|
|
| |
Access State and Federal Case Law, plus U.S. Supreme Court cases —
for free!
Click on any of the case links below to view the full text of that case —
for free — through lexisONE®, a legal research and news service from LexisNexis®. Login is required — registration is free!
While viewing the full text of the case, select from upgrade options to Shepardize® or view the fully-featured case on lexis.com including Core Terms, Shepard's® Signals, Case Summaries, Print Options, and more.
lexisONE offers access to comprehensive content and flexible services for faster, more efficient legal research. Review our flexible LexisNexis® subscriptions offered through daily, weekly or monthly research packages.
|
| |
Federal Courts -
U. S. Supreme Court - June 11 - June 18, 2001
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 11, 2001, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Respondent school opened its facilities to activities that served a variety of purposes, including discussions of subjects such as child rearing and of the development of character and morals. However, the community use policy prohibited use by any individual or organization for religious purposes. Petitioner club applied to use the facilities for after school meetings, but respondent denied the request, finding that the proposed use was the equivalent of religious worship. Petitioners sued respondent, alleging free speech violations. The parties agreed that respondent created a limited public forum. On certiorari review, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent. The Court determined that respondent engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it excluded petitioner club from the after school forum. Such violation was not justified by respondent's concern that permitting petitioner club's activities would violate the; the meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by respondent, and open to any student who obtained parental consent.
|
|
| |
|
| |
Kyllo v. United States, No. 99-8508,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 11, 2001, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: The police had aimed a thermal-imaging device at petitioner's residence after a police detective suspected that petitioner was growing marijuana. Based on the thermal-imaging information, police obtained a search warrant for the residence. The lower court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of privacy as he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager did not expose any intimate details of petitioner's life. The appellate court concluded that obtaining information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, such as petitioner's private residence, constituted a search, at least where the technology was not in general public use. Since thermal imaging technology was not in general public use, such a surveillance was a search and was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause without the surveillance evidence was for the trial court to determine in the first instance.
|
|
| |
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, No. 99-2071,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 11, 2001, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: imposed different requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent was the mother or the father. The question before the instant court was whether the statutory distinction was consistent with equal protection. The instant court found that the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one, was justified by two important governmental objectives. The first objective was the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship existed. The second objective was the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent had some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop a relationship that consisted of the real, everyday ties that provided a connection between child and citizen parent. The means adopted by Congress to further its objectives substantially related to the facilitation of a relationship between parent and child. The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process was a real one, and the principle of equal protection did not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender.
|
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 18, 2001, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: At about the time the Vice President of the United States began speaking at a public gathering, respondent protestor raised a banner and walked toward the speakers' platform. Petitioner officer arrested the protestor and shoved him into a van. The protestor sued the officer, alleging excessive force. The district court denied the officer's summary judgment motion on the grounds of qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed, finding that qualified immunity was duplicative in an excessive force case. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed because the inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remained distinct and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The initial inquiry should have been whether the facts alleged showed the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. The next question should have been whether the right was clearly established in the context of the case. In the circumstances presented to the officer, which included the duty to protect the safety and security of the Vice President, there was no clearly established rule prohibiting the officer from acting as he did.
|
|
| |
United States v. Mead Corp., No. 99-1434,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 18, 2001, Decided
View this case - free
|
Overview: Prior to the ruling, the planners were classified as unbound. The court held that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualified for deference when it appeared Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. The ruling at issue failed to qualify, although the possibility that it deserved some deference led the court to vacate and remand. The delegation gave no indication it delegated authority to issue classification rulings with the force of law. There was no notice-and-comment practice at the time, and the Custom Service had regarded a classification as conclusive only as between itself and the particular importer only until advance notice of an intended change was given. Such a ruling could at least seek a respect proportional to its power to persuade under prior case law. Because the prior case law assessment called for was to be made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the Court of International Trade, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
|
|
| |
Back to Top |
| |
|