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| Terry v. Ohio, No. 67,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 10, 1968, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, contending that the weapon seized from him was obtained through an illegal search, under, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. On certiorari the court affirmed petitioner's conviction. The court ruled that despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he made the "stop and frisk" warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at issue, the search satisfied the conditions of: the officer had a reasonable suspicion, based upon his experience, that petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime robbery, and his belief that petitioner was presently armed, dangerous, and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer's "stop" of petitioner and the "frisk," or pat-down, of petitioner's overcoat. Furthermore, the court ruled that the search of the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and to neutralize the danger posed.
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| Pennoyer v. Neff,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 21, 1878, Decided; OCTOBER, 1877 Term
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Overview: This was an action to recover possession of a tract of land to which both plaintiff and defendant asserted title. Defendant claimed to have acquired the premises under a sheriff's deed made upon a sale of the property resulting from a judgment recovered against plaintiff in one of the circuit courts of the state. The case turned upon the validity of that judgment. The lower court found that the judgment was invalid due to problems with an affidavit. On appeal, the court ruled that the judgment was invalid, on different reasoning. Because at the time the action was commenced and the judgment was rendered plaintiff was a non-resident of the state, was not personally served with process, and did not appear, the judgment could not be valid against plaintiff. Because of the lack of personal service, the sale of the property in controversy was not authorized. Accordingly, the decision below was affirmed.
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| Roe v. Wade, No. 70-18,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 22, 1973, Decided
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Overview: Plaintiffs and intervenor appealed directly to the instant Court on the injunctive rulings. The State cross-appealed from the declaratory judgment. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding that abortion was within the scope of the personal liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. This right was not absolute, but could be regulated by narrowly drawn legislation aimed at vindicating legitimate, compelling state interests in the mothers health and safety and the potentiality of human life. The former became compelling, and was thus grounds for regulation after the first trimester of pregnancy, beyond which the state could regulate abortion to preserve and protect maternal health. The latter became compelling at viability, upon which a state could proscribe abortion except to preserve the mothers life or health. The Texas statutes made no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limited the legal justification for the procedure to a single reason --saving the mother's life -- so it could not survive the constitutional attack. This conclusion made it unnecessary for the Court to consider the doctor's vagueness challenge.
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| Kelo v. City of New London, No. 04-108,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 23, 2005, Decided
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Overview: The city approved a development plan that had been submitted by the development agent. The plan called for construction of a waterfront hotel, restaurants, retail stores, residences, and office space; also, portions of the development area were to be used for marinas and for support services. The city authorized the agent to purchase property in the development area or to acquire it by eminent domain. The agent purchased most of the required property, but the nine owners refused to sell. The Court found that the development plan served a public purpose and therefore constituted a public use under the. The plan was not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals. Although the owners' properties were not blighted, the city's determination that a program of economic rejuvenation was justified was entitled to deference. There was no basis for exempting economic development from the broad definition of "public purpose." The Court declined to require a reasonable certainty that the expected public benefits would accrue, nor was it proper to second-guess the city's determination of the boundary of the development area.
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| McNeil v. Econs. Lab., Nos. 85-1332, 85-1398,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, August 29, 1986, Filed
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Overview: The court affirmed a judgment that defendant employer's discharge of plaintiff employee violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),Plaintiff was removed from a sales manager position and offered a non-salaried, commission-based position as a sales representative. The district court's conclusion that defendant's proffered reason for failing to offer a commensurate position was pretextual and was not clearly erroneous because plaintiff's alleged misconduct occurred well in the past and was not included in plaintiff's performance evaluations. The court also held there was sufficient evidence, based on statements by a supervisor, supporting an inference of defendant's intent to discriminate based on age. The court rejected plaintiff's assertions on cross appeal that he was entitled to liquidated damages and front pay. It was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that violation of the ADEA was not willful, a prerequisite for liquidated damages under. The court also held that it was not an abuse of discretion to decline to award front pay until age seventy based on the evidence presented at trial.
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| Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, No. 05-1126,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 21, 2007, Decided
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Overview: The subscribers asserted that the carriers were former local monopolies which engaged in parallel billing and contracting misconduct designed to discourage new competitors from entering their markets through sharing of the carriers' networks. The subscribers also alleged that the carriers agreed not to compete outside their own markets. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the subscribers' allegations that the carriers engaged in certain parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context suggesting agreement, were insufficient to state a claim underof the Sherman Act. To state such a violation, allegations of parallel conduct were required to be placed in a factual context which raised a plausible suggestion of a preceding agreement rather than identical independent action. Further, the subscribers' complaint did not indicate that the carriers' resistance to competitors was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each carrier which was intent on keeping its regional dominance. Also, the alleged anti-competitive conduct of the carriers itself indicated that a carrier's attempt to compete in another carrier's market would not be profitable.
