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| Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. 92-466,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1993, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner sued respondent under 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 13(a), alleging price discrimination. It argued that respondent's volume rebates to wholesalers threatened primary-line competitive injury by furthering a predatory pricing scheme designed to purge competition from the generic segment of the cigarette market. The trial court reversed a jury verdict after determining that respondent had no reasonable possibility of injuring competition by limiting the growth of that segment. The lower court affirmed and petitioner sought further review. Although it refused to create a per se rule of nonliability for predatory price discrimination through oligopolistic price coordination, the Supreme Court held that petitioner had failed to demonstrate competitive injury as a matter of law. Specifically, it held that the evidence did not prove that respondent had a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from its alleged below-cost pricing scheme through slowing the growth of the generic market. The lower court's judgment was thereby affirmed.
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| St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, No. 92-602,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1993, Decided
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Overview: The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment for respondent African-American employee in his action against petitioners, alleging intentional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e-2(a)(1). Although the district court rejected petitioners' proffered reasons for their termination of the employee, the district court entered judgment for petitioners after a full bench trial because it concluded that the employee failed to prove that petitioners' crusade to terminate him was racially rather than personally motivated. The appellate court reversed, holding that the employee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law once petitioners' proffered reasons for the employment action against the employee were discredited since he had established a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas scheme. The appellate court failed to recognize that the presumption of intentional racial discrimination created by establishing a prima facie case fell away when petitioners met their burden of producing evidence showing non-discriminatory reasons for their action. The employee at all times bore the ultimate burden of persuasion.
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| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., No. 92-102,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1993, Decided
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Overview: The summary judgment was reversed where expert opinions were admissible to show respondent's drug caused birth defects despite the fact that the experts' analysis had not been published or subject to peer review. Petitioners were children with serious birth defects. Their parents alleged that the mothers' ingestion of respondent's drug caused defects. Respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, supported by proof that the drug did not cause defects. Petitioners responded with expert opinions that the drug did cause defects. The opinions were based on a reanalysis of previously published studies stating the drug did not cause defects. The trial court granted respondent's motion, holding petitioners' scientific evidence was inadmissible because the reanalyzed studies were not reliable where they had not been published. Petitioners appealed. The Court vacated and remanded, holding that a technique upon which an expert opinion was based did not have to be generally accepted as reliable as a precondition to the opinion's admission as long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the federal evidence rules were met.
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| Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., No. 91-1111,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1993 * , Decided*Together with No. 91-1128, Merrett Underwriting Agency Management Ltd. et al. v. California et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: Defendant foreign and domestic insurers were not entitled to a dismissal under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (the Act), 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1012(b), when plaintiffs alleged antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. ¿ 1 because the complaint properly alleged the boycott exception to antitrust immunity under the Act. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated antitrust laws for various conspiracies to affect the American insurance market. Defendants contended that the Act granted defendants antitrust immunity for the business of insurance that was regulated by state law. The court affirmed the appellate court's refusal to dismiss the complaint because the claims fell within the boycott exception to antitrust immunity. The court, however, reversed the holding that defendant domestic insurers were not entitled to antitrust immunity simply because they acted with defendant foreign insurers.
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| United States v. Dixon, No. 91-1231,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1993, Decided
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Overview: Two defendants were tried for criminal contempt of court for violating court orders that prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject of a criminal prosecution. The Court considered whether the subsequent criminal prosecutions were barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court concluded that where the two offenses for which defendants were punished or tried could not survive the same-elements test, the double jeopardy bar applied. The same-elements test inquired whether each offense contained an element not contained in the other. If not, they were the same offense and double jeopardy barred additional punishment and successive prosecution. The Court overruled the same-conduct test. Because defendants' subsequent offenses did not include any element not contained in their previous contempt offenses, subsequent prosecutions violated the double jeopardy clause. The remaining counts were not barred under the same-elements test because the crimes were different offenses.
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| Harris v. Forklift Sys., No. 92-1168,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, November 9, 1993, Decided
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Overview: The court held that the district court erred when it relied on whether a manager's conduct seriously affected plaintiff worker's psychological well being or led her to suffer injury. The court held that while Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 2000e-2(a)(1) barred conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, the statute was not limited to such conduct. The court held that as long as the environment would reasonably be perceived and was perceived as hostile or abusive, there was no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. The court found that psychological harm could be taken into account, but was not required by the statute.
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