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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 26 - December 5, 1978
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Franks v. Delaware, No. 77-5176,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1978, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was convicted in state court for rape, kidnapping, and burglary. During petitioner's trial, the state trial court admitted evidence that was obtained pursuant to execution of a search warrant. The police officers' affidavit in support of the search warrant noted the victim's description of her assailant and the police officers' attempt to confirm that petitioner's typical outfit matched that of the assailant. The state supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress evidence and motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial and held that a criminal defendant never had the right to challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police to procure a search warrant. The Court reversed the state supreme court's judgment. The Court held that the inclusion of the evidence under the warrant in petitioner's trial was not harmless error and that the Fourth Amendment and the derivative exclusionary rule applicable to the states allowed petitioner, under the circumstances present in his case, to attack the veracity of the warrant's affidavit after the warrant had been issued and executed.
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Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, No. 77-444,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1978, Decided
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Overview: The court affirmed the judgment holding that defendants had not taken plaintiffs' property without just compensation and did not arbitrarily deprive plaintiffs of their property without Fourteenth Amendment due process of law. The Court held that plaintiffs could not establish a "taking" simply by showing that they had been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they had believed was available for development. The court noted that landmark laws were not like discriminatory or "reverse spot" zoning. The Landmarks Law did not interfere in any way with the terminal's present uses and plaintiffs' primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. The restrictions imposed were substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permitted reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site, but also afforded plaintiffs opportunities further to enhance not only the terminal site, but also other properties.
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Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, No. 76-811,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1978, Decided
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Overview: The Court reversed in part and affirmed in part a judgment declaring a special admissions program unlawful, enjoining petitioner medical school from considering the race of any applicant, and denying respondent an injunction ordering his admission. The Court found that the admissions program involved the unlawful use of an explicit racial classification, thereby disregarding individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent was entitled to a showing that the classification was necessary to promote a substantial state interest because the admissions program hinged on race, an inherently suspect distinction. Petitioner failed to show that the classification was necessary to its goals. Nevertheless, petitioner had a substantial interest that legitimately could be served by the competitive consideration of race. Race could be deemed a "plus," yet not insulate the applicant from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. Petitioner also failed to show that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, respondent would not have been admitted. Therefore, respondent was entitled to the injunction ordering his admission.
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FCC v. Pacifica Found., No. 77-528,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 3, 1978, Decided
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Overview: After the radio station broadcast a humorist's monologue containing indecent language, the FCC issued an order that the language was patently offensive, although not obscene. The Court held that the FCC's action was constitutionally permissible. The action was not forbidden "censorship" within the meaning of 47 U.S.C.S. ? 326 because that statute did not limit the FCC's authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engaged in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. The monologue was indecent under 18 U.S.C.S. ? 1464 because it did not conform to accepted standards of morality; prurient appeal was not an essential component of indecent language. Thus, there was no basis for disagreeing with the FCC's conclusion that indecent language was used in the broadcast. Content that was vulgar, offensive, and shocking was not entitled to absolute protection under the First Amendment.
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Rakas v. Illinois, No. 77-5781,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 5, 1978, Decided
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Overview: The Court affirmed petitioners' convictions for armed robbery because their motion to suppress a sawed-off rifle and shells seized by the police during the search of a vehicle in which petitioners were passengers was properly denied. Noting that the inquiry was essentially the same, the Court expressed that the preferred analysis for determining the scope of constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule focused on the substantive question of whether petitioners had their own rights infringed by the police's search and seizure, rather than on the concept of standing, as previously decided. Further, the Court determined that the appropriate measure of rights was no longer guided solely by whether petitioners were legitimately on the premises that the police searched. Without holding that a property interest was required, the Court decided that U.S. Const. amend. IV protected only those places in which petitioners themselves had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Using this analysis, the Court found that petitioners' rights were not violated where they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no property or possessory interest.
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