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| Crawford v. Washington, No. 02-9410,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 8, 2004, Decided
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Overview: The state asserted that United States Supreme Court precedent allowed the use of the wife's statement, which arguably controverted defendant's assertion of self-defense, since the wife was unavailable as a trial witness due to marital privilege and her statement to an interrogating police officer had sufficient indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court held, however, that the prior case law erroneously permitted admission of the wife's statement based on the amorphous concept of reliability without taking into account the constitutional requirement of confrontation that the statement be subject to cross-examination. The wife's statement during interrogation was testimonial in nature, rather than non-testimonial hearsay which would be properly subject to evidentiary rules concerning reliability, and defendant's right to confront the wife thus clearly included the right to cross-examine the statement, especially in view of the ambiguity in the statement. The right to confrontation was not a substantive guarantee that evidence be reliable, but rather a procedural guarantee that the reliability of the wife's statement be tested by cross-examination.
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| Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL],
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK, May 29, 1928, Decided
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Overview: The passenger was standing on a platform of the railroad after buying a ticket. A train stopped at the station, and a man ran forward to catch it. When he attempted to board the train in haste, he dropped a package containing fireworks. As a result, the passenger was injured from the subsequent explosion and sought to hold the railroad liable for negligence. Pursuant to a jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the passenger. The appellate court affirmed, and the railroad appealed. Upon final determination, the court reversed the judgment, holding that the passenger failed to prove that the railroad's alleged negligence proximately caused her injuries. Essentially, the court held that under the foreseeability test, it was not reasonable to hold that the railroad's alleged negligence was the cause of the passenger's injuries. Rather, it was the explosion that was the proximate cause, and the railroad could not have reasonably expected such a disaster.
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| Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 21,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1969, Decided
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Overview: Respondent school officials suspended petitioner students from public high school because they wore black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War. Petitioners sued respondents under. The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding the constitutionality of respondents' action on the ground that it was reasonable in order to prevent the disturbance of school discipline. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed because the wearing of armbands was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those that participated in it. Petitioners' conduct was closely akin to pure speech which was entitled to comprehensive protection under the, absent facts that might reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.
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| Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., No. 107,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 3, 1945, Decided
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Overview: Appellee state sought to collect from appellant corporation a deficiency in the payment of contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. Appellee personally served appellant's salesman with notice of the suit and mailed a copy of the notice to appellant's out-of-state headquarters. Holding that the systematic and continuous activities carried on in-state by appellant's salesmen made it reasonable and just to permit appellee to enforce the tax by suit against appellant in the forum, the court affirmed. The court held that in order to subject appellant to a judgment in personam, due process required only that appellant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court also held that a corporation was deemed to have a "presence" in a state for jurisdictional purposes where its in-state activities had been continuous and systematic and gave rise to the liability sued on. The court held that the activity of appellant's salesmen was not only substantial, but also gave rise to the obligation to contribute to the unemployment compensation fund.
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| Lawrence v. Texas, No. 02-102,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 26, 2003, Decided
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Overview: The state appellate court's decision to uphold the Texas law was based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Bowers. In considering the doctrine of stare decisis in the instant case, the Court held that there was no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there were compelling reasons to do so. The Court further held that there were compelling reasons to overturn Bowers. The central holding of Bowers demeaned the lives of homosexual persons. Petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual. Petitioners were entitled to respect for their private lives. The State could not demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. The Court also noted that the reasoning and holding of Bowers had been rejected in other nations, and there was no showing that the United States' governmental interest was more legitimate or urgent.
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| McCreary County v. ACLU, No. 03-1693,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 27, 2005, Decided
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Overview: After the ACLU sued to enjoin the counties' displays of the Ten Commandments in their courthouses, the counties adopted resolutions calling for more extensive exhibits to show that the Ten Commandments were Kentucky's "precedent legal code." Subsequently, the counties revised the exhibits to post new displays entitled the "Foundations of American Law and Government" with the professed intent of educating citizens as to nine documents including the Ten Commandments. The Court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that all of the displays violated thebecause they did not have a secular legislative purpose. The Court rejected the counties' request to abandon Lemon's purpose test or to truncate the Court's enquiry into purpose. The Court held that it was necessary to take purpose seriously under theand to understand purpose in light of context. Therefore, the lower courts properly considered the progression leading up to the counties' third displays in determining that a religious objective permeated the counties' actions. The Court emphasized the importance of neutrality as an interpretive guide to the.
