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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 24 - June 29, 1992
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Cipollone v. Liggett Group, No. 90-1038,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1992, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner alleged that the cigarette manufacturers were liable for his mother's death because they breached express warranties contained in their advertising, they failed to warn consumers about the hazards of smoking, they fraudulently misrepresented the hazards, and they conspired to deprive the public of medical and scientific information about smoking. The court of appeals held that the claims based upon the manufacturer's advertising and promotional activities were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C.S. ?? 1331-1340, and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C.S. ?? 1331-1340. On certiorari, the Court reversed in part by holding that, due to the strong presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations, the 1965 Act did not by its statutory language preempt state common law damages claims. The Court held that the more broad language of the 1969 Act did preempt some common law damages claims based upon the failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation; however, the claims based upon the breach of an express warranty, intentional fraud, and conspiracy were not preempted.
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Doggett v. United States, No. 90-857,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1992, Decided
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Overview: In February 1980 defendant was indicted for conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. When government agents went to defendant's home to arrest him, they learned he was in Colombia. In September 1981 agents learned that defendant was in Panama. In September 1982, he passed unhindered through customs and settled down in Virginia. In September 1988, the government ran a credit check and found within minutes where defendant lived. Defendant was arrested. He filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his right to a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed. The court reversed. The court found that the lag between defendant's indictment and arrest clearly sufficed to trigger the speedy trial inquiry. The court also found that the government negligently failed to pursue defendant with diligence. The court determined that although to warrant relief negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing prejudice, the government's egregious persistence in failing to prosecute defendant was clearly sufficient.
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Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 24, 1992, Decided
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Overview: In the public school system, principals were permitted to invite members of the clergy to offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of formal school graduation ceremonies. Respondent parent, whose daughter was scheduled to graduate from middle school, sought a temporary restraining order in the district court to prohibit school officials from including invocation or benediction in the graduation ceremony. The Court denied the motion for lack of adequate time for consideration. The parent then amended the complaint, seeking a permanent injunction barring the officials from inviting the clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations, which the district court granted, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Court affirmed, holding that including clerical members who offered prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable with full force to the states and their school districts.
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Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, No. 91-971,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1992, Decided
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Overview: Respondent had several restaurants with a certain theme. Several years later petitioner opened up his chain of restaurants copying the same theme of respondent. Respondent filed suit against petitioner for trade dress infringement. At trial, the jury found that respondent's trade dress was inherently distinctive, but that the trade dress had not acquired a secondary meaning. The appellate court correctly rejected the argument raised by petitioner, the alleged trade dress infringer, that a finding of no secondary meaning contradicted a finding of inherent distinctiveness. The court held that proof of secondary meaning was not required to prevail on a claim under 15 U.S.C.S. ? 1125(a), where the trade dress at issue was inherently distinctive. Specifically, there was no persuasive reason to apply to trade dress a general requirement of secondary meaning which would be at odds with the principles generally applicable to infringement suits under 15 U.S.C.S. ? 1125(a). Moreover, adding a secondary meaning requirement could have anticompetitive effects, creating particular burdens on the startup of small companies.
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Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, No. 91-453,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1992, Decided
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Overview: The landowner purchased two residential lots on which he intended to build homes. In 1988, State enacted the Beachfront Management Act, S. C. Code Ann. ? 48-39-250 et seq., which barred the landowner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. A state trial court found that this prohibition rendered the landowner's parcels valueless. The landowner asserted the effect of the Act on the value of the lots accomplished a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that where a state seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate showed that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey, No. 91-744,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 29, 1992, Decided * *Together with No. 91-902, Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that only the husband notification provision, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ? 3209, was unconstitutional. The Court granted certiorari. The Court applied the doctrine of stare decisis and reaffirmed the essential holdings in Roe v. Wade because that decision was still workable and its factual underpinnings had not changed. In a joint opinion, three Justices rejected Roe's trimester framework and adopted an undue burden test for determining whether State regulations had the purpose or effect of placing substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability. The Court agreed that ? 3209 imposed a substantial obstacle in a large fraction of cases and was invalid. The Court also affirmed the holding the court of appeals that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ? 3202, the medical emergency provision, did not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion right. A plurality of the Court determined that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. ? 3214(a)(12) was also invalid because it required a married woman to provide a reason for her failure to provide notice to her husband.
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