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| Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, No. 88-1597,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 4, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Students at petitioners' school were permitted to join various clubs that met at school after school hours. Respondents, a group of students, requested permission to form a Christian club and meet at the school for Bible study and prayer. Petitioners, school board and associated officials, denied the request asserting that the club would violate the Establishment Clause of U.S. Const. amend. I. Respondents brought suit asserting, among other things, that petitioners violated the Equal Access Act (EAA), 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 4071-4074. The district court entered judgment for petitioners, holding that EAA did not apply to the school because it did not have the requisite "limited open forum" to fall under the EAA. On appeal, the circuit court reversed, concluding that the school maintained a "limited open forum," fell within the EAA, and the EAA did not violate the Establishment Clause. On grant of certiorari, the Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
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| Horton v. California, No. 88-7164,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 4, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of the treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress weapons seized by police from his residence. After an appellate court affirmed the conviction, petitioner sought certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court concluded that, though inadvertence was a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures, it was not a necessary condition, so that the items seized from petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. When the weapons were discovered, it was immediately apparent to the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. The officer had probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was authorized by the warrant, and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant.
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| Ill. v. Perkins, No. 88-1972,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 4, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The prisoner claimed that the statements were properly excluded because he had not been given Miranda warnings by the undercover agent. The State alleged that the statements were voluntary and not coerced, and that Miranda warnings were not required when an undercover agent was asking questions that could elicit an incriminating response. The court held that Miranda warnings were not required when the suspect was unaware that he was speaking to a law enforcement officer and gave a voluntary statement. The court found that conversations between suspects and undercover agents did not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion were not present when an incarcerated person spoke freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. Coercion was to be determined from the perspective of the suspect. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that did not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak were not within the concerns of Miranda warnings. Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities.
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| Ala. v. White, No. 89-789,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 11, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent's car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and cocaine seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting that a "totality of circumstances" approach was used to determine whether an informant's tip established probable cause or the reasonable suspicion required by an officer to make a Terry stop. The level of suspicion required for a Terry stop was less demanding than that required for probable cause, and reasonable suspicion could arise from information less reliable than that required to show probable cause. When the officers stopped respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. The investigative stop, therefore, did not violate U.S. Const. amend. IV. When significant aspects of the informant's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe that the informant was honest and well-informed.
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| Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., No. 89-275,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 11, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner challenged an appeals court decision imposing sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and affirming an earlier award to respondents of attorney fees incurred on appeal of Rule 11 sanctions, after petitioner had voluntarily dismissed its action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) that charged respondents with engaging in unfair competition practices. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appeals court in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the lower court's imposition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions after petitioner had voluntarily dismissed its complaint was proper and that the appropriate standard of review of Rule 11 sanctions was abuse of discretion. The lower court was permitted to enforce Rule 11 even after petitioner filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal based on the lower court's jurisdiction that was invoked by the filing of the underlying complaint. The lower court had jurisdiction to consider collateral issues, such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions, after the underlying action was no longer pending. The court held that Rule 11 did not authorize the award of attorney fees incurred on appeal of a Rule 11 sanction.
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| Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, No. 88-1897,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 14, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints, and respondents, all licensed drivers, challenged the constitutionality. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate, balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving; the checkpoints were generally effective, and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. However, the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program.
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| Pa. v. Muniz, No. 89-213,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 18, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant argued that portions of a videotape should have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda warnings. The state appellate court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction, holding that when the physical nature of the tests began to yield testimonial and communicative statements, the protection afforded by Miranda was invoked. The Court found that the Miranda requirement afforded protection against self-incrimination to persons under custodial interrogation. The Court distinguished between testimonial and real or physical evidence when invoking the privilege. The Court held that a field sobriety test or taking a blood sample constituted real or physical evidence; whereas requiring defendant to respond to specific questions was testimonial. The Court distinguished questions from defendant while he was informed about the properties of a breathalyzer test from utterances made in response to personal questions from the police officer, such as the date of defendant's sixth birthday. The Court held that comments made by defendant while submitting to a test should not have been suppressed.
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| Ill. v. Rodriguez, No. 88-2018,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1990, Decided
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Overview: The State argued that defendant's former roommate still retained control over defendant's apartment and, therefore, had common authority over the premises to consent to the police search. The State also argued that even if the roommate lacked control or authority, the search and seizure was still proper under the Fourth Amendment because the police reasonably believed that she had authority to consent. Defendant asserted that permitting a reasonable belief of common authority would cause his Fourth Amendment rights to be "vicariously waived." The Court held that "common authority" rested on mutual use of the property and that there was sufficient proof in the record that the State failed to satisfy its burden that defendant's former roommate had joint access or control over the apartment. The officers' reasonable belief that the roommate had common authority over the apartment could have validated the search, but the lower courts failed to render a decision on the issue.
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| Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., No. 89-645,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner coach sued respondents, an author and a newspaper, for defamation after respondents printed an article implying that petitioner had lied under oath. The trial court granted summary judgment for respondents and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the article was an opinion and was protected by U.S. Const. amend. I. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the U.S. Const. amend. I, did not prohibit the application of Ohio's libel laws to the alleged defamation. The Court said that there was no absolute privilege protecting opinion from the application of defamation laws. It said that the dispositive question was whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that respondents' statements implied that petitioner had perjured himself. The Court said that the connotation that petitioner perjured himself was sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. It said that petitioner had to show that the connotations were false and made with some level of fault.
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| Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, No. 88-1503,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1990, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners, parents suing on their behalf and on behalf of their daughter, requested a court order directing the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment after she was rendered vegetative in an auto accident. The appellate court denied their petition holding that petitioners lacked authority to effectuate the request because there was no clear and convincing evidence of the daughter's desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn as required under the Missouri Living Will statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010 et seq. (1986). The United States Supreme Court affirmed. It said that the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, did not require the state to repose judgment on matters concerning the right to refuse treatment with anyone but the patient herself. The Court held that a state could choose to defer only to the patient's wishes rather than confide the decision to close family members.
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