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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 30 - December 10, 1986
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Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 30, 1986, Decided
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Overview: Respondent was charged with violating O.G.C.A. ? 16-6-2 (1984), which criminalized sodomy. Respondent allegedly engaged in sodomy with another adult male in the bedroom of his home. After the district attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed, respondent brought suit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The court of appeals held that ? 16-6-2 violated respondent's fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association that was beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of U.S. Const. amends. XI and XIV. Reversing that judgment, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV did not confer any fundamental right on homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy, even if the conduct occurred in the privacy of their own homes.
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Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, No. 84-1667,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 7, 1986, Decided
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Overview: At school-sponsored function at petitioner's school, respondent delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office. During the entire speech, respondent referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Respondent used the language against the advice two teachers. Pursuant to petitioner's disciplinary rules, respondent was suspended from school for two days. Respondent brought suit against respondent alleging a violation of hisright to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. The trial court found for respondent and the court of appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the Court reversed, holding thatdid not prevent petitioner from suspending respondent since the penalties imposed were unrelated to any political viewpoint.did not prevent petitioner from determining that to permit respondent's speech would undermine the school's basic educational mission.
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, No. 85-619,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 7, 1986, Decided
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Overview: Respondents sued petitioner in state court. Each respondent, alleging that a child suffered birth defects due to the mother's ingestion of a drug made by petitioner, requested damages on tort theories and for violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDC), 21 U.S.C.S. ? 301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Petitioner had the cases removed to federal court, the cases were consolidated, and respondents moved to remand to state court. The district court denied the motion, but the appellate court reversed. The parties agreed there was no federal cause of action for FFDC violations. On appeal, the Court held that federal question jurisdiction was lacking because a complaint using a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when there was no private federal cause of action under the statute, did not state a claim arising under federal law. The judgment was affirmed.
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Colo. v. Connelly, No. 85-660,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 10, 1986, Decided
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Overview: Defendant approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to a murder. The officer immediately advised him of his Miranda rights and defendant said that he understood the rights. After another police officer arrived, defendant was again advised of his rights. Defendant was then held in custody and proceeded to confess to a child's murder. The next day, defendant stated for the first time that voices had told him to confess. On defendant's motion at a preliminary hearing, the trial court suppressed his initial statements and the custodial confession because they were involuntary. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed, holding that the admission of the evidence in a court of law would have violated the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. On certiorari, the Court reversed, holding that absent police coercion, defendant's confession was not barred by either Miranda or the Due Process Clause.
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