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| Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 2007, Decided¿
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Overview: The student was suspended from school after he refused the principal's direction to take down a banner that he unfurled at a school-sponsored and school-supervised event. The principal directed the student to take the banner down because the banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violation of school policy. The school board upheld the student's suspension. The Ninth Circuit found aviolation because the school officials punished the student without demonstrating that his speech gave rise to a risk of substantial disruption. The Court, however, held that the school officials did not violate theby confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending the student. The Court concluded that the "substantial disruption" rule of Tinker was not the only basis for restricting student speech. Considering the special characteristics of the school environment and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse, the Court held that schools were entitled to take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that could reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.
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| United States v. Booker, (No. 04-104), (No. 04-105),
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 12, 2005, Decided
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Overview: The first defendant's sentence was increased under the Guidelines by more than eight years based, inter alia, on the trial judge's finding that defendant possessed a greater quantity of drugs than was found by the jury. In the second defendant's case, the trial judge made findings that would have added ten years to defendant's sentence, but the judge declined to apply the Guidelines' enhancement provisions. The Supreme Court concluded that its Apprendi and Blakely decisions applied to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; under the, any fact other than a prior conviction that was necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict had to be admitted by a defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,andwere unconstitutional. The Guidelines were effectively advisory rather than mandatory; district courts were required to take the Guidelines into account but were not bound to apply them. Review of sentencing decisions was to be subject to an unreasonableness standard. The Court's ruling was applicable to all cases on direct review.
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| Miranda v. Ariz., No. 759,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 13, 1966, Decided **Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No. 584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February 28-March 2, 1966.
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Overview: The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of three cases, and affirmed the fourth. When an individual was taken into custody and subjected to questioning, theprivilege against self-incrimination was jeopardized. To protect the privilege, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Effective waiver required that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Presuming waiver from a silent record was impermissible.
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| Illinois v. Caballes, No. 03-923,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, January 24, 2005, Decided
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Overview: The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether therequired reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The state trial court concluded that the duration of the stop was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop. The state supreme court concluded that because the canine sniff was performed without any specific and articulable facts to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog unjustifiably enlarged the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog--one that did not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would have remained hidden from public view--during a lawful traffic stop, generally did not implicate legitimate privacy interests. The dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations did not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.
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| Korematsu v. United States, No. 22,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, December 18, 1944, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner challenged the assumptions underlying the order and claimed that when the exclusion order was enacted, all danger of Japanese invasion of the exclusion area had disappeared. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion order under which petitioner was convicted was valid and, thus, upheld the conviction. Because the order curtailed the rights of a group based on national origin, the order was inherently suspect and rigid scrutiny was applied. The Court found that the exclusion order, like a previously upheld curfew order, was intended to prevent espionage and sabotage in threatened areas during war. The exclusion from such an area was closely related to the intent of the order. Moreover, the Court could not reject the judgment of the military and Congress that there were disloyal members of the population who constituted a menace to the national defense and safety. Compulsory exclusion of groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, was inconsistent with the basic governmental institutions. However, the Court held that the exclusion order was justified by the exigencies of war and the threat to national security.
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| Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, No. 85-198,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1986, Decided
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Overview: Respondent alleged that the death of her husband resulted from his exposure to products containing asbestos that were manufactured by petitioner. The district court granted petitioner's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence to negate exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its favor, and the court of appeals reinstated the suit. On appeal, court held that petitioner did not have to adduce affirmative evidence to disprove respondent's claim. The court held that under the court of appeals ruling, petitioner could have never been granted summary judgment unless he could have produced a detailed chronology of the decedent's life and showed that the decedent never came into contact with one of its products. Respondent was in the best position to produce such information; therefore the burden should have rested on her.
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| Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., No. 84-1602,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 25, 1986, Decided
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Overview: Respondents filed a libel suit against petitioners following the publication of two articles portraying respondents as racists. Vacating and remanding the partial grant of petitioners' motion for summary judgment, the Court found that the court of appeals erred in holding that, for the purposes of summary judgment in a libel case, the standard of evidence required to prove actual malice was irrelevant. Because the threshold inquiry on a motion for summary judgment revolved around whether any genuine factual issues existed which could have been resolved in favor of either party, the Court held that the determination of whether a given factual dispute required submission to a jury had to be guided by the same substantive evidentiary standards that applied to the case. Where the libel suit involved a limited-purpose public figure, the Court held that the factual dispute involved the issue of actual malice so that the appropriate summary judgment standard required a determination of whether the evidence in record could support a reasonable jury finding that respondent had shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
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| Strickland v. Washington, No. 82-1554,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 14, 1984, Decided
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Overview: On review by the Supreme Court, respondent contended that his death sentence should have been overturned as the strategic decisions upon which he was advised by his attorney during the guilt and penalty phase of his trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thus violating his right to counsel pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. VI. On appeal, the death sentence was affirmed. In support of its ruling, the Supreme Court held that in order to show that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a death sentence, respondent must have shown counsel's performance was deficient, and that such deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In applying this standard, the Court further held that respondent's counsel's performance could not be deemed unreasonable, and even if such was the case, respondent suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence. In addition, in failing to make a showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance, respondent also failed to show that his sentencing proceeding was fundamentally unfair.
