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| Bragdon v. Abbott, No. 97-156,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1998, Decided
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Overview: Respondent was infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Petitioner dentist informed respondent of his policy against filling cavities of HIV infected patients at his office. Respondent sued petitioner under 42 U.S.C.S. ¿ 12182 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court, which ruled in favor of respondent, was affirmed by the court below. The judgment of the court below, was affirmed insofar as it determined that that respondent's HIV was a disability under the ADA even though her infection had not yet progressed to the symptomatic phase. The Court held that HIV was an impairment from the moment of infection that substantially limited respondent's ability to reproduce, which was a major life activity. However, the judgment was vacated and remanded to the court below to give that court the opportunity to determine whether an analysis of some of the cited medical studies would change its conclusion that petitioner presented neither objective evidence nor a triable issue of fact on the health risks associated with petitioner's treatment of respondent.
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| Clinton v. City of New York, No. 97-1374,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1998, Decided
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Overview: Appellees challenged the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act (Act), 2 U.S.C.S. ¿ 691 et seq., after appellant, the United States President exercised his authority under the Act to cancel one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251,515, and two provisions of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 895-896, 990-993. On review, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that the cancellation procedures set forth in the Act violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, ¿ 7, cl. 2. The Court held that constitutional silence on the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes is equivalent to an express prohibition. Thus, cancellations pursuant to the Act had no legal force or effect and failed to satisfy the procedures set out in Article I, ¿ 7.
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| E. Enters. v. Apfel, No. 97-42,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1998, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner former coal mining company paid medical benefits for its employees as legally provided in the law, while in the coal mine industry. Years after petitioner left the coal mining business, Congress passed the Coal Act, 26 U.S.C.S. ¿ 9701 et seq., requiring petitioner to pay additional medical benefits not previously required. Petitioner filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the law was an unconstitutional taking in violation of U.S. Const. amend. V. The trial court and appellate court denied petitioner's claim, and petitioner challenged the rulings. The court held that legislative acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the court with a presumption of constitutionality, and the burden was on petitioner to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way in violation of due process. The court determined that because the law was retroactive, it deprived petitioner of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions by making them pay for benefits years after it left the industry. The court concluded that the law was an unconstitutional taking and therefore void.
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| Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, No. 97-371,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1998, Decided
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Overview: The artists challenged the grant-making procedures outlined in the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C.S. ¿ 954 (d)(1), for First Amendment violations and constitutional vagueness after the NEA denied funding for their projects. The district court and court of appeals found that the statute was invalid, but on review, the Supreme Court held that the statute was facially valid because it neither inherently interfered with First Amendment rights nor violated constitutional vagueness principles. The legislation merely took "decency and respect" into consideration and was aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding speech. The Court also held that the NEA expressly took diversity into account in the grant-making process. Additionally, the Court held that the NEA had limited resources which made it impossible not to deny money to a large amount of constitutionally protected expression. Thus, the Court found that the subjective selective process did not infringe on First or Fifth Amendment rights and reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the artists.
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| Swidler & Berlin v. United States, No. 97-1192,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1998, Decided
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Overview: Respondent, as part of an investigation of the dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office, sought the notes petitioner attorney had made during an interview of his client, the Deputy White House Counsel, prior to the client committing suicide. Petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the notes were protected by the attorney client privilege and by the work product privilege. The lower appellate court reversed the trial court which had found the notes were protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege and the work product privilege. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to the decision. The court reversed finding that the general rule with respect to confidential communications was that such communications were privileged during a testator's lifetime and, also, after the testator's death unless sought to be disclosed in litigation between the testator's heirs. The court held that the attorney-client privilege survived the death of the client in this case.
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| Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1998, Decided
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Overview: The employee refused the unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor. She suffered no adverse tangible job consequences because of her refusal of the supervisor's advances. The employee filed suit against the employer alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, but the intermediate appellate court reversed. On appeal, the court affirmed that summary judgment was inappropriate and remanded for determination of whether the employee was entitled to relief. The employer was vicariously liable for any actionable hostile work environment created by the supervisor, who had authority over the employee, if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it. Because the supervisor took no tangible adverse employment action against the employee, the employer could raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages by asserting that it took reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing behavior and that the employee failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
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| Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, No. 97-282,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1998, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner worked as a lifeguard for respondent city. Petitioner lifeguard brought an action against respondent and her two immediate supervisors, asserting a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,The complaint alleged that the two supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere at the beach by repeatedly subjecting petitioner and other female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching and lewd remarks. Petitioner asserted that the supervisors were agents of respondent and that their conduct amounted to discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment. The judgment of the trial court, which entered judgment in favor of petitioner and held respondent liable, was reversed by the court below. The judgment of the court below was reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the trial court's judgment. The court's judgment was based on an application of its holding that an employer may be held vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.
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