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| Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, No. 87-980,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 3, 1989, Decided
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Overview: A Choctaw woman domiciled on the reservation left the reservation to give birth to her twin, illegitimate children. She and the father of her children, a Choctaw man also domiciled on the reservation, signed consents in state chancery court allowing the adoption of the children by non-Indians. Appellant, the Choctaw Tribe, filed a motion to vacate the adoption, claiming that it had exclusive jurisdiction over the children's adoption under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1911. The chancery court dismissed the motion and was affirmed by the state supreme court. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that appeal was improper, but granted certiorari. The Court held that because the children's parents were domiciled on the reservation, the children were domiciliaries under ICWA. The fact that the parents left the reservation prior to birth did not change the children's domicile. The Court found that both the parents and appellant had an equal interest in the placement of the children. Thus, appellant had exclusive jurisdiction over the children's adoption. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and remanded the case.
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| United States v. Sokolow, No. 87-1295,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, April 3, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Honolulu learned that defendant had paid cash for his $ 2,100 airline tickets to spend a short time in Miami, a drug source. In addition, defendant appeared nervous and was travelling under a false name. They stopped him when he returned to Honolulu and discovered cocaine in his luggage. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.S. ¿ 841(a)(1). The appellate court reversed, holding that the DEA agents had no reasonable suspicion for the stop defendant. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that although each of defendant's actions by itself might have been innocent, the totality of all the circumstances together with all of defendant's actions were sufficient for DEA agents to have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a drug crime. Because the standard for reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop was less than for probable cause, the Court determined that the DEA agents were justified in making the stop. The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case.
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| Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 1, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Defendant employer appealed a judgment in favor of plaintiff employee in her action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,The courts below held that an employer who had allowed a discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an employment decision could avoid liability by showing by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. However, the Supreme Court held that conventional rules of civil litigation generally applied in Title VII cases, and one of those rules was that parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Court held that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proved that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, defendant could avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff's gender into account.
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| Graham v. Connor, No. 87-6571,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 15, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Diabetic filed a 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 action against respondent law enforcement officers to recover damages for injuries he sustained when physical force was used against him during an investigatory stop, while he was on his way to obtain orange juice to counteract the onset of an insulin reaction. The appellate court endorsed the four-factor test applied by the trial court. The diabetic argued that it was error to require him to prove that the excessive force used against him was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. The Court vacated the judgment, holding that the diabetic's claims should have been analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard. The proper Fourth Amendment inquiry was one of objective reasonableness under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like malice and sadism had no proper place in that inquiry.
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| Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, No. 88-293,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 5, 1989, Decided
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Overview: The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a judgment which held that a sculpture created by an artist hired by an organization was not a "work made for hire" under provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.S. ¿ 101. Petitioners, a non-profit organization, hired respondent artist to create a sculpture of homeless individuals for a Christmas contest. The Court held that under ¿ 101, a work was a work for hire when either the work was prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment or it was included in the list of nine categories of works enumerated in ¿ 101. The Court rejected petitioners' arguments that the hiring party's right to control or actual control tests should determine whether the work was for hire. The Court stated that because the statute did not define the terms "employer" or "employee," they had to rely on the conventional master-servant relationship understood by the common law. Respondent was not an employee given the facts that he was hired only for one specific task for a limited time, worked in his own studio with his materials, and was a skilled sculptor. Finding that respondent was an independent contractor; the Court affirmed the judgment.
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| Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, No. 87-1387,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 5, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Two employers operated salmon canneries in remote and widely separated areas of Alaska during the salmon runs in summer months. Because of the remoteness of the cannery locations, employees were housed at the canneries and ate in company-owned mess halls. Cannery employees were unskilled laborers and were predominately Filipinos and Alaska Natives. Non-cannery jobs required skilled laborers and were filled by predominately white employees. Non-cannery employees were housed in separate dormitories and ate in mess halls separate from cannery employees. The district court rejected all of the minority employee's claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact. The court held that the court of appeals erred in determining that the minority employees had established a prima facie case of disparate impact based solely on the number of whites and non-whites in the different employment categories. If nonwhites were hired for non-cannery positions in the same ratio as there were qualified nonwhite applicants to qualified white applicants, there would be no disparate impact. Alternative employment selection practices were required to meet the employers' legitimate business practices.
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| Michael H. v. Gerald D., No. 87-746,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Mother and respondent were married. Mother had an adulterous relationship with petitioner father. As a result petitioner child was born. Respondent was listed as father on child's birth certificate and held child out to the world as his daughter. Blood tests showed a 98.07 percent probability that petitioner was child's father. For a time, mother resided with petitioner, who held child out as his daughter. Mother subsequently moved and rebuffed father's attempts to visit child. Petitioner filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and right to visitation. Child filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. Mother and respondent reconciled. Respondent intervened, and the superior court granted his motion for summary judgment against petitioner and child. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The Supreme Court affirmed.
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| Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No. 87-107,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1989, Decided
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Overview: The employee sought damages for racial harassment and for discrimination under. The Court held that harassment relating to the conditions of her employment was not actionable underbecause, under the rule of stare decisis, that provision did not apply to conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract and did not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations. With the exception of the refusal to promote claim, none of the conduct that petitioner alleged was racial harassment involved either a refusal to make a contract or the impairment of her ability to enforce her contractual rights. However, the failure to promote was actionable underbecause it involved her ability to enter into a new contract with her employer. The appeals court erred in holding that the employee could succeed in her discriminatory promotion claim only by proving that she was better qualified for the position than the white employee who was promoted. The employee was not limited to presenting evidence of a certain type in order to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reasons for its decision were not its true reasons.
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| Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, No. 87-1207,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 15, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner filed suit against defendants, a state and a state official, under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1983 for denying petitioner a promotion in violation of the state and United States Constitutions. Under ¿ 1983, "persons" who deprived others of their Constitutional rights were liable to the injured party. Affirming the lower court, the United States Supreme Court held that ¿ 1983 was inapplicable to defendants because they were not "persons" within the meaning of the statute. Because the Court found that common usage of the word "person" did not include the state, the Court construed ¿ 1983 as excluding the state from the definition of "person." Where there was a lack of evidence of a clear congressional intent to make states liable for unconstitutional state action, the Court found that sovereign immunity was applicable. Because the state official was being sued in his official capacity, the Court held that petitioner's suit against the state official was a suit against the office and, therefore, the official was not included within the ¿ 1983 definition of person.
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