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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - May - June, 1987
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United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 26, 1987, Decided
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Overview: The arrestees were charged with criminal offenses. At their arraignments, the government filed a motion to detain them on the ground that no condition of release would assure the safety of the community or any person. The district court granted the motion. The arrestees appealed, arguing that their pretrial detention, under 18 U.S.C.S. ? 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA), was unconstitutional. The appellate court struck down the provision as facially unconstitutional. The government appealed from the decision. The Court reversed, holding that ? 3142(e) was constitutional on its face because it was based on the compelling interest of concern for the safety of people. It did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the excessive bail clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court also noted that the fact that the BRA might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances was insufficient to render it wholly invalid. The arrestees failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the BRA was "facially" unconstitutional.
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Turner v. Safley, No. 85-1384,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 1, 1987, Decided
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Overview: The district court certified respondents as a class that included inmates at one particular prison who desired to correspond with inmates at other state prisons, and persons who desired to marry inmates of the prison system. The correspondence regulation restricted correspondence between inmates in different prisons. The marriage regulation permitted inmates to marry only with permission of the prison superintendent, whose approval would be given only for compelling reasons. The district court applied a strict scrutiny standard in invalidating the regulations. On certiorari review, the Court held that a lesser standard of scrutiny, the reasonable relationship standard, applied to the regulations. Applying that standard, the Court concluded that the correspondence regulation was reasonably related to legitimate security interests, while the marriage regulation did not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard because it was an exaggerated response to rehabilitation and security concerns and there were obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation. Hence, the Court upheld the validity of the correspondence regulation, but held that the marriage regulation could not be sustained.
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Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist., No. 85-1695,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners sought review of decision denying a writ of mandamus and holding that when the district court had jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 (Hague Convention), did not apply to the production of evidence in the litigant's possession. The Court held the Hague Convention applied to production of evidence in the litigant's possession but the treaty was not mandatory and exclusive procedure for obtaining documents and information located within the territory of a foreign signatory. Instead, the Hague Convention was a permissive supplement, not a pre-emptive replacement for other methods of obtaining evidence located abroad. Text of the treaty did not speak in mandatory terms to describe procedures for all permissible transnational discovery and required any contracting state to use Hague Convention procedures or compel a contracting state to change its own evidence-gathering procedures. First resort to Hague Convention procedures was not required when the treaty itself made no such requirement and American discovery procedures were often broader.
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Edwards v. Aguillard, No. 85-1513,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 19, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Appellees challenged the constitutionality of the Louisiana Creationism Act (Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. ?? 17:286.1 - 17:286.7. Appellees sought an injunction and declaratory relief. Appellants defended on the ground that the purpose of the Act was to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom. Appellees stated the Act was facially invalid because it violated the Establishment Clause. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court noted probably jurisdiction and affirmed the decision of the appellate court. The Court found that the Act advanced a religious doctrine by requiring either banishment of the theory of evolution or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejected evolution in its entirety. The Act violated the Establishment Clause because it sought to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.
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New York v. Burger, No. 86-80,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 19, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Police officers searched respondent vehicle dismantler's junkyard pursuant to N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law ? 415(a)(5), which required junkyard owners to maintain records for routine spontaneous inspections by police officers and state agents. In the course of their search, officers discovered stolen vehicles and parts in respondent's junkyard. On appeal from a decision holding that the statute and search were constitutional, the appellate court reversed upon a conclusion that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment because of its authorization of warrantless searches solely for the purpose of uncovering criminality. On grant of certiorari, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment upon a finding that vehicle dismantlers were part of a closely regulated industry that carried a reduced expectation of privacy thereby lessening the application of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. In addition, the high incidence of motor vehicle theft rendered such inspections essential and amounted to a substantial state interest and hence the State was allowed to address the major social problem of car theft by the implementation of an administrative scheme.
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Bourjaily v. United States, No. 85-6725,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine. The government introduced, over defendant's objection, out-of-court telephone statements. The trial court held that such statements satisfied Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) as being the statements made by a co-conspirator during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy. On appeal, the Court held that in making a preliminary factual determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as to whether the conspiracy existed and that defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, the trial court could examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted. The Court further rejected any suggestion that the admission of statements against defendant violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. As the requirements for admission under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) were identical to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause and because the statements were admissible under the Rule, there was no constitutional problem. The Confrontation Clause did not require a trial court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfied the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
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South Dakota v. Dole, No. 86-260,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner State permitted persons 19 years of age or older to purchase beer pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws ? 35-6-27. However, 23 U.S.C.S. ? 158 permitted the reduction of federal highway funds otherwise allocable to a state if the state had a minimum drinking age below 21. Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that ? 158 violated Congress's spending power, U.S. Const. art. I, ? 8, cl. 1, and that it violated U.S. Const. amend. XXI. The trial court rejected petitioner's claims, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the Court affirmed, holding that: (1) the statute's indirect imposition of a minimum drinking age was a valid exercise of Congress's spending power, reasonably calculated to advance the general welfare and national concern of safe interstate travel; and (2) the Twenty-First amendment was not violated as the statute did not induced petitioner to engage in unconstitutional activities.
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Anderson v. Creighton, No. 85-1520,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1987, Decided
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Overview: The Supreme Court vacated the judgment denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in a suit for money damages arising from a search that violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court erred in finding that petitioner's search was objectively legally unreasonable based on its conclusion that it was firmly established that warrantless searches not supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment. The relevant question was whether a reasonable officer could have believed petitioner's warrantless search to have been lawful, in light of clearly established law, and the information the searching officers possessed. The Court reasoned that petitioner's subjective beliefs about the search were irrelevant. Principles of qualified immunity required that petitioner should have been allowed to argue that he was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that, in light of the clearly established principles governing warrantless searches, he could, as a matter of law, reasonably have believed that the search at issue was lawful.
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San Francisco Arts & Ath. v. United States Olympic Comm., No. 86-270,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner athletics corporation was enjoined from using the word "Olympic" on the basis of exclusive rights owned by respondent United States Olympic Committee (USOC) pursuant to ? 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.S. ? 380. In granting the injunction, the appellate court found that the USOC was not a state actor bound by constraints of the Constitution and that property rights in the term could be protected without violating the First Amendment. Petitioner argued that the Act could only grant the USOC typical trademark protection and that the First Amendment prohibited Congress from granting exclusive use absent a requirement that the USOC prove that unauthorized use was likely to cause confusion. The Court affirmed, concluding that Congress had reasonably determined that the historical and present value of the word was the product of the USOC's talents and energy and proof of likelihood of confusion was not necessary. In addition, the First Amendment had not been affronted because the restrictions contained in the Act were no broader than reasonably necessary to further Congressional interests and also because petitioner was not prohibited from conveying its message.
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Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Com, No. 86-133,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1987, Decided
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Overview: Appellant landowners brought suit to invalidate a condition on their land permit requiring them to grant the public an easement across their beachfront property. The court of appeals found the condition to be valid and reversed the writ of mandamus issued by the superior court. The United States Supreme Court granted review and found that the right to exclude others from private property was an essential right to the ownership of property. If government action resulted in permanent occupation of land, it would effect a taking unless it substantially furthered legitimate state interests. The Court found that California required the use of eminent domain to obtain easements across private property and the condition imposed was not a use of eminent domain. The Court finally held that the condition was a taking and that, if the state wanted an easement, it would have to compensate appellants.
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