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| Tex. v. Johnson, No. 88-155,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Respondent participated in a political demonstration where he doused the American flag with kerosene and set it on fire. Respondent was charged and convicted of desecration of the flag. The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction and held that petitioner could not punish respondent for burning the flag as a part of political speech. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to determine whether the conviction was consistent with U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court found that it was not. The Court held that petitioner's interest in preventing breaches of the peace did not support respondent's conviction because his conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Additionally, petitioner's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood did not justify the criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of criminal appeals.
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| United States v. Zolin, No. 88-40,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 21, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner sought review of a judgment holding that petitioner's evidence that summoned materials were not subject to attorney-client privilege because they fell within the crime-fraud exception, which had to come from sources independent of the attorney-client communications contained within the materials. The court held protection of attorney-client communications ceased to operate where the desired advice related to a future wrongdoing. The court further held that in camera review could be used to determine whether allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fell within the crime-fraud exception. Before a district court engaged in in camera review at the request of a party opposing the privilege, that party had to present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review would have yielded evidence that established the exception's applicability. The threshold showing to obtain in camera review could be met by using any relevant evidence, lawfully obtained, that had not been adjudicated to be privileged. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
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| Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, No. 88-10,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 22, 1989, Decided
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Overview: A judicial candidate won a judgment against a newspaper for libel after the paper published a story alleging that he acted unethically, lied, and extorted witnesses. The appellate court affirmed. On final appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court applied the correct substantive legal standard in reviewing the action because its opinion ultimately rested on a finding of the paper's reckless disregard for the truth and actual malice. The appellate court properly conducted its review independently of the jury's verdict, and determined that the record supported the finding of actual malice where testimony proved that the paper purposely avoided the truth when it published the story based on the allegations of a single source without verifying her claims against the taped interview of another key source, and that it intentionally ignored the contrary assertions of other witnesses and the candidate's denials. Further, a conclusion of actual malice logically followed the jury's rejection of testimony by the paper's witnesses as to their reasons for failing to corroborate the allegations.
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| Ward v. Rock against Racism, No. 88-226,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 22, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Respondent's rock concert took place in an amphitheater and stage structure known located in city's park. In close proximity was a grassy open area, which the city designated as a quiet area for passive recreations. Just beyond the park were apartments and residences. The city attempted to regulate the volume of amplified music at the band shell so the performances were satisfactory to the audience without intruding upon those using the grassy area or living in the vicinity. The regulation required performers to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by city. Respondent sought damages and a declaratory judgment striking down the guidelines as facially invalid. The district court denied respondent relief and sustained the noise control measures, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the regulation met the demands of the First Amendment. The Court concluded that the regulation was valid as a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of expression because it was content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve the city's legitimate public interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome noise.
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| Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, No. 87-1716,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Respondent Chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee filed suit in district court against petitioner corporations seeking to avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers and to recover damages under 11 U.S.C.S. ¿¿ 548(a)(1)-(2), 550(a)(1). The proceedings were referred to a bankruptcy court, where the judge denied petitioners' request for a jury trial and entered judgment for respondent after a bench trial. On appeal affirming the judgment the Court reversed, holding petitioners had not submitted claims against the bankrupt estate and were therefore entitled to a jury trial notwithstanding the fact that under 28 U.S.C.S. ¿ 157(b)(2) fraudulent conveyance suits were designated core proceedings triable in bankruptcy court, a non-Article III tribunal. The Court found that U.S. Const. amend. VII protected petitioners' right to a jury trial because the suit against them was legal rather than equitable in nature and involved matters of private rather than public rights. The Court acknowledged that jury trials in some fraudulent conveyance actions would impede proceedings and increase expenses, but held that those considerations were insufficient to overcome the clear command of U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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| Stanford v. Ky., No. 87-5765,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 1989, Decided **Together with No. 87-6026, Wilkins v. Missouri, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
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Overview: The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment did not prevent states from imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Finding that the majority of states allowed capital punishment for juveniles aged 16 to 17, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment analysis had to conform to the conceptions of decency that were espoused by modern American society as a whole. The Court found that the analysis was dictated by the language of the Eighth Amendment, which proscribed only punishments that were both "cruel and unusual." The Court also found that it owed deference to decisions of state legislatures and Congress. Holding that the juveniles failed to show a historical or modern societal consensus against capital punishment for 16- and 17-year old offenders through state and federal statutes, the Court found that such capital punishment did not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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| County of Allegheny v. ACLU, No. 87-2050,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, July 3, 1989, * Decided*Together with No. 88-90, Chabad v. American Civil Liberties Union et al., and No. 88-96, City of Pittsburgh v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Overview: Respondents alleged that the display of a creche and a Chanukah menorah in government buildings by petitioners violated the Establishment Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I. Respondents contended that the displays had the effect of endorsing religion. The Court examined whether the display of the creche and the menorah, in their respective particular settings, had the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs. The Court held that petitioners sent an unmistakable message that it supported and promoted the Christian praise to God that was the creche's religious message, and therefore held that the display of the creche was unconstitutional. The Court held that the display of the menorah in its particular setting was a visual symbol for a holiday with a secular dimension. The injunction against the display of the menorah was reversed.
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