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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 24 - December 5, 1977
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Shaffer v. Heitner, No. 75-1812,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1977, Decided
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Overview: Appellants, corporate officers and directors, sought review of judgment in appellee's shareholder derivative suit, contending that Delaware's statute permitting courts of that state to take jurisdiction of a lawsuit by sequestering defendant's property located in the state violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, as it permitted state courts to exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of sufficient contacts with the state. On appeal, judgment was reversed. In support of its ruling, the court held that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe should have been applied to assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction. The court noted that appellant's seized property did not have sufficient contacts with the state to support Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction over appellants. The court further held that appellants had neither purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the state, nor had any reason to expect to be brought before a Delaware court.
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Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., No. 76-316,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1977; as amended Petition for Rehearing Denied October 3, 1977
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Overview: Appellant attorneys were licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona. In direct violation of a disciplinary rule prohibiting attorney advertising that had been promulgated by appellee, the State Bar of Arizona, appellants placed an advertisement in an Arizona newspaper, which stated that they were offering legal services at reasonable fees and which listed their fees for certain services. Appellants sought review of the rule after it was recommended that appellants be temporarily suspended from the practice of law. The state supreme court rejected appellants' arguments that the disciplinary rule violated 15 U.S.C.S. ?? 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and that the rule infringed their U.S. Const. amend. I rights. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the regulation was shielded from Sherman Act attack because the rule was an activity of the state acting as sovereign. However, that part of the judgment dealing with U.S. Const. amend. I was reversed upon the Court's holding that advertising by attorneys could not be subjected to blanket suppression and because the truthful advertisement at issue was found to be protected by U.S. Const. amend. I.
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Dothard v. Rawlinson, No. 76-422,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1977; as amended
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Overview: An applicant applied for a job as a prison guard and was turned down because she did not meet the statutory minimum height and weight requirements. She brought a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C.S. ? 2000e et seq., and under 42 U.S.C.S. ? 1983, alleging that she had been denied employment because of her sex, in violation of federal law. While the suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a regulation that created male only and female only positions in the prison system. The effect was to exclude women from 75 percent of the jobs in the system. She amended her suit to include a claim that the regulation violated federal law. The three-judge panel held that both the statute and regulation violated Title VII. On review, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had shown the statute had a discriminatory effect and that the director had failed to show the challenged requirements were job related. However, the regulation fell within the narrow exception for bona fide occupational qualifications because most of the jobs in Alabama's atypical unclassified system were just too dangerous for women.
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Coker v. Ga., No. 75-5444,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1977; as amended
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Overview: Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to death by a jury. The state supreme court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, and the court granted defendant's writ of certiorari for the limited purpose of determining whether a death sentence for a rape conviction violated the Eighth Amendment, which proscribed cruel and unusual punishments and which must be observed by states as well as the federal government. After conducting an examination of recent death penalty cases that invoked the Eighth Amendment, as well as the trend of state legislatures to pass or repeal laws concerning death sentences for persons convicted of rape, the court held that a sentence of death was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape. It did not matter that Ga. Code Ann. ? 26-2001 (1972) required the existence of an aggravating circumstance in order for the jury to return a death sentence. Imposition of the death penalty for rape cases was cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment.
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Pa. v. Mimms, No. 76-1830,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 5, 1977
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Overview: Two police officers spotted respondent driving a vehicle with an expired license plate. The officers stopped the vehicle and asked respondent to step out of the car and produce his license. When respondent exited the vehicle, the officer noticed a large bulge under his sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge may be a weapon, the officer conducted a "pat down" search and discovered a revolver in his waistband. Upon a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court. The Supreme Court found that respondent was legitimately stopped by the police in order for them to issue him a traffic summons. The fact that respondent was ordered out of his car was only a de minimis intrusion on his freedom. The police had already decided to briefly detain respondent, whether it was inside or outside of the car was irrelevant. The Supreme Court found that the police officer was justified in conducting a limited search of respondent's person for weapons once he reasonably concluded that respondent, who had been legitimately stopped, might be armed. Under these circumstances, any person of reasonable caution would have searched respondent.
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