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Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 27, 1991
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Harmelin v. Michigan, No. 89-7272,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1991, Decided
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Overview: The inmate claimed that his sentence was cruel and unusual because it was disproportionate to the crime and the sentencing judge was statutorily required to impose it. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality guarantee. In so holding, the Court rejected its prior decision of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). The Court's prior assumption that cruel and unusual included disproportionate punishments was erroneous because, while severe, mandatory penalties might be cruel, they were not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout the nation's history. The clause disabled the legislature from authorizing particular forms or modes of punishment and, specifically, cruel methods that were not customarily employed. What was cruel and unusual was to be determined without reference to the particular offense. A sentence that was not otherwise cruel and unusual did not become so simply because it was mandatory. There was no requirement comparable to the individualized capital sentencing doctrine outside the capital context because of the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties.
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Payne v. Tenn., No. 90-5721,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Defendant argued that the statements of family members of the victims and remarks by the prosecutor during defendant's capital sentencing were highly prejudicial and contrary to the Supreme Court's holdings that such evidence was not admissible. The Court found that the sentencing judge could conduct a broad inquiry, largely unlimited either as to the type of information that could be considered or its source. The Court found that the State had the right to present evidence to counteract evidence presented by defendant, relating to his character and family associations. The Court held that if the State chose to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment presented no per se bar. A state could legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family was relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There was no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence was treated. In so holding, the Court overruled its prior decisions in Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers.
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Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, No. 89-1448,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 1991, Decided
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Overview: Respondent minority shareholders filed suit against petitioners, banks and directors, after petitioners solicited proxies for voting on a merger proposal. In their solicitation, petitioners urged the proposal's adoption and stated respondents would earn a "high" value and a "fair" price for their stock. Respondents withheld their proxies and after approval of the merger sought damages alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78n(a), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1990). The trial court found in favor of respondents and awarded damages. The appellate court affirmed holding that certain statements in the proxy solicitation were materially misleading. The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the knowingly false statements might have been actionable even though conclusory in form, but that respondents failed to demonstrate the equitable basis required to extend the private action pursuant to 15 U.S.C.S. § 78n(a) to them.
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