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| Marbury v. Madison,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, February 24, 1803, Decided
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Overview: The applicant and two others contended that the late President of the United States had nominated them to the Senate and that the Senate had advised and consented to their appointments as justices of the peace. The commissions were signed by the late President and the seal of the United States was affixed to the commissions by the Secretary of State. The commissions were withheld from the applicants and they requested their delivery. The Court granted a rule to show cause, requiring the Secretary to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to direct him to deliver to the commissions. No cause was shown and the applicant filed a motion for a mandamus. The Court determined that the applicant had a vested legal right in his appointment because his commission had been signed by the President, sealed by the Secretary of State, and the appointment was not revocable. The Court found that because the applicant had a legal title to the office, the laws afforded him a remedy. However, the Court held that ¿ 13 of the Act of 1789, giving the Court authority to issue writs of mandamus to an officer, was contrary to the Constitution as an act of original jurisdiction, and therefore void.
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| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., No. 92-102,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, June 28, 1993, Decided
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Overview: The summary judgment was reversed where expert opinions were admissible to show respondent's drug caused birth defects despite the fact that the experts' analysis had not been published or subject to peer review. Petitioners were children with serious birth defects. Their parents alleged that the mothers' ingestion of respondent's drug caused defects. Respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, supported by proof that the drug did not cause defects. Petitioners responded with expert opinions that the drug did cause defects. The opinions were based on a reanalysis of previously published studies stating the drug did not cause defects. The trial court granted respondent's motion, holding petitioners' scientific evidence was inadmissible because the reanalyzed studies were not reliable where they had not been published. Petitioners appealed. The Court vacated and remanded, holding that a technique upon which an expert opinion was based did not have to be generally accepted as reliable as a precondition to the opinion's admission as long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the federal evidence rules were met.
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| Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 1, 1989, Decided
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Overview: Defendant employer appealed a judgment in favor of plaintiff employee in her action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,The courts below held that an employer who had allowed a discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an employment decision could avoid liability by showing by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. However, the Supreme Court held that conventional rules of civil litigation generally applied in Title VII cases, and one of those rules was that parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Court held that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proved that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, defendant could avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff's gender into account.
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| Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., No. 97-843,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 24, 1999, Decided
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Overview: Petitioner brought suit against respondent school district, alleging that her fifth-grade daughter was the victim of sexual harassment by another student in her class. Petitioner claimed monetary and injunctive relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, which held that "student-on-student," or peer, harassment provided no grounds for a private cause of action under Title IX. The Court held that a private damages action could lie against a recipient of Title IX funding in cases of peer harassment, but only where the recipient acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities. Moreover, the Court concluded that such an action would lie only for harassment that was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit. On the complaint, the Court could not say beyond doubt that petitioner could prove no set of facts in support of her claim. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
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| Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, No. 83-2097,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, May 20, 1985, Decided
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Overview: Appellant brought suit against appellee for breach of contract in the Florida courts. The court of appeals reversed the holding of the lower court that Fla. Stat. ch. 48.193(1)(g) (Supp. 1984) granted the Florida courts personal jurisdiction over the appellee. On review, the Supreme Court determined that a party that avails themselves of the protections and benefits of the law of a forum state is subject to personal jurisdiction of that state. The court found that the appellees had entered into a contract and established a substantial and continuing relationship with the appellant, a Florida resident. The court further found that the appellee had fair notice that he might be subject to suit in Florida. The court further found that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process and reversed the holding of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.
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| Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, No. 92-1292,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, March 7, 1994, Decided
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Overview: Petitioners, a rap music group, were sued by respondent, the corporate owner of an original rock ballad, for copyright infringement. Petitioners claimed the song was a parody entitled to fair use protection under the Copyright Act of 1976,. The court below found the commercial purpose of petitioner's parody had prevented it from being a fair use. That judgment was reversed on appeal because the Court found it was error for the court below to have concluded that the commercial nature of petitioners' parody had rendered it presumptively unfair. The Court held that no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either, the character and purpose of the use, or, market harm, in determining whether tranformative use, such as parody, was a fair one. The Court held that a parody's commercial character, which tended to weigh against a finding of fair use, was only one element that should be weighed in a fair use enquiry. Therefore, the court below was found to have given insufficient consideration to the nature of the parody under the fair use factors as set forth inin weighing the degree of copying.
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