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| Estate of Chambers, B210500,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: In denying appellant's petition to be declared decedent's sole heir and determining that respondent was decedent's natural son and sole heir, probate court erred in applying preponderance of evidence standard of proof instead of clear and convincing evidence standard, as required by Prob. Code, § 6453, subd. (b), and Fam. Code, § 7630, subd. (c).
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| In re Jason J., D054188,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Biological father was not a Kelsey S. father, and his parental rights were properly terminated under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, without an express finding of unfitness, because he pointed to no evidence that anyone precluded him from establishing himself as a presumed father or that he stepped forward to assume parental responsibilities.
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| Maystruk v. Infinity Ins. Co., B209404,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FOUR, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Insured's complaint failed to allege a violation of Ins. Code, § 758.5, subd. (d)(2), by stating that the insurer paid all of the reasonable costs incurred at its affiliated repair shops but only 80 percent of costs incurred elsewhere; this two-tier coverage was permissible because the reduced rate was not based on the prices of affiliated shops.
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| People v. McNeal, S157565,
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Although evidence about partition ratio variability was relevant in generic DUI cases to rebut the presumption of intoxication in Veh. Code, § 23610, any error in excluding such evidence was harmless as there was significant other evidence of defendant's intoxication and jurors rejected defendant's breath result in considering a per se DUI charge.
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| People v. Sizemore, B200408,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION THREE, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Termination of Proposition 36 supervision was proper after defendant, who had not cooperated with substance abuse testing and treatment, asked to opt out of the program and serve regular probation; when he committed another violation and had probation revoked, a state prison sentence was appropriate under former Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (e)(1).
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| People v. Stuckey, C057782,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT, July 9, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Because Evid. Code, § 730, limited a trial court to appointing experts for the defense when requested before or during trial for purposes of formulating a defense or testifying on a contested fact at trial, defendant had no statutory right to the appointment of a psychotherapist and a drug treatment counselor for purposes of sentencing.
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| People v. Hernandez, A119501, A124474,
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO, July 10, 2009, Filed
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Overview: Placing an armed deputy behind defendant during his testimony, without inquiring whether he was a danger to courtroom security, violated defendant's due process right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the measure carried a grave risk of prejudice by singling defendant out as potentially dangerous or untrustworthy.
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