 |
|
 |
|
|
Access State and Federal Case Law, plus U.S. Supreme Court cases — for free!
Click on any of the case links below to view the full text of that case — for free — through lexisONE®, a legal research and news service from LexisNexis®. Login is required — registration is free!
While viewing the full text of the case, select from upgrade options to Shepardize® or view the fully-featured case on lexis.com including Core Terms, Shepard's® Signals, Case Summaries, Print Options, and more. lexisONE offers access to comprehensive content and flexible services for faster, more efficient legal research. Review our flexible LexisNexis® subscriptions offered through daily, weekly or monthly research packages.
| Mitchell v. Forsyth, No. 84-335,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 19, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The court affirmed the denial of the petitioner Attorney General's claim to absolute immunity in a suit for damages stemming from a warrantless wiretap. The court held that the Attorney General was not absolutely immune from suit for damages arising out of his allegedly unconstitutional conduct in performing his national security functions on three grounds. No historical or common-law basis for an absolute immunity for officers carrying out tasks essential to national security existed, the performance of national security functions did not subject officers to the same obvious risks of entanglement in litigation, and such officers were not subject to other checks that help to prevent abuses of authority from going unredressed. The court also held that a district court's denial of petitioner's claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turned on an issue of law, was an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, and the court found petitioner immune from suit for his authorization of the wiretap under the qualified immunity exception.
|
|||||
| Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, No. 83-18,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Petitioner, who was in the business of composing and selling financial reports about businesses, mistakenly reported that respondent had filed for bankruptcy. The report was sent to several of petitioner's subscribers. Petitioner issued a corrective statement, but refused to divulge the names of those that received the report. Respondent brought a defamation suit and the jury awarded respondent presumed and punitive damages. However, a new trial was ordered because the court was dissatisfied with its jury instructions regarding petitioner's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed, holding that respondent was not required to show actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages because petitioner was a nonmedia entity. On certiorari the Court affirmed, holding that respondent was not required to show actual malice to recover presumed and punitive damages because petitioner's false and defamatory speech was not a matter of public concern.
|
|||||
| Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, No. 84-233,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Petitioner purchased and produced gas from leased land located in 11 states, and sold most of the gas in interstate commerce. Respondents, royalty owners possessing rights to the gas leases, filed a class action suit against petitioner seeking to recover interest on royalty payments that were delayed by petitioner. Respondents resided in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and several foreign countries. Respondents recovered over petitioners' objections that Kansas was prohibited from adjudicating the claims of all respondents and from applying Kansas law to all the transactions. The state appeals court affirmed the ruling. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the court's jurisdiction over the claims because the parties were given the opportunity to opt out, but reversed its application of Kansas law to all the transactions because Kansas did not have significant contact with each of the class members.
|
|||||
| Marek v. Chesny, No. 83-1437,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The administrator did not accept the police officers' timely settlement offer of $ 100,000 and received an award of $ 60,000. He then filed a request for $ 171,692 in costs, including attorney's fees and costs incurred after the settlement offer. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 did not require that a settlement offer itemize the respective amounts being tendered for settlement of the underlying substantive claim and for costs. The term "costs" in Rule 68 was intended to refer to all costs properly awardable under the relevant substantive statute or other authority. Thus, absent contrary congressional expressions, where the underlying statute defined "costs" to include attorney's fees, such fees were to be included as costs for purposes of Rule 68. The administrator, as a prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action, was entitled to be awarded attorney's fees as part of the costs pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988. Because Congress expressly included attorney's fees as "costs" available to a plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suit, such fees were subject to the cost-shifting provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
|
|||||
| City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., No. 84-468,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 1, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Respondent sought to open a home for the mentally retarded in petitioner city. Under the zoning ordinance, petitioner refused to give respondent the permit. The zoning ordinance specifically restricted the home because the occupants were mentally retarded even though the home complied with space requirements for the occupants. Respondent alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutional and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class. The Court held that to withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguished between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. As no rational purpose was present, the Court held that the ordinance was invalid and remanded the action to the lower court.
