assailant and that her description to the police was more than ordinarily thorough.
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