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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - May 23 - June 24, 1991
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Florida v. Jimeno, No. 90-622,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 23, 1991, Decided
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Overview: After the trial court granted respondent husband and wife's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found in a container in their vehicle, petitioner state sought review. The trial court held that although respondents could have assumed that the officer would have searched the bag at the time they gave their consent, the mere consent to search did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents. The appeals court affirmed and established a per se rule that consent to a general search did not extend to containers within the general area agreed to by respondents. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, and the court granted certiorari. The court reversed, holding that respondents gave permission to search the car without placing any explicit limitations on the scope of the search. The court held that the officer had informed respondents that he believed they were carrying narcotics and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers which might bear drugs.
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Rust v. Sullivan, No. 89-1391,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 23, 1991, Decided **Together with No. 89-1392, New York et al. v. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: In two consolidation actions, petitioners, grantees under Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.S. ?? 300-300a-6, challenged the validity of the Department of Health and Human Services regulations which limited the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities, 42 C.F.R. ?? 59.8-59.10. The trial court granted summary judgment for respondent agency secretary, and the appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed holding that the regulations were a permissible construction of the underlying legislation and did not violate either U.S. Const., amend. I or U.S. Const., amend. V. It said that the Constitution did not require the government to distort the scope of its program in order to provide information about abortion to indigent women where the statute does not encroach on a doctor's ability to provide or a woman's right to receive information concerning abortion-related services outside the Title X project.
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Cal. v. Acevedo, No. 89-1690,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 30, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Defendant placed a bag in the trunk of a car. Police officers stopped him, opened the trunk, and found marijuana. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lacked probable cause to search the entire car. The same probable cause to believe that a container held drugs allowed the police to arrest the person transporting the container and search it. The police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the car's trunk contained marijuana and probable cause allowed a warrantless search of the paper bag. The Fourth Amendment did not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extended only to a container within the vehicle. The police could search containers found in an automobile without a warrant if their search was supported by probable cause.
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Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., No. 90-256,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 6, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was sole shareholder and director of a radio and television station. Petitioner agreed to sell the station and license to respondent. Petitioner through his attorney, changed his mind. Respondent brought suit. Sanction of respondent's attorney fees and costs was affirmed where petitioner acted in bad faith in delaying and complicating issues at trial in a contract case. The court held that a district court, sitting in diversity, did not abuse its discretion when it invoked its inherent power in assessing sanction based on the circumstances. In a case for specific performance of a contract, petitioner attempted to fraud the court, continuously took action to delay proceedings, repeatedly took actions in contempt of court orders, and proceeded with a series of meritless motion and pleadings and delaying actions. The court gave repeated warnings to petitioner and his counsel that his actions were sanctionable. Statutes and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address sanctions in no way limited court's ability to use its inherent power; they instead supplemented that power. There was no abuse of discretion in the court ordering attorney fees and expenses as a sanction.
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Connecticut v. Doehr, No. 90-143,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 6, 1991, Decided
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Overview: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which held that Conn. Gen. Stat. ? 52-278e(a)(1) was violative of the requirements of due process. This statute allowed prejudgment attachment without prior notice or a hearing. The attachment at issue arose out of an action filed in conjunction with a civil action for assault and battery. The U.S. Supreme Court held that even the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments and similar encumbrances entail were sufficient to merit due process protection and that any significant taking of property by the state was within the purview of the due process clause. Conn. Gen. Stat. ? 52-278e(a)(1), which allowed for an attachment without notice or a hearing, was therefore in violation of the due process clause. Therefore, since the attachment of respondent's property was a one-sided determination which did not afford him notice or an opportunity to dispute, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.
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McNeil v. Wis., No. 90-5319,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 13, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant charging him with an armed robbery. After his initial appearance for the robbery charge, police questioned defendant multiple times pursuant to their investigation of a murder, attempted murder, and armed burglary. Defendant eventually admitted his involvement with the crimes and signed statements. Thereafter, defendant was convicted and sentenced for second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and armed robbery. On appeal, defendant argued that his courtroom appearance with an attorney for the initial charge constituted an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel. Defendant asserted any subsequent waiver of that right was invalid. The state's highest court rejected defendant's argument. After granting certiorari, the Court held that defendant invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his initial appearance. The Court determined that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar the admission of defendant's statements. The Court found that the assertion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not imply an assertion of the Miranda right to counsel. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed.
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Fla. v. Bostick, No. 89-1717,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Respondent was travelling on an inter-city bus that was at a stopover, when police boarded the bus. Without any reasonable suspicion, they asked respondent's consent to search his luggage. Respondent gave his consent, police found illegal drugs, and respondent pled guilty to drug trafficking. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed, holding that because respondent was on a bus, he was not free to leave the bus without the risk of being stranded, and his consent was involuntary. On certiorari, the court held that if the police indicated that respondent was free to refuse consent and terminate the encounter, and that the police would not detain him if he refused, his consent was voluntary. Because there was no finding by the lower court using that standard, the court reversed the decision of the state supreme court and remanded the case to determine if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police, and thus determine if respondent's consent was voluntary.
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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, No. 89-1799,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 20, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner, a public figure, claimed that he was defamed by respondent author who attributed statements to him that were untrue. Petitioner further claimed that respondent author knew these statements were untrue but used them in her book anyway. Petitioner brought an action for libel in federal court against respondent author, respondent publisher, and respondent magazine, which had originally published the book in the form of a series of articles. The lower court held that because petitioner was a public figure he had to show malice on the part of respondents in order to avoid summary judgment, and that he had failed to do so, therefore, it dismissed petitioner's suit. On appeal, the court held that petitioner had satisfied the malice prong of the test for defamation of a public figure, or libel.
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Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., No. 90-634,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Plaintiff agreed to provide defendant with documents relating to a candidate in an upcoming election, but only if he was given a promise of confidentiality. The newspaper nevertheless published the name of the source, and plaintiff was subsequently fired from his job. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and fraud. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the award of punitive damages after concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a fraud claim, the only claim that would support such an award. The state supreme court reversed the compensatory damages award, concluding that enforcement of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory violated defendants' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that defendant newspaper publisher had no special immunity from the application of general laws and was therefore liable just as any other for breach of contract based on promissory estoppel.
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Coleman v. Thompson, No. 89-7662,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner was convicted of rape and capital murder in a Virginia court. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. Petitioner sought habeas corpus in state court, which ruled against him as to all counts. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 33 days after the entry of final judgment. Under Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:9(a), no appeal was allowed unless a notice was filed with the trial court within 30 days of final judgment. The state court dismissed the appeal due to the late filing. Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief, which was denied by the district court. The circuit court affirmed, and the Supreme Court issued certiorari to resolve several issues concerning state procedural defaults and federal habeas review. The Supreme Court held that in all cases in which a state prisoner had defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims was barred unless the prisoner could demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or demonstrated that failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
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