|
|||||
| Sedima v. Imrex Co., No. 84-648,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 1, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Petitioner corporation entered into a joint venture with respondent corporation. Petitioner became convinced that respondent was cheating petitioner out of a portion of its profits and sued respondent under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. § 1964(c), based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, seeking treble damages and attorney's fees. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that petitioner's civil RICO action could not proceed because it had failed to allege a "racketeering injury," which was different from the direct injury resulting from the alleged predicate acts; and petitioner had also failed to allege that respondent had already been criminally convicted of the predicate acts or of a RICO violation. The court rejected both of these holdings and reversed, concluding that based on the statutory language and legislative history, RICO imposed no distinct "racketeering injury" requirement and that the racketeering activity prohibited by the statute consisted not of acts for which respondent had been convicted, but of acts for which it could have been convicted.
|
|||||
| Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, No. 84-312,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 2, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) was an annual charity drive created by petitioner federal government to which federal employees donated. Organizations who received donations included organizational statements in federal employee-distributed literature. Respondents were advocacy organizations who challenged petitioner's denial of participation to advocacy groups on grounds that denial violated respondents' first amendment rights to solicit charitable contributions. The trial and appellate courts held the government's reasons for exclusion were not reasonable and violated respondents' rights. On review, the Court reversed, holding that where brief solicitation in CFC literature facilitated the dissemination of views and ideas, solicitation was constitutionally protected speech. The Court determined that where the government limited access to the CFC and respondents sought access only to the CFC, the CFC was a nonpublic forum in which restrictions must be reasonable. Therefore, the Court remanded for a determination of whether the government's facially reasonable reasons were merely a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.
|
|||||
| Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, No. 83-1569,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 2, 1985, Decided **Together with No. 83-1733, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., also on certiorari to the same court.
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Plaintiff car manufacturer had an agreement with defendant car dealership that had a clause requiring all disputes to be settled by arbitration. Plaintiff filed suit to compel defendant to arbitrate several disputes. The trial court ordered arbitration on all claims except one counterclaim. The reviewing court affirmed the orders, except it reversed an order that defendant's antitrust claims were arbitrable. The court here found that the antitrust dispute alone did not invalidate the forum selection clause, and the potential complexity of the antitrust claim did not bar arbitration. The parties and arbitral body could retain competent arbitrators, and the dispute would be governed by the national law giving rise to the claim. There was a strong presumption reinforced by the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards that favored arbitration for international commerce.
|
|||||
| United States v. Bagley, No. 84-48,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 2, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: Defendant was indicted for violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. Defendant filed a discovery motion regarding whether witnesses were paid to give testimony. The prosecutor failed to disclose that witnesses would be paid after testimony. Defendant was found guilty. Subsequently, defendant discovered that the witnesses had been paid, and he sought to vacate his sentences on the grounds that failure to disclose violated his right to due process and to impeach witnesses. The trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate, holding that impeachment evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that the denial of evidence was a violation of due process and defendant's right to confrontation. The Court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the failure to disclose the evidence would have affected the trial outcome, thus comprising a constitutional error where such evidence was material.
|
|||||
| Hill v. Lockhart, No. 84-1103,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, November 18, 1985, Decided
View this case - free |
|||||
Overview: The inmate contended that his guilty plea was involuntary as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his court-appointed attorney supplied him with information about parole eligibility that was erroneous. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the inmate's allegations were insufficient to establish grounds for habeas relief. The Court found that the district court properly declined to hold a hearing on the inmate's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because the inmate had failed to allege the type of prejudice that was necessary to grant relief. The Court stated that the inmate did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. The Court found that the inmate alleged no special circumstances that would have supported the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.
|
|||||
Back to Top
| www.lexisnexis.com | About LexisNexis | Terms & Conditions | Customer Support | Contact Us |
| Copyright® 2009 LexisNexis , a